An investigation into the market of initial public offerings of shares in the United KIngdom by Strang, James Mark Nelson.
An Investigation into the Market for Initial Public Offerings of
Shares in the United Kingdom.
by
James M. N. Strang
Presented for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
The University of Edinburgh
1998
Abstract
This thesis takes as its subject the market for Initial
Public Offerings (IPOs) of equity securities in the
United Kingdom. The principal aim of the study is to
try to find an explanation for why investments in IPOs
in the UK provide an average excess return to
investors.
Once levels of excess returns have been identified this
study seeks to offer 'stabilisation' as an intuitively
appealing, theoretically sound and practically
evidenced explanation of excess returns in the UK IPO
market.
This thesis then goes on to look at the UK IPO market
in more detail, paying particular attention to the roles
played by sponsoring agents involved in the IPO
process and what impact they have, if any, on
differential levels of excess returns between IPOs. The
economic efficiency of the IPO market is also
addressed at this point.
The final piece of research in this thesis examines the
subject ofmanagement buyout flotations. The aim here
is to provide evidence to support the claim forwarded
that management buyout flotations produce superior
performance to the universe of IPOs as a whole.
The data set used for this thesis is made up all
flotations undertaken in the United Kingdom in the
period from 1989 to 1995.
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Introduction
This thesis concerns itself with the market for initial public offerings (IPOs) of shares
in the United Kingdom. The principal aim at the outset of the project was to try to
provide an explanation as to why initial public offerings conducted in the United
Kingdom appear to produce an average excess return in the order of 10% in the
immediate aftermarket. Evidence to support this statement has been provided by a
number of researchers with Merrit, Howe and Newbould undertaking the first
extensive UK study in 1967.
Obviously, the fact that evidence to attest to this proposition exists in the UK, and
indeed in many other countries, goes in the face of one of the principal tenets of the
Modern Theory of Finance, namely that an investor should not be able to make a
profit by following a trading rule. The evidence presented from all studies carried out
to date repudiates this proposition.
This thesis is organised into eight principal chapters ofwhich the final three contain
the principal research work. In addition to this brief introduction which is intended to
set the scene for the rest of the work, there is a concluding piece that draws together
the findings.
The first four chapters of the thesis are concerned with introducing the vast and
complex subject of initial public offerings. The IPO process is introduced in some
detail along with a number of features salient to it. These include the roles of the
players involved in the flotation and the costs both indirect and direct of obtaining a
listing. The difficult and complex issues of pricing and valuation are also discussed at
some length. A significant amount of time is taken in familiarising the reader with
the dynamics of the market as it is most important that the results presented later in
this thesis can be placed firmly in context in what is a complicated market.
Chapter five contains the literature review. This is also a lengthy piece, purely a
function of the complexity of the issues and the sheer volume of the work written on
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the subject. The major theories are introduced and discussed in this chapter. In broad
overview there are arguably half a dozen main theories advanced to explain the
anomaly of IPO excess returns. Each is discussed at some length. A number of the
theories are based on informational asymmetries between agents in the market for
IPOs.
The principal fundamental research undertaken in this thesis is conducted in three
parts. The work follows the theme of attempting to reconcile the observed
phenomenon with the data at hand while also expanding the work into different, but
related, areas of research.
To that end the first research chapter, chapter six, introduces evidence on a particular
explanation for observed excess returns. This explanation, which involves
manipulating actions by stockbrokers termed 'stabilisation', has not been
investigated to any great degree in the United Kingdom although some work has
been undertaken in the USA. This explanation reconciles the excess returns in the
context of a 'fair game'. In that sense this explanation is broadly in agreement with
the principals of the Modern Theory of Finance.
Evidence is presented in this chapter to show that this explanation would indeed
appear to be valid in a UK context.
Chapter seven contains the results of research on 'signalling'. The notion here is that
potential IPOs attempt to show the underlying quality of the businesses through
appointing advisors of a high quality. By so doing they hope to signal superior
quality and hence reduce risk and levels of excess return in the aftermarket. This
research moves on a step from the work conducted in chapter six where the results
indicate that the excess returns in the UK may be more of a statistical artefact than a
function of a market failure. The notion of the research here is to identify whether,
among the universe of IPOs where we believe underpricing to be caused by
'stabilising' activities, there are differential levels of excess returns as potential IPO
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companies attempt to 'signal' their quality to potential outside investors (and hence
reduce the 'indirect' costs of underpricing and consequently the excess returns).
In this instance this theory is not supported for the data used. 'Signalling' does not
appear to have a differential impact on levels of excess returns in the manner
suggested by the 'signalling' literature.
This chapter then goes on to address the issue of costs of flotation, and in particular
indirect costs. The purpose of this adjunct to the study is to determine if 'smaller'
flotations derive value for money through the appointment of 'high quality' advising
agents. This is found not to be the case. Small flotations appear to incur unnecessary
costs via the use of expensive investment banks.
Chapter eight moves on from chapter seven and examines the phenomena of venture
capital backed flotations. The rationale behind this research is to investigate the topic
of venture capital backed flotations to identify whether the 'due diligence'
undertaken by venture capitalists in their pre-investment evaluation process, and their
subsequent decision to invest, acts as a signal of'quality' to potential new investors
when the underlying company attempts to achieve a listing on the Stockmaket.
After introducing the subject of venture capital, what exactly is meant by it and
recent trends in the UK, the main empirical work attempts to test for the 'signalling'
effect of a venture capitalist on a corporate flotation. The evidence points to venture
capital backed flotations performing better that the universe of IPOs in the medium
term. This study attempts to determine whether any differential effect can be detected
in the immediate aftermarket returns. No such effect is found.
Finally, this thesis concludes with a brief piece drawing together all the work
undertaken in its constituent chapters.
The findings of this thesis can be very briefly summarised as follows. Firstly,
evidence is presented to point to the existence of 'stabilisation' in the UK IPO
market. This may account for the average excess returns found. The further work
undertaken points to 'signalling' via the appointment of highly reputable agents not
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helping to reduce levels of excess returns. In addition, it is found that smaller IPOs
incur additional costs through their use of highly reputable sponsors.
The final result relates to the work undertaken into the market for venture capital
backed flotations. The aim of this piece of research was to determine whether venture
capital backed floats produced superior share price performance in the immediate
aftermarket. No such evidence was found.
The UK IPO market is dynamic. Consequently, a number of features relating to the
market have changed over the time that this thesis covers. While this does not
fundamentally alter the results, the reader should bear in mind that certain elements
of the marketplace have changed over the passing of time. The main changes are
outlined for the reader throughout the thesis.
I should like to take this opportunity to thank the great many individuals who have
assisted me over the years in this project. Firstly, I extend my warmest thanks to
Professor Andrew McCosh and Dr. Peter Moles ofEdinburgh University without
who's support and backing this project would not have been a success. Mr Andrew
Adams and Dr. Seth Armitage also provided valuable help and encouragement.
I also owe a great deal of gratitude to the institutions who have both employed me
over the course of this project and have sponsored the research. I am particularly
grateful to Mr Gordon Anderson and Mr Neil Pirie of Castlelnternational Asset
Management who provided the initial support for the project and to Mr Mike Balfour
and Mr Alistair Currie ofEdinburgh Fund Managers p.I.e. who continued this
support in a way that I regard myself very lucky to have enjoyed.
The many others who have suffered with me over the course of this project are too
many to mention by name. I thank you all for your support and for your inspiration.
Finally, I certify that this work is my own and that all errors of commission or
omission relate to me alone.
Chapter One
1.1 Introduction
When a company grows beyond a certain size it will have to look further than its
founding members for additional finance. A common method of obtaining this
financing is for the company to 'Go Public' and seek a listing on the London Stock
Exchange. This process is a complicated and drawn out one and not one which is
taken lightly by those companies who embark on it. The whole process from
instigation to completion may take two years or more.
A fundamental part of the flotation process involves determining the suitability of the
potential IPO candidate to move into the quoted arena. The criteria that such
organisations ought to have are discussed in this chapter.
Once the decision on the suitability of the company has been made, the complex and
time consuming process of attaining a listing can begin.
Hopefully, this chapter will introduce the reader to some of the fundamentals of the
UK IPO market so that when the fundamental research chapters are reached, the
reader can place the results firmly in context.
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1.2 Motivations for Going Public
1.2.1 Divestments
There are essentially two types of new issue. They are either individual growth
companies or divestments of sub-units out of larger groups. Such divestments may be
floated immediately on exit from the group, such as Zeneca was from ICI, or there
may be a management buyout from the parent (backed by venture capitalists) which
leads to a new issue some two to three years later. Companies have their own reasons
for divesting subsidiaries but in general recent thinking is that non-core activities
which don't meet pre-determined objectives should be disposed off. For instance in
August 1994 the small engineering company Wellman bought a package of non-core
engineering businesses from mini-conglomerate FKI.
The reason FKI decided to divest of certain units was that these businesses did not
meet the organisational objectives of group senior management in that they could not
meet the 10% return on sales criterion that the group management had set for all of
its businesses. In such circumstances selling the business to the management via an
MBO1 who will then sell it onto the market normally two to three years later is
preferred to a trade sale where the endeavours of the incumbent management get
passed directly to the competition.
KPMG Corporate Finance give the following reasons why a company may divest a
part of its business
• It no longer wishes to devote resources to peripheral operations.
• It has assets which can be sold to release capital for other more attractive projects
or to reduce capital.
• Statutory or Regulatory change prevents the business continuing in its current
form.
• It is compelled by poor core business performance to sell profitable subsidiaries
to reconstruct its balance sheet.
• It lacks the resources to realise the growth potential of the non-core businesses.
• There is no succession in a family company.
1
Or indeed via an MBI
2
KPMG New Issues Quarterly Jan-Mar 1992 p7
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• There are differences in opinion among the management which is causing
inefficiency.
1.2.2 Small Growth Companies
There are essentially two kinds of small company which might contemplate a float.
There are the small fast growing companies who need the additional equity finance to
fund expansion and there are the small, low growth 'stagnant' companies who need
funding to finance capital replacement. Only the former really ever trouble the
market as the slow growth 'stagnant' sort rarely engender enough enthusiasm to float
successfully.
Going public is an avenue that nearly all small growing companies must go down at
some stage. The faster they grow the sooner this step is likely to be taken. A time
will be reached when previous sources of finance become unavailable to growing
enterprises. The owners own capital will be exhausted and the banks, who like to
lend against an asset base, will not be willing to lend . It is at this stage that the
company will have to bridge the 'small company financing gap'4 and progress,
possibly by the involvement of a venture capitalist or a 'business angel'. Essentially a
company can grow to a certain point with the backing of the banks and the injection
of capital from the owners. Beyond this point (which is not finite but varies from
business to business dependent on a number of factors) further growth may be
financed by a number of methods.
Venture/Development capital is a route commonly followed by more substantial
enterprises and may be provided from a number of sources such as the recently
privatised 3i. In this arrangement the venture capital provides finance in return for an
equity stake in the organisation (which will be liquidated at a later date, possibly
when the company gains a Stock Exchange listing).
A recent trend which is most worrying is that the venture capital industry is changing
in that there is less and less 'seed corn' capital available. This means that smaller
1
Banks often use 'collateral ratios' when making lending decisions and like to see a profitable track
record.
4
As outlined in the MacMillan, Wilson and Boulton Committees of 1931, 1981 and 1971 respectively
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organisations seeking funding need to find this funding through contacting relatively
scarce 'business angels'. More and more funds are being concentrating in what is
known as the 'development capital' end of the spectrum due in no small part to the
more favourable risk/reward ratio. At this end the lendee is a more advanced business
which requires additional funding for expansion as opposed to funding for start up. In
1989 only 7% by value of venture capital investment was made at the 'seed corn'
level versus 27% in 19845. Other methods of obtaining finance exist. Perhaps the
most common of these was until recently the Business Expansion Scheme6 where by
investors could inject capital into small businesses and obtain a tax benefit from so
doing. However, there remains a problem in financing small businesses. This small
company financing gap has been recognised for many years by at least three
government committees and yet it still remains. However, after a point in the
development of the business there is no alternative to seeking a listing to raise further
funding. A listing provides a means ofwidening the ownership of the company and
allows access to a large pool of long term risk capital (which it is not the task of the
banks to provide) as well as providing an exit route for parties to a venture capital
transaction or the parent company of a group. Equity capital can provide long term
financial stability while reducing reliance on riskier debt based finance.
5
'New Issue Overload', pi7, published by James Capel Ltd, London 1995
6
The scheme stopped on 31/12/93
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1.3 Suitability for Flotation
Perhaps the most significant step a company takes on the way to attaining a listing is
to publish a prospectus. If a company is applying for a listing the prospectus becomes
known as the 'listing particulars' and is then subject to Stock Exchange regulation.
This document lays down what the company intends to use the proceeds of the
flotation for and, among other things, that the directors are responsible to
shareholders for mis-statements in the document. A private company is prohibited
from issuing a prospectus to the public under the terms of sl70 of the Financial
Services Act 1986. It follows that all listed companies are public companies but not
all public companies are listed, (e.g., Virgin) In essence then there are a number of
statutory and quasi statutory terms and conditions which much be met before a
company can attain a listing. These are easy to interpret as they are written in
legalistic form. However, in addition to this there are a number of qualitative criteria
which a company must go some if not all the way to fulfilling if the prospective issue
is to be a success. Satisfying the Exchange's requirements does not mean that a
company is suitable for flotation. In the end the company will have to convince the
investment community of the quality of its business and its prospects. Perhaps most
important of all the company must be able to meet the expectations of it which the
market may come to hold. To that end there are a number of factors that the
prospective new issue's management and its advisors must be aware of.
Management
The management of the business must be sound, experienced and offer sufficient
depth of experience and knowledge of the business concerned to allow potential
investors to put their trust in them. As far as the success of the issue is concerned it
would seem anecdotally that there are three types ofmanagement. Type 2
management, the most prevalent, have solid backgrounds. They are well qualified,
have suitable experience and have run the business successfully enough to get it in a
position where a float can be contemplated. The presence of this type ofmanagement
is not a major concern in determining the success of the float. Types 1 and 3
management do make a difference. Type 1 management are the 'white knights'. Such
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management have excellent track records of providing high returns and as such their
existence acts as a plus factor to the perception of the success of the issue7. Type 3
management could be characterised as having 'skeletons in the cupboard'. The
existence of this type ofmanagement acts to the detriment of the success of the issue.
Ifmanagement have run the business into trouble in the past investors will not be
inclined to back them to do likewise with their money. As well as the abilities and
history of the individuals there must also be a management structure in place which
provides for the proper running of the firm in the best interests of the prospective
shareholders. Perhaps the classic example of the failure of this is Rolls Royce. In the
early seventies the lack of proper financial management at board level and the
consequent bias towards technological development in the face of business risks saw
the company in severe financial trouble. In the light of this and subsequent cases and
in the wake of the recommendations of the Cadbury Committee on Corporate
Governance which reported in 1993, investors like to see the separation of the roles
of executive Chairman and ChiefExecutive as well as the existence of such bodies as
the Audit Committee and the Remuneration Committee. These bodies should be
staffed by a majority ofNon Executive directors. The potential role of the Non
Executive directors is discussed in Cadbury and the City group Pro Ned produces
guidelines for the appointment and responsibilities of the Non Executives. The board
need to understand and fully accept their responsibilities as directors of a public
company, the demands these responsibilities may place on their time and that their
freedom of action may have to be curtailed by the need to satisfy the needs of
shareholders. This factor may be particularly pertinent where a small privately run
company is taken public by its founders and majority shareholders as management.
This is often the case and management in this scenario anecdotally have the hardest




An example of this phenomena is the management of Pillar Properties Ltd who came to the market
in August 1994
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Before a listing can be contemplated the organisation must have a track record which
potential investors can examine before committing funds. In particular, the abilities
of the management to grow the earnings and dividends of the business will be
critical. At the time ofwriting the market was looking for around 12-15% earnings
growth per annum. If the management have not grown the business at such levels in
the past investors will want to know why. There may have been constraining factors
such as a lack of capital committed by a parent company which will be eliminated by
the float. If not investors may require a lower level of earnings growth to be
compensated for by a higher level of dividend. In recent years the track record
requirements imposed by the Stock Exchange have been reduced and brought into
line with those of the European Community. Investors like to see a record of
consistent and increasing profitability over a period. Inconsistent performance which
cannot be explained by extenuating factors will dissuade potential investors from
participating.
Business Outlook
The general factors affecting the business and its market sector must appear
favourable to investors and will effect the timing of the flotation. If there is sudden
news which effects the business directly then the issue will be delayed if not
permanently abandoned. This is fairly rare as the sponsor to the issue normally
spends long enough in due diligence that there is little chance of such a potential
outcome being overlooked. What is more likely is that the market / market sector
becomes less attractive. In the latter part of February 1994 the market corrected quite
strongly after a period of strong outperformance. This caused a number of potential
new issues to be delayed. This may mean that certain macroeconomic factors have a
significant impact on the likely success of an individual issue. For instance at the
time ofwriting the performance of property companies coming to the market was
somewhat constrained by the performance of the UK gilt market. This was due to the
fact that there is a considerable amount of historic correlation between the level of
gilt yields and the yield on property portfolios. At the time ofwriting it didn't appear
that gilt yields were going to move sufficiently to facilitate a move forward in the
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value of property company shares. As such property company new issues were
somewhat constrained. Similarly there may be certain industry specific factors
which would stop a new issue being a success. At the time of writing the food
retailing sector was out of favour as the market polarised into quality and discount
operators. As incumbents fought for market share there was considerable pricing
pressure. It is therefore unsurprising that there were no new issues into this sector in
the period.
In general investors will look for a stable and well diversified business with good
growth prospects and will look to the micro and macro economic factors in the
economy at the time of the float to facilitate the realisation of potential.
Operating Structure
If the organisation is organised in a complex manner some element of rationalisation
may be required before a flotation can be contemplated. If the structure makes the
business to complex too understand for potential investors then some form of
rationalisation should take place. A recent example of how a complex operation acted
against the chances of success of a class of companies can be found in the
Biotechnology sector. Recent years have seen a number of new issues from bio¬
technology companies. These are often small organisations, often spin-offs from
various Universities, which specialise in developing new drugs to treat diseases such
as cancer. The technology involved is complex and difficult to understand. The
combination of the technology which is difficult to understand and the risk of
investing in such a cash intensive industry put many institutions off investing.
Perhaps the sponsors to the issues did all that was possible by circulating easy to
understand guides to the companies? However, even they proved difficult to deal
with. To a certain extent such a problem as was felt by those companies is difficult to
deal with. What is somewhat easier to cope with is the situation where the company
is simple to understand but is just badly run with an inappropriate organisational
structure. This is far easier to rectify and many new issues make a point of re¬




Potential applicants for admission to listing must be aware of the consequences of
substantial relationships with shareholders. If the company has a relationship with a
shareholder who has 30% or more of the voting capital or who is in a position to
control the composition of the Board which could result in a conflict of interest with
its responsibilities to the general body of shareholders it may be considered
unsuitable for flotation. This kind of potential problem can be discussed with the
exchange.
Financing and Financial Controls
Any company intending to enter the market must ensure that it has a strongly
capitalised balance sheet and enough working capital to meet its current and
projected needs. This can sometimes be problematical as organisations which make
disposals pre flotation have to come to terms with accounting convention which
requires the write back of purchased goodwill on the disposal of previously acquired
businesses. The effect of this is to give the balance sheet a somewhat anaemic look at
times. In such cases investors would look to the issue of paper to allow for a
significant reconstruction of the balance sheet to a reasonable level of capitalisation
This financial strength should be augmented by a strong system of financial controls.
While it would be impossible to stereotype the characteristics of companies which
seek a listing, the above criterion should be exhibited by potential applicants if they
hope to proceed to a successful listing.
Potential investors will not look at a potential investee company in isolation. They
will instead examine the company in light of the industry and geographical markets
in which it operates. If, for example, a potential investment is in a cyclical business
(such as steel manufacture of commodity chemicals) then the timing of the flotation
will be all important. Investors will need to perceive that the flotation is taking place
near the cyclical trough.
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Building on the last section, the purpose of this section is to introduce the results of a
survey conducted among British institutional investors and investment analysts by
o
MORI . It provides an interesting insight into the types of characteristics that all
attractive investment opportunities should share. As such it offers an insight into the
characteristics that a potential IPO should have in order for it achieve a successful a
listing.
The sample of British institutional investors was drawn from Crawford's Directory of
City Connections 1995 edition. It included all major insurance companies,
investment trusts, investment management groups, unit trusts and self-investing
pension funds.
The universe consists of 250 investors in the top 400 investing institutions, out of
which 159 interviews were completed. The response rate was 64%. The sum of the
funds managed was 400 billion sterling. Interviews were conducted face-to-face
between November the eighth and December thirteenth 1995.
A total of 256 analysts were nominated for inclusion in the survey. Of these 34 were
untraceable. Consequently 222 were approached and 140 telephone interviews
completed. The response rate here was 74%.
Criteria for judging companies
Investors were asked spontaneously to give the criteria by which they judge
companies. They were then asked, along with the analysts, to choose selected criteria
from a pre-coded list. Financial strength and quality ofmanagement came out as key
criteria. Sample investor responses were as follows9.
High return on capital to allow the companies to generate cash for their own
expansion andpositive cashflow so they can pay the dividends.
8
'Institutional Investors and Analysts in Great Britain', Winter 1995, MORI, London
9
MORI Survey, ibid, p8
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Apartfrom the basic analysis ofthe balance sheet strength and so on, the main and
single most important factor is the management of the company.
The most importantfactor is management. Even ifthe company is in apoor industry
or in a poor position within the industry, goodmanagement can reposition a
company and make it into a successful investment.
Good management is almost essential, particularly in this day an age when ifyou 're
not doing the right thing at the right time, your business will simply notprosper, even
ifyou 're in a growth industry.
The full list of criteria appear below.
Table 1
Source: MORI Survey, ibid, p9
The base consisted of 159 investors and 140 analysts.
In a prompted survey, financial performance and quality ofmanagement came out as
clear leaders is a poll of what factors were considered to most important.
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Evaluating management
Given the importance of the quality and strength of the management in evaluating
companies, it is important to consider how the City evaluates management. For both
analysts and investors the track record is of paramount importance when evaluating
management teams, with over half of both audiences citing this factor. Sample
comments are given below10.
Ijudge management really by its track record - for instance ifthe company is able to
deal well during a period ofrecession. That really is the crux of it - the ability of
management to deal with a series ofproblems.
The record ofthe company in terms ofbeing able to cope with changes in terms of
the demandfor its products and services.
The track record - have they done what they 'd said they '11 do in the past and are they
personally geared to the performance of the company.
One endeavours to identify the track record ofthe managers involved. It's becoming
more difficult as keypeople are moving aroundfrom one company to another so that
the time span in any one particular business is quite restricted.
The full list of responses is as below.
Table 2 (over)
10
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1.4 Investors Perceptions Relating to IPOs
The purpose of this section is to discuss a survey of institutional investors
perceptions of the IPO process in the UK. In some ways it reiterates some of the
points outlined by the MORI survey discussed in the previous section but in addition
it adds a fresh perspective on IPOs in particular.
The study was commissioned by the accounting firm KPMG1'. They surveyed 105
fund managers in the UK who were responsible for managing some 640 billion of
sterling assets. On average each manager had invested in 14 new issues in 1994 (the
year to which the survey data relates) and can be regarded as giving a reasonable
insight into the IPO process in the UK.
As indicated respondents had invested in an average of 14 IPOs in 1994. Twenty per
cent of respondents had invested in fewer than five IPOs, half had invested in
between ten and fifteen and twenty five per cent had invested in more than this
number. A small number (four per cent) had invested in fifty new issues in 1994.
When asked what factors they considered most important when investing, those
questioned provided the following responses.
Table 3
g Quality of Management
g Pricing of the Issue




g State of the market
g Quality of the business
Source: KPMG Survey p2
11
'Flotation Survey Summary Report', KPMG, London 1994
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As we can see, investors rate the quality of the management as the most significant
factor in rating a new IPO. What is quite surprising is that the perceived 'quality of
the business ranks a lowly eighth.
Further to this, investors were read out a list of factors relating to how they would
evaluate each new IPO and then they were asked to rank them. A rank of 5 meant
that the investor considered the factor very important whereas a rank of 1 indicated
that the factor was considered of little significance. Mean scores were then calculated





Source: KPMG Survey p3
As we can see, investors focus in the first instance on price to determine whether they
will get involved in an IPO or not. What is interesting from the point of view of
reputation capital is that the reputations of the sponsors and brokers to the issue rank
fairly lowly at seventh and eighth respectively.
Perhaps the most interesting facet of the study was what it revealed about the time
investment managers took to make their investment decisions. Eleven per cent of
investors took the decision to invest within one hour ofmeeting with the company.
Twenty-one per cent made their investment decision within 2 to 3 hours. Twenty five
percent of respondents took between two days and a week to decide. Few took longer
than this to make up their minds.
25
The study also provided interesting evidence on which factors investment managers
considered important when investing in an IPO. The most important factor identified
was the growth prospects for the company relative to its peers. What is ofmore
interest is that the second highest ranked factor was the proportion of the founder's
equity stake being sold. This adds further weight to the signalling argument






Source: KPMG Survey p4
The only factor considered important by a minority of investors was whether the
company was venture capital backed.
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1.5 Conclusion
This chapter sought to introduce the reader to some of the dynamics surrounding the
UK IPO market. It should now hopefully be clear just how complicated and involved
the process of successfully floating a company on the stock market actually is. There
are a number of issues which must be addressed by the issuing company and its
advisors long before the flotation process can commence. At each stage it is crucial
that the right decisions are made if a successful flotation is to the outcome of the
process.
Some of the issues introduced in this chapter will be built on later in this thesis. In
particular, the issue of valuation and pricing will be revisited continually throughout
the remainder of this study.
This chapter has hopefully given the reader a flavour of some of the issues facing
both IPO companies and those who might seek to invest in them. Some of the many




The aim of this chapter is to build on the reader's understanding of the IPO market
in the UK by introducing and discussing some of the institutional features of the
marketplace and the regulatory environment in which IPOs are conducted.
This chapter builds on the content of chapter one by in the first instance introducing
the various methods by which companies can achieve a stockmarket listing. After
this subject is introduced, the chapter then goes on to further discuss the flotation
process and the role played in the flotation process by the London Stock Exchange.
Obviously, the Exchange plays a vital role in the flotation process and an
appreciation of its role is most important.
By the end of this chapter the reader should be able to place the operation of the UK
IPO market firmly in the context of its institutional environment.
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2.2 Methods ofGoing Public
Companies have a choice of method of flotation ranging from a straightforward
'introduction' of existing shares to the most complex of 'offers for sale'. The choice
ofmethod most appropriate to the circumstances of the firm concerned depends on a
number of factors including costs, regulation, whether or not new money is to be
raised and the company's view of the shareholder profile it thinks most appropriate.
Applicants without shares already listed may bring shares into listing by means of an
introduction, where no real consideration need be given to pricing the shares, or by
methods which are dependent on the value at the offer price of the shares being
12
offered or placed. In summary, the options available are as follows .
Table 1
Value of Shares at the Offer Price Methods Available
Not more than £25m -Offer for Sale
-Offer for Subscription
-Placing (which may be combined with
an offer for sale, offer for subscription or
an intermediaries offer)
-Intermediaries Offer
More than £25m but less than £50m -Offer for Sale
-Offer for Subscription
-Placing (which must be combined with
an offer for sale, offer for subscription or
intermediaries offer)
-Intermediaries Offer
More than £50m -Offer for Sale
-Offer for Subscription
12
Table taken from 'Investment Regulation and Practice', Financial Training Ltd, London 1994 p9-14
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Offer for Sale
In this method shares are offered by the company's sponsor to the general public,
inviting subscriptions from institutional investors and private individuals. The shares
made available may be new shares issued for cash or existing shares held by current
shareholders. Normally, the offer is underwritten in that the sponsoring agent
undertakes to ensure that all the shares are taken up even if the offer is under-
subscribed. In that way the company receives all the money it intended to raise
regardless of the actual take up in the market. In order to pool the risks involved, the
broker to the issue makes sub underwriting arrangements mainly with institutional
investors. Offers for sale are mandatory for offers raising more than £30m, although
part of the offer may be placed. Application forms and the prospectus are advertised
in the national press and are also available from outlets such as high street banks (and
in particular the registrar to the issue). Offers for sale ensure the widest possible
participation by investors and result in the widest possible shareholder base. The
advantages of such a wide and diverse shareholder base must be mitigated by the
additional costs of advertising and promoting such an issue.
Offers for Subscription
This is an offer made on or on behalf of the issuer of its own securities. The company
is issuing new securities direct to the public and keeps all the money raised (i.e.,
there are no underwriters involved). This method is more risky in that there is no
guarantee that the company will raise all the funds which it seeks. This method of
issue is comparatively rare and is favoured in particular by Investment Trusts.
There are two methods by which public offers can be made,
a) Fixed Price Offer: The company predetermines the price at which the shares will
be sold (in conjunction with the professional advisers to the issue and in particular
with regard to the advice of the sponsoring agent) Applicants then apply for the
number of shares which they are prepared to acquire at this indicated price. The
process of setting the price, even in this 'fixed price' environment, in not without
recourse to what the sponsor to the issue believes the market will be willing to pay.
During pre-marketing of the issue the sponsor will conduct some sort of
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'bookbuilding' exercise to determine the level of interest from investing institutions
and what their level of interest is likely to be at a range of different prices. The
consolidation of responses from individual institutions is then used as a major factor
in setting the price which will become the fixed price at which the offer will be made.
13If the price is 'attractive' the issue will be oversubscribed. The company will then
be forced to scale down the actual numbers of shares received by investors under the
offer to take account of this oversubscrition. A second result of the oversubscription
will be 'stagging' profits. The company is normally pleased to see stagging profits as
this generates interest in the company. However, too much stagging may be
indicative of an issue priced too cheaply. If an issue proves to be a 'give-away' the
company is unlikely to be pleased with the quality of its professional advice,
b) Tender Offer: Under an offer such as this the company requires applicants to state
on their applications both the number of shares which they would like to acquire and
the price which they are prepared to pay for them. The company at the centre of the
issue normally specifies a price below which applications will not be entertained.
Once all the applications have been received the company then fixes a single
'striking price' at which the shares are allotted to applicants who apply for stock at
that price or higher. In practice, the striking price is often set a little below the
'equilibrium level' in order to stimulate an active aftermarket.
Comparing the two methods the fixed price offer has the certainty of the sum
received by the company. This method is easy to understand for investors. It also
encourages stags who can oversubscribe the issue when they know the striking price
in advance. The tender offer does not display either of these two aforementioned
characteristics and in addition may be unsuccessful if the company pitches the
striking price at too near what turns out to be the aftermarket clearing price.
Placings
In a Placing new shares or shares of existing shareholders are offered to the public on
a selective basis. A company's sponsor or broker sells the shares to its own client
13
The meaning of 'attractive' will be dealt with in later sections
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base - typically this is investing institutions and private clients - finding purchasers
with whom the shares are then placed. Placings are particularly geared towards small
companies where they have historically constituted the most favoured way ofmaking
an initial offer to the public. Versus an 'offer', a placing is a very low key operation
with less publicity and no widespread advertising. The associated costs are lower but
the shareholder base is less well diversified than would be the case as a result of a
public offer. As the general public is being excluded from the offer the Stock
Exchange has strict rules as to where and when a placing is permitted14. The rules are
designed to allow the issuer maximum freedom in the decision on how to raise
capital while ensuring an equitable distribution of shares and enough liquidity in the
aftermarket to ensure active trading of the newly quoted stock. When a placing is
used as the vehicle for a new issue there a number of rules which apply, such as that
there must be at least one hundred placees. These requirements are outlined below.
Table 2
Money Raised Distribution Requirements
up to £15m Up to 95% of the issue
may be placed by the
sponsor or broker with its
own clients. A least 5%
must be offered to
independent market
maker(s)
At least 100 investors
taking up the placing, [a]
("Placees")
At least one independent
market maker.
£15m-£30m Up to 75% of the issue or
£15m, whichever is the
less, may be placed with
the sponsor or broker with
its own clients. At least
5% must be offered to an
independent market
At least 5 placees for each
£lm placed.[a]






of the issue must be
market by an
intermediaries offer or an
offer for sale.[b]
£30m plus Up to 50% of the offer At least two independent
may be placed. The market makers.
remainder must be
marketed by an offer for
sale. 5% of the placed
shares should be offered to
at least two independent
market makers.
Source: 'Going Public' p9
[a] The first 100 investors may include employees but must exclude all directors and
their associates and any other shareholders interested in more than 3% of the issued
capital prior to flotation.
[b] In an intermediaries offer, all Exchange member firms, other than the sponsor and
the broker, may apply for securities at the issue price to sell to their client base. It is
possible for such an offer to be made in a shorter timescale than a conventional offer
for sale and thus at a reduced cost.
Intermediaries Offer
An intermediaries offer is a marketing of securities by means of an offer by, or on
behalf of, the issuer to intermediaries for them to allocate to their own clients. Such
an offer might typically be characterised by an issue being taken by a stockbroker
who would then pass the shares on to his private clients. There are a number of
regulations which must be adhered to when conducting an intermediaries offer16.
There must be a distribution statement completed by the sponsor or any securities
15
'Going Public', London Stock Exchange, 1992. Note that the various limits do move over time.
16
Yellow Book chapter 4 points 16 to 20
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house assisting with the offer in the appropriate form issued by the Exchange before
consideration of the listing application can be made. Also, a list of the names of and
addresses of the clients of each intermediary to whom securities were allocated may
be required and there are further conditions which must be satisfied where the share
for allocation are for a new issue. Namely, the shares must normally be allocated by
intermediaries to a total of at least 100 persons except where the intermediaries offer
is made in conjunction with a placing. The total number of shares reserved for
allocation to existing holders must be disclosed in the listing particulars. If less than
ten intermediaries apply for securities all must be given an allocation. If ten or more
apply, at least ten must be given an allocation and any consequent scaling down of
allocations must be effected pro rata to each application. The result of the
intermediaries offer must be notified to the Company Announcements Office by the
sponsor before dealings in the securities can begin.
Introduction
Where the shares of a company are already widely held and the proportion held in the
publics hands is sufficient to meet the Exchange's demands the shares may be
'introduced' to the market. In an introduction no money is raised from the public
either for the company or for major shareholders. The Stock Exchange does n't
normally permit an introduction if a company has offered securities within a period
prior to it coming to the market or if there is an intention by shareholders to dispose
of shares on float. As no shares are issued and no money raised there are no
advertising or underwriting costs for the company to bear. That being the case this
method of float is the cheapest of the potential methods.
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2.3 The Role of the Exchange
The London International Stock Exchange is empowered to exercise the functions of
the 'Competent Authority' for listing in the UK under part IV of the Financial
Services Act 1986 and also has responsibility for the Alternative Investment Market
(which superseded Unlisted Securities Market). The Exchange's aim is to regulate
listing and to facilitate capital raising by companies while ensuring that investors are
protected and can have confidence in the market. These aims are achieved by
ensuring that;
a) Companies have a record of trading under their present management and that the
information disclosed about their history, prospects and financial condition presents a
reasonable basis for investors to reach an informed investment decision.
b) Offer of securities take place on a fair and open basis allowing public access
wherever appropriate.
c) Shares are freely transferable and widely distributed in order to promote trading
and marketability.
d) Investors are treated with proper consideration at all times by company boards,
even though the public may only represent a minority of the shareholders.
e) Company information is disclosed in such a way that all investors have equal
access and an orderly market can be maintained.
The Stock Exchange has three principal roles. It facilitates raising capital by means
of sale of securities in the 'new issues' or 'primary market'. It provides a means
whereby interests in capital can be bought and sold in a trading market. Finally, it is
responsible for ensuring that the settlement of transactions is carried out in an
efficient and secure manner.
During the period covered by the empirical data used in this thesis there were two
markets onto which shares could be listed in the UK. These were the 'Official List'
and the USM. It was also possible to gain a listing via meeting the requirements of
s535 of the Companies Act. The USM was introduced to cater for the needs of
smaller companies and in an attempt to mitigate the problem of the observed 'small
company' financing gap. It was hoped at its inception that companies listed on the
USM would progress onto a main market listing. However, the actual numbers of
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companies making the transition proved to be disappointing. The Stock Exchange,
fearful of the apparent failure of the USM (as indicated by the increasing average size
of each new applicant) led to a rethink on how best to cope with the small company
financing gap. In the first instance, this led to the creation of the 'Third Market'
which was designed to fall into place behind the USM. Admission to the 'Third
Market' was open to companies which had established genuine trading operations but
which did n't generally satisfy the USM entry classifications. The Quotations
Department does not subject the prospective issues to the exacting listing
requirements ofUSM issues. The Third Market is, however, now defunct, due to lack
of interest. At the end of March 1994 the Stock Exchange considered the merits of
introducing a new small company market to try an offer a better solution to the
observed problem than had in the past been offered by the USM and the Third
Market. These discussions led to the creation of the Alternative Investment Market
(AIM) which commenced operation in mid 1995. However, the two markets onto
which shares listed over the empirical study period used in this thesis were the
Official List and the USM. Details relating to them are listed below.
1. The Official List: This is the oldest and most prestigious market for publicly
quoted securities. The origins of the market go back to the early days of the market
when an official list of securities suitable for trading was first kept and displayed on
the market floor. At this time most of the securities traded on the Exchange are
companies which are listed and many others have listed eurocurrency/debt securities.
Listing requirements are set out in detail in 'Admission of Securities of Listing',
known as the Yellow Book, which is published by the Stock Exchange.
2. The USM: The USM was established in 1980 to provide finance to small growing
companies in the UK. It offered a distinctively different regulatory regime in a
separate segment of the market for companies not prepared or able to accept all of
the controls of the Official List. While being significantly less stringent in its
requirements, the USM offered the same capital raising opportunities. The rules for
entry to the USM were set out in the USM booklet which is known as the Green
Book which was published by the Exchange. The specifically designed and less
stringent listing requirements were put in place to cater for companies at earlier
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stages in their development than those on the Official List. As well as the initial
requirements being less severe, the continuing listing requirements were similarly
less onerous. Once the USM requirements had been met each company could make a
decision as to if and when it wanted to move to the Official List.
Table 317
Official List USM
Number of Companies 2,456 352




Average Float Size(2) £28.4m £3.3m
(1) From 1/1/91 to 21/12/91
(2) From 1/1/87 to 31/12/91 (excluding Introductions and Privatisations)
Table 418
Official List USM
Market Cap Minimum £700000 No minimum
Latest Audit not more than 6 months ago 9 months ago
Minimum Trading Record 3 years 2 years
Marketability 25% of equity in public
hands
10% of equity in public
hands
Working Capital Letter Statement made by the
directors that working
capital is adequate.
Sponsors must submit a
supporting letter




Offer for Sale: mini-
prospectus or offer notice
in one national newspaper
A formal notice in one
newspaper-irrespective of
the method of issue
17
'Going Public' published by the London Stock Exchange in 1992, p5
18








Scale rate dependent on
the size of the issue, e.g.,
£6080 for a company with
a market cap of £10m or
£13380 for one with a
£50m market cap
Half the rate payable for an
applicant for listing
Annual Charges Scale rate dependent on
size, - based on the
nominal value of share
capital. For the above
example £4580 v £7880
Flat fee of £1950 for all
companies with market
cap less than £10m. For
larger companies half the
rate payable for a listed
company
As can be seen from the tables above the listing requirements for the USM were
considerably less severe than those for the main market.
As indicated, the USM was replaced in mid 1995 by the Alternative Investment
Market (AIM). AIM is in essence very similar to the USM in terms of it's goals (to
provide access to capital markets for young growth companies). It's structure is
arguably more simple than that of the USM which it replaced and as a function of the
generally less onerous requirements placed on companies who seek and attain an
AIM listing, it is cheaper to attain a listing on the AIM. Regulations on such items as
the length of trading history that the company needs to have are less strict. Similarly,
companies listing on AIM do not need to use expensive City investment banks. All
that is required is that a 'Nominated Advisor' be used. This need not be an
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investment bank but could be an accountancy firm or any other body deemed
competent by the Stock Exchange to act in the capacity.
This has meant that AIM has attracted considerable interest from a number of small
enterprises who (anecdotally) would have been unwilling or unable to meet the
financial and operational obligations imposed under the old USM regime.
At the present day AIM has succeeded in attracting 260 businesses to list. The
combined market capitalisation of the index is around £6 billion. The companies on
the index have also succeeded in raising some £1 billion of new capital. It those
terms AIM has successfully addressed the objectives it sough to at it's inception.
Performance from AIM company shares has been volatile, especially over the period
near the index's inception, but in more recent times volatility has reduced.
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2.4 Conclusion
This chapter sought to build on the framework outlines in the first chapter.
Hopefully, the reader will now have a much fuller appreciation of the London
Markets and their operation. The various different methods by which new listing can
be achieved have been introduced at this stage due to the importance of being able to




This chapter builds on the work of the previous two chapters by introducing, in the
first instance, the roles played by the various different players involved in the IPO
process. It is important that the reader gains an appreciation of the roles played by the
different agents in the IPO process as in a later chapter of this thesis they will be a
fundamental part of some of the analysis work undertaken.
As one would suspect the length of the process and the number of different
professional advisers involved lead to a significant cost being incurred. This chapter
outlines the typical costs of an IPO both in quantum and by cost centre.
41
3.2 The Roles of the Players
When a company comes to the market it will have to enlist the help of a number of
professional advisors. The company will need a sponsor as discussed in earlier
sections, to deal with the requirements of the Stock Exchange. It will also have a
stockbroker to help facilitate easy transactions of shares in the aftermarket. It will
need an accountant to sign off on the accounts which will be incorporated in the
prospectus and it will need a lawyer to help negotiate the myriad of legal issues
which a potential new issue must deal with. Getting this team together, and getting
the right team, is vital if the flotation is to be a success. The advisers can help the
company decide if and when the time is right to launch a flotation and can provide
the advice to make the issue a success. If, however, the team is not right the whole
process can be an unmitigated failure. If the flotation proceeds but goes badly,
anecdotal evidence would suggest that the market takes a long time to forget. In this
time the company may well not be rewarded for strong performance as this image of
being a 'failed flotation' hangs over it. As a flotation takes time it makes sense to
appoint the advisers at an early stage.
In days gone by this process was dominated by the incumbent advisers (lawyers and
accountants) automatically being appointed and these individuals recommending
sponsors. However, in more recent times it has become common place for 'beauty
parades' to take place where there is intense competition between professional
service organisations to act in advisory roles during corporate flotations. Competition
is based on value for money and potential corporate clients demand high quality
service at an extremely competitive price and they want to enter into long term
corporate relationships with these advisers. This may mean that the auditors are
replaced as the reporting accountants and the company's lawyers are replaced as
solicitors to the issue.
The Sponsor
The Role of the Sponsor
It days gone by it used to be a requirement of listing that every new applicant for
listing appoint a sponsoring agent who was a member of the Stock Exchange. This is
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no longer a requirement. Instead Chapter 2 of the Yellow Book requires the
appointment of an approved sponsor or a listing agent under certain specified
circumstances. These are
1. For all issues which involve the issuance of listing particulars.
2. Where the listing rules require specific matters to be reported on by the sponsor
to the Exchange and ...
3. Where there has been a breech in the listing rules and the Exchange thinks the
appointment of a sponsor would be in the interests of the investors.
Issuers are encouraged to retain a sponsor on a continuing basis but this is in no way
mandatory. The listing rules recognise that there are certain organisations which are
able to act as sponsors e.g., merchant bankers and accountants. In December 1993
there were 92 sponsors in the UK19 (54 member firms and 38 new sponsors). As part
of the application process the would be sponsor gives an undertaking to the Exchange
that it will fulfil its responsibilities under the listing agreement. The duties placed on
a listing agent are less severe and they are not required to give an undertaking to the
Exchange. It is expected that the listing agents will be corporate brokers, merchant
banks or the lead manager of the relevant issue.
The sponsor plays a crucial role at the time of the flotation and in the period leading
up to it. In general terms the sponsor advises the company on all aspects of going
public from the initial suitability of the company to the specific timing of the issue.
The sponsor may be a member of the Stock Exchange or not (as indicated earlier).
Merchant Banks are frequently involved in large and complex issues but some
companies appoint large stockbroking firms who act in a dual role as sponsor and
broker. The key roles of the sponsor are as follows.
• Assessing the company's suitability for flotation and reviewing its structure and
capital needs.
• Advising the company and ensuring that its board of directors is of a calibre and
structure suitable for a floated company.
• Advising on the choice ofmarket and the method of flotation.
19
Source - London Stock Exchange
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• Drawing up the detailed timetable and co-ordinating the activities of the other
professional advisers.
• Helping to prepare the company for flotation and drafting of the prospectus.
• Pricing and arranging the underwriting of the shares.
• The overall marketing strategy.
The Corporate Broker
If the sponsor is a merchant bank a corporate broker will be appointed. A broker
acting as sponsor normally combines the two roles. The broker will advise on the
prevailing conditions in the market and the potential demand from the investment
community for the company's shares. They will also represent the company in
meetings with private and institutional investors with a view to generating a market
in the company's shares and will give guidance on a wide range of subjects including
issue method, marketing, size and terms of the issue and the pricing and terms of the
issue. The broker also arranges the sub-underwriting and placing arrangements with
the institutions. One of the main responsibilities of the broker is to act as the
principal point of contact between the company, its advisers and the Exchange. The
broker also gives advice on Exchange and listing requirements after the flotation and
plays a vital role in ensuring a liquid aftermarket for the company's stock. The broker
may be an independent company, although integrated securities firms are able to
provide both merchant banking and stockbroking services.
Why smaller companies should use a regional broker?
20
According to Ralph Singleton, a Director of Rowan Dartington , one of the UK's
leading regional investment banking operations, certain smaller company IPOs are
tempted to use a regional broker. Using a regional broker reduces costs for the IPO
company and also may mean that the IPO is treated 'more seriously' than it would be
by a leading City advisor. Realistically, it is likely that the 'top man' from the
regional team will look after the flotation as opposed to one of the more junior
20
Interview with Ralph Singleton, Birmingham, 21/5/95
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members of a large City team. So long as the regional practice has sufficient
reputation with its institutional clients, then using a smaller brokerage may be
advantageous to the issuing company.
The Reporting Accountant
The sponsor normally asks a firm of accountants (who are in many cases the auditors
to the issue) to prepare a 'long form' audit report in order that they can be sure that
the company is in a condition suitable for flotation. This provides a detailed financial
and business analysis of the company, its financial controls, track record, financing
and forecasts. The 'long form' report is not published but acts as a basis for the short
form report which is, in the prospectus. In addition the reporting accountants are
asked to report on the adequacy of the company's working capital needs and to
comment on the accounting policies and calculations used in any profit forecast. The
accountants will be expected to assist in the preparation of a statement of the
company's current indebtedness. Tax planning is an important part of the
accountant's role
Solicitors
The solicitors are primarily concerned with ensuring that all the legal requirements
are complied with both in readiness for the flotation and in terms of information
disclosed in the prospectus. Specific responsibilities include making necessary
amendments to articles of association and drawing up the director's service contracts
and, where needed, re-registering the company as a public limit company. In addition
agreements have to be entered into between the company, its shareholders and the
sponsor. These may include a placing or underwriting agreement and where
appropriate, a tax indemnity. Solicitors are often asked to draw up share options
schemes for the company. In order to safeguard against any conflicts of interest
which may arise, its usual to appoint two firms of solicitors. One acts for the
company and its shareholders and the other for the sponsor.
Other Advisers
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Depending on the type and circumstances of the issue, other professional advisers
may be needed. These may include Public Relations firms, Registrars to maintain
share registers, Receiving bankers who handle share applications in offers for sale
and Chartered Surveyors for any property valuations required.
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3.3 The Costs of Going Public
Going public is a time consuming process which involves the use of a number of
very expensive professional advisers. The choice of issue method depends on Stock
Exchange rules, the cost involved and the likely effect on the performance of the
issue in the aftermarket. For small offerings the placing is the most favoured issue
method due in no small part to the fact that the costs are significantly less than those
for an offer for sale and the majority of issues whose size would permit so under the
Stock Exchange rules are done in this way.
On the date of the Big Bang the Stock Exchange changed its rules to allow placing to
be used for larger issues, £15m in the listed market and £5m for the EISM. Data from
the Bank of England shows that for issues above the old £3m limit the offer for sale
at a fixed price dominated. Above the limit offers for sale by tender were also
popular. The tender method produces more accurate pricing of issues than fixed
priced issues but in order to ensure a buoyant aftermarket a significant element of
underpricing still exists. A company making an initial offering has to pay a wide
range of expenses. Some of these are not affected by the size of the issue, making
smaller issues relatively expensive. Whatever the size or type of the issue the
company is required under Stock Exchange and Companies Act rules to publish a
prospectus setting out detailed information on its financial state (and other matters).
For listed companies these are set out in the listing particulars. Preparing the
prospectus involves considerable work and cost in terms of accountancy and legal
fees. These fees depend on the complexity of the issue and are not entirely related to
the size of the issue. Another cost which is largely fixed is the statutory advertising
costs. The Stock Exchange sets out the minimum advertising requirement. For AIM
issues the Exchange stipulates that a formal notice must be published in a national
newspaper. Although this is regarded as sufficient for a placing the issuing houses
and brokers generally feel that for an offer for sale a prospectus should be published
in a national newspaper (to attract public attention) For the listed market the Stock
Exchange generally requires that the prospectus be published in two national
newspapers. However they make an exception for issues which are within the limits
for a placing, requiring the publication of a prospectus in one national newspaper and
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a formal notice in another. In addition the company frequently advertises its latest
results to encourage demand for the issue. The costs related to the printing of the
prospectus, application forms, allotment letters are related to the size of the issue but
they are also related to the issue method. In a placing, for example, there is no need
for the distribution of application forms and prospectus to the public. Receiving
banks charges are related to the number of applications submitted and the number of
allotments made and are therefore affected as much by the degree of oversubscription
as the size of the issue. In a placing the registration fees are nominal or nil, because
the number of initial investors is much smaller than in an offer for sale and the
registration department of the issuing house often undertakes the initial registration
of allotment letters. Stock Exchange charges for companies seeking a full listing are
based on the market value of the company rather than the size of the new issue.
These costs are disclosed in the Yellow Book. However one major cost which is
based on the size of the issue is the capital duty paid by the company. That part of an
initial offering which involves the sale of existing shares is exempt from capital duty.
The costs of the financial institutions involved in the issue is based on the size of the
issue. The issuing house/sponsor charges commission amounting to around 2% of
the amount raised and there may be an additional fee charged also. The broker to the
issue is paid a fee of 0.25% for arranging the sub-underwriting or placing. Under the
Stock Exchange rules it is necessary to have a broker to the issue to approach the
Exchange if the sponsor is not a member firm. The investing institutions which sub-
underwrite offers for sale receive 1.25% of the gross proceeds as payment. In general
the costs of an issue may be split out as follows. The professional fees account for
roughly a third of the cost, the issuing house a quarter of the total. The other major
components of the costs are the advertising costs and capital duty. The costs of a
typical offer for sale might be in line with the following example.
48
Table 2
Costs of a Typical Offer for Sale of £7.000.000~
£ % of amount raised




Fee (initial plus annual for
total share capital of
£14m)
7,340 0.1
Advertising Costs 98,000 1.4
Printing Costs 30,000 0.4
Extel Fees 1,500 0.0
Receiving Bank's Charges 10,000 0.1
Accountant's Fees 93,500 1.3






Additional advisers fees 14,000 0.2
Total 562,340 8.0
The table above quantifies the measurable financial costs to a company of going
public. What it does not measure is the impact of the loss ofmanagement time to the
business as they organise the flotation. Nor does this table indicate the costs of the
'underpricing' of the issue to the company. While the costs of underpricing may be
22
quantifiable at very roughly 10% of the issue proceeds the costs in terms of
21
Taken from Bank Of England Quarterly Report 1990 p535
22
i.e. the price at the close of trading on the first day is likely to be some 10% higher than the price
the issue was floated at.
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management time are much harder to quantify. They are none the less significant.
The direct financial costs of an issue are significant and concern many companies
who contemplate a float. While it is hard to generalise, the following data from
23
KPMG acts as a benchmark for the kinds of financial costs which may have to be
borne.
Table 3
Flotation Costs as a Percentage ofMarket Capitalisation
n 16.13
As can be seen from the graph above, for nearly 80% of new issues the costs of
flotation are less than 5% of the market capitalisation of the company after the float.
33.87
Table 4








'Flotation Survey Summary Report', KPMG, London 1994
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The graph above shows the costs of a new issue as a percentage ofmoney raised. As
can be seen in comparison with the graph of costs as a percentage ofmarket
capitalisation these costs are higher. Only 63% of issues fall within the 5% band and
4.84% have costs greater than 20% of the money raised.
3.4 Conclusion
In this chapter the various roles played by the many players involved in the IPO
process are discussed at length. This is included to give the reader more of a feel of
the complexity of the process and also to put the roles of the agents involved in the
IPO process (which will be important later in this thesis) into perspective.
This chapter also provides a further insight into the costs of flotation. The costs
incurred in the IPO process will also feature in a later chapter of this thesis. The issue
is introduced here to at least partially set the scene for the fundamental research
which appears in chapter seven.
As can clearly be seen, the direct costs are substantial. Any company contemplating a
flotation has to bear these considerable costs. This fact adds more weight to the
earlier statement that the process must only be started when the company has a clear
idea of the advantages it can gain by virtue of having a listing.
In addition to the considerable direct costs, the IPO must bear substantial indirect




This chapter starts by introducing the subject of pricing and valuation of initial public
offerings. The subject of pricing is fundamental to later discussions in this thesis as it
is the share price appreciation from the price set to the price in the aftermarket that
constitutes the excess return that we are seeking to explain.
The pricing process is subjective in its nature and a number of valuation techniques
are used by professionals depending on the circumstances of the underlying entity.
The different approaches commonly used are introduced in this chapter. Also
included at the same juncture is a discussion of the process by which IPOs are
allocated among investors wishing to participate in the flotation process.
The chapter then goes on to introduce some of the observed anomalies surrounding
the pricing, valuation and subsequent share price performance of initial public
offerings. This is included by way of a preamble.
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4.2 Pricing and Valuation
The pricing of initial public offerings is not an exact science. No matter how precise
estimates of future earnings, dividends and cash flows may be there will always be an
element of subjectivity which will influence the decisions of individual investors as
they make their own value judgements. The mis-pricing of IPOs as an explanation of
the observed excess returns is not an all pervasive one. There are a number of studies
which assume 'correct' pricing of IPOs but the issue is worthy of examination in this
thesis. There are a number ofways in which IPOs are valued both in theory and in
practice. This chapter will attempt to provide detail on the methods and the rationale
behind them.
Perhaps the most simple share valuation model is the dividend growth model
advanced by Gordon. There are two components to investment return in equities,
namely capital gains and dividend. To illustrate, if an investor subscribes for a share
at 200p, expects a 20p dividend and expects to sell the share for 220p in a years time
then the return on the equity will be as follows.
Ifwe solve the following for Re (return on equity capital)
200 = 20 + 200 / (1+Re)
1+Re = 240/200
Re = 20%
This implies that the expected value of the shares today will be the dividend for the
year plus the expected future value of the share ex ante capitalised by the discount
rate for equity. Illustratively,
So = (DIV, + SO/ 1+Rg ... Re = DlVj/So +(SrSo)/So
Price(current) = This year's dividend + The estimate of the price in one year / (1 plus
the return required for this equity)
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We can break this simple formulation down further to show that the return on equity
is the sum of the dividend forecast divided by the current share price and the change
in the share price anticipated over the year divided by the current share price. In other
words dividend yield plus capital gains.
A question which must be asked is what determines investor expectation of the share
price in one year. The hypothetical investor who buys the stock in the future is
entitled to some form of capital gain (and the dividend stream associated with
holding the security). In such a scenario the value of a hypothetical share one year
from now can be defined as the dividend expected to be received in the year plus the
capital appreciation expected between year 'one' and year 'two' capitalised by 1 plus
the required rate of return on equity for the period. Bearing in mind the two previous
derivations, it follows that the price of the hypothetical stock today is the sum of the
forecast dividend capitalised by the discount rate plus the forecast dividend two years
out capitalised by the discount rate plus the share price forecast at the end of the
second year capitalised by appropriate discount rate. The general regime holds over
all time periods and as such the value of the underlying security today is the sum of
all the future dividends paid by the entity discounted back to present value. This
derivation is commonly referred to as the 'dividend discount model'. It assumes that
the equity exists and pays dividends into perpetuity. If that is not the case then we
must assume that the entity pays some form of final dividend on termination.
The essence of this approach is the same as one would use in traditional project
appraisal. In 'traditional' NPV analysis we adopt the decision rule of accepting all
projects where the expected sum of net present values is greater than the initial cash
outlay. For a single project firm, that stream of payments discounted back to present
values gives the value of the firm. Where the valuation of shares becomes more
complex is where the firm involves a multitude of projects. In this circumstance, the
amount of information required to fuel a hypothetical dividend growth model is
immense to the degree as to make the exercise almost futile. To follow such an
approach requires massive assumptions to be made on the value of future dividends.
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Such payments will be predicated on future earnings which will in turn be inexorably
linked to the state of the economy. In addition to such general complexities, the issue
is further complicated by the impact on valuations of such events as a hostile take¬
over. It is possible to eliminate some of the potential problems caused by such an
approach by utilising the mathematical properties of a sum to perpetuity. The essence
of such an approach is that it allows us to utilise a growth rate to perpetuity using the
initial dividend payment made by the firm as a basis as opposed to an estimate of
each future dividend. The valuation simplifies to a more appealing formulation. This
is that the value of a share today is simply the expected dividend capitalised by the
anticipated return on equity less the growth rate, (with the obvious caveat that if the
growth rate expected is greater than the anticipated return then the formulation ceases
to work.) This formulation is frequently referred to as the 'Gordon Growth Model'
following the work carried out by Gordon and Shapiro24 in 1956.
The model is intuitively appealing but does make a number of assumptions. The first
such assumption is why use r(e) as the required rate of return? We know from the
work of Fisher and Hiershleiffer that an all equity firm should use the investors
required rate of return as the discount rate on all projects. In terms of returns, there
are only two things the firm can do with its earnings namely either pay a dividend or
reinvest the funds. If the firm is taking the value maximising route it should adopt the
approach which maximises shareholder value. Suppose a firm is trying to decide
whether to pay a dividend of x or to reinvest the money in a taxless environment.
The value to shareholders of dividend x paid at t=0 is simply DIV (the value of the
alternative investment which can be made with the money). The value ofDIV
reinvested in the firm is the present value of the infinite stream of future dividends
generated by the extra investment. At the end of one year the investment ofDIV will
yield earnings ofRDIV ofwhich (1-b) will be distributed and b reinvested. By the
end of year two the earnings from the initial investment will have grown to
RDIV(l+bR) of which (1-b) will be distributed. Therefore, the reinvestment will
generate a stream of dividends which will be valued thus.
24
'Capital Equipment Analysis : The Required Rate of Profit', Management Science October 1959
pi 02-110
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Value of reinvestment = (l-b)RDIV/(l+r(e) + (l-b)RDIV(l+bR)/(l+r(e))2 + ....
which is a series which sums to (l-b)RDIV/(r(e) - bR)
Shareholders will prefer reinvestment when the value of reinvestment exceeds the
value of the dividend i.e.,
(l-b)RDIV/(r(e) - bR) > DIV
Dividing each side by DIV and multiplying by (l-b)RDIV the criterion becomes..
R-bR/r(e)-bR > 1
Hence when R=r(e) the shareholders are indifferent between the two policies and
values them equally. The shareholder prefers reinvestment when R>r(e) and prefers a
dividend when r(e)>R. On that basis the firm will maximise shareholder wealth by
using r(e) as the hurdle rate for investment projects.
Having accepted r(e) as the valid discount rate, what can we say about g, the rate of
anticipated growth? Firstly, it's fair to say that attempting to forecast growth ad
infinitum is a fairly hopeless task. We cannot use the Gordon Growth Model when
g>r(e) as it yields infinite share values. In practice though it is possible to come
across firms which achieve over a period of years very high annual growth rates in
excess of the cost of capital. Thus we must be careful in applying such a model.
However, it is unlikely that rates of growth in excess of the required rate of return
can be maintained. As the firm gets larger and larger it will need to find more and
more projects yielding R to maintain its growth. As the set of available investment
projects is finite the firm will find this increasingly hard to do. The rational firm will
pick the project with the highest rate of return first and then the project with the
second highest and so on. For a firm to find a rate of return R wherever it turns there
must be a constant return throughout the economy but if this the case then this rate of
return must be r(e).
In practice there is some research to suggest that firms do maintain above average
returns for protracted periods of time. We must assume that they do this by
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constraining the reinvestment rate in the long run so that r(e)>bR. However, we can
value firms which achieve super-normal growth for finite periods of time by
integrating a 'super-normal' growth rate model into the standard 'Gordon' model.
In the case of initial public offerings, valuation via the traditional 'Gordon' method is
complicated by a number of factors. Firstly, the firms concerned tend to be fairly
embryonic and have little to go by way of a trading history. Secondly, in many cases
the firms either pay an 'unrealistic' dividend or may even pay no dividend at all. This
may be due in the first case to the firm being relatively well established entity with
an ownership structure such that shareholders found it most tax efficient to take their
profits via 'super normal' dividends. Alternatively, the firm which pays out little or
no dividend may be a management buy-out type organisation which finds itself cash
constrained. Venture capitalists do not normally demand high payouts on normal
equity holdings from their investee companies preferring instead the potential capital
gains from an exit. The fact that where IPOs are concerned there is a distinct lack of a
trading history is another problematic feature. It makes forecasting future dividends
from an examination of the previous payout levels distinctly difficult. Bearing in
mind the problems outlined above its unsurprising to learn that practitioners don't
utilise such theoretical methods in practice.
It would be fair to suggest that, where possible, 'peer group' valuation is the most
commonly used method of valuing initial public offerings in the UK. Where no
obvious peer group exists (such as in the recent flotation of Orange, a cellular
telephone company) different methodology is used. Stockbroking firms are common
exponents of these approaches in the UK. A useful example of where a 'peer group
valuation proved most helpful was in the recent flotation of Macdonald Hotels, a
hotel chain, which was floated in 1996 by SBC Warburg. Not only was it an
interesting exercise in itself but the use of the advisors of the 'Enterprise Value'
valuation parameter introduces a relatively new and worthwhile valuation yardstick.
Enterprise value was first introduced in the USA a number of years ago but has only
recently appeared as a widely used valuation criterion on this side of the Atlantic.
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The essence of the approach is to avoid a number ofweaknesses symptomatic of
traditional inter-firm comparison using the price to earnings (P/E) ratio. The brokers
attempted to value Macdonald with reference to the 'Enterprise Values' of other
similar quoted hotel companies. The merits of enterprise values are discussed
elsewhere but the key to the approach is that it allows for many of the inter company
subjectivities which traditional P/E and earnings growth models fail to account for.
Basically, enterprise value is the ratio of the sum of the market capitalisation of the
company plus any net debt divided by the earnings of the company before
depreciation, interest and taxation. This allows for different capital structures, tax
rates and depreciation policies among peer group members. The merits of such an
approach become immediately apparent when one considers the variety of different
capital structures among hotel companies (which can either issue significant equity to
finance the construction of their assets or, alternatively, use bank debt to finance the
work) Similarly, the different depreciation policies adopted by different entities
creates further problems in terms of cross-comparability. The brokers to the issue




Stock Year Share Market EV/ EV/ Cal 95 Cal 95 Cal 96 Cal 96
End Price Capital
isation
EBIT EB1TD EPS g PER EPS g PER
Forte 1/96 398p 3769m 17.4x 13.2x 26 182 35 161
Friendly 12/94 146p 30m 10.7x 9.5x 152 84 33 70
Ladbroke 12/95 180p 3148m 14.2x 11.2x 2 159 24 137
Stakis 9/95 94p 449m 15.4x 13.lx 12 128 13 126
Macdonald 5/96 145p 85m 12.Ox 11.Ox 14 103 18 96
Source: SG Warburg Securities
What is immediately clear from the table above is that finding a comparable firm is
not an easy task. In the case ofMacdonald hotels the company has few real
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comparables. Stakis has a similar portfolio of hotels but is a much larger entity and
also maintains a gaming business which the stockmarket values quite differently
from the hotels business. Forte and Ladbroke have hotel operations but these entities
are significantly larger than even Stakis and they also suffer from having a multitude
of other operations concealed within them. Friendly hotels is a much smaller
company and is possibly too small to be a viable comparative. We are therefore left
with Stakis as our flawed but acceptable comparative. From the above valuations is
appears that Macdonald is 20% undervalued on PER grounds and about 17%
undervalued on EV/EBIT grounds. However, to be fair we should adjust for the
impact forthcoming relaxation of gaming controls as having at the time on the Stakis
share price. The value of Stakis shares before the speculation set in was around 88p.
From this we can deduce that the premium enjoyed by Stakis is around 10-13%.
Bearing this in mind the target price for Macdonald should be around the 160-165p
level.
The scenario above is a fairly typical picture of the way peer group type valuations
get performed in the UK. However, as previously indicated, it's not always possible
or feasible to utilise this approach in all circumstances. A recent example ofwhere a
different valuation methodology was used was in the flotation of the cellular
communications company, Orange. As there was no real comparable firms available
the approach adopted by the advisors to the issue, ABN AMRO Hoare Govett, was to
utilise a discounted cashflow based approach and to let each individual investor gain
access to a rough theoretical model and to allow them to make whatever adjustments
they felt were necessary to arrive at their valuation.
In circumstances where a lack of any comparable peers precludes any direct
comparisons cash flow modelling is a commonly adopted technique. A common
method adopted is for the firm to be valued as the sum of a short term stream of
relatively forecastable cashflows (discounted back to present value at some
appropriate discount rate) plus the perpetuity value of the next cashflow after the end
of the forecast period where this cashflow is treated as if growing ad infinitum at
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some given growth rate. In many ways this model owes a lot to the Gordon Growth
model already discussed. This approach is sensible in that it takes some of the
inherent subjectivity out of the valuation process but even the most highly rated
brokers analyst is unlikely to be able to look out much further than three years and
place any real credence on the derived numbers. From the individual investors' point
of view the operationalisation of this process is quite straightforward. The exercise
involves looking at profit forecasts and then adjusting for non-cash items such as
depreciation and for any working capital changes, taxation and dividends. The result
of this exercise should be a cashflow forecast which allows this valuation
methodology to be followed.
Essentially, the aim of this model is to provide as much information as possible on
future cashflows before having to resort to the sum to perpetuity. If three years of
future cashflow data is available then the valuation attached to this should constitute
25% of the derived total valuation. Obviously, the choice of discount rate used in the
capitalisation process is vital. Small changes in the rate can have marked effects on
the derived valuation. A preferred way of deriving the appropriate rate is to look to
the CAPM. For the ungeared firm this should provide an appropriate discount rate.
re(I) = Rf+ P(i) [E(Rm)-Rf],
where Rf is the risk free rate, B(i) the firms beta coefficient and [E(Rm) - Rf] is the
market risk premium. For a geared entity it is more appropriate to use the weighted
average cost of capital as the appropriate discount rate. In such circumstance the
appropriate discount rate will be...
re(I) = D/(D+E).rd + E/(D+E).re
In this instance terms D and E refer to the market value of the equity and debt within
the business. Term rd refers to the required rate of return on debt. This will be readily
available but should be somewhere between one and two percent over LIBOR. In this
calculation one would think that the only term over whose value the potential
investor has to make significant judgements is p(i). The remainder of the terms in the
expression should be deterministic. However, recent work on what should be used to
represent the 'equity risk premium' has pointed to quite stark differences in opinion
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among academics. The quantum of the differences (premiums anywhere from 2 to
9%) can obviously make a very real difference to the underlying calculation to
determine the weighted average cost of capital.
This type ofmethodology has been widely used in the UK in industries where
traditional valuation techniques are inappropriate. The pharmaceutical and
technology sectors have been particular beneficiaries of this approach.
Another approach which is popular in certain instances is the 'net asset value'
method. Here the entity is valued against its underlying assets. The most typical
example of this approach is in the property sector. In this instance investors can take
comfort from the professional valuations put on assets by Chartered Surveyors and
can then decide on an appropriate valuation in light of perceived growth.
With the passing of time valuation techniques have become more and more advanced
and should continue to do so. The bio-pharmaceutical industry provides an excellent
example. Organisations in this area are characterised by large negative cashflows
during their start-ups and then large positive cash flows later in their development as
all the research turns into sellable product. Due to this characteristic these firms
valuations are highly influenced by the choice of the discount rate. Conventional
wisdom suggests using a high rate (25%-40%). However, due to the sensitivity of the
final valuation to this parameter, even an educated guess produces a final valuation
which is so subjective as to be spurious. DCF models also require some estimate of
the residual value of the business (as discussed). Residual values are often calculated
on a multiple of final sales (as if the business had been sold on such a basis).
Residuals in the biotech area can account for a very high proportion of the final value
and therefore place a heavy burden on a part of the model which is subject to some
fairly sweeping assumptions.
In the case of pharmaceutical companies we can modify the DCF valuations on an
objective basis. The aim here is to use a more objective discount rate to reflect the
differing likelihood of the various projects producing an income stream. One way of
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achieving this is to use the discount rates forwarded by the US Food and Drug
Administration (FDA). This body produces a list of probabilities linking the stages of
pre-clinical and clinical development to the probabilities of ending up with a






By adjusting the cash flows the model is inherently weighted for the business risk
and then the cash flows can be discounted by the appropriate cost of capital. Models
such as this are an improvement on the simple DCF but still don't get around the
problem of residual values and the applicability of the end result to the value attached
by the stockmarket. To deal with these problems we must go one stage further. For
each product under development peak sales five years after launch are estimated.
These values are then risk adjusted according to the phase of development the project
is currently at. A multiple of the market capitalisation to sales ratio corresponding to
the UK pharmaceutical sector is then applied to this number. The resulting value is
market driven and risk adjusted. The expected research and development spending to
progress the product through to commercialisation is calculated assuming that the R
and D is committed ahead of a decision to pursue or drop a product. The weighting
for each phase of the product's costs is therefore one phase ahead of the product's
revenues.
An example of this approach is as follows,
e.g., A company with a single product for delivery in 1999.
Peak sales Risk Factor Risk Adjusted NPV
600m 65% 150m 53m
Market Value R and D Risk Factor Risk Adj.






This per share value is then adjusted for and net cash held. The resulting value
provides a more helpful, although still not perfect framework.
In the final analysis the process is highly subjective and the judgement plays a major
role. The following section illustrates some of the practical issues relating to IPO
pricing in the UK. In the first instance the perceptions of investors as to how pricing
structures should be determined are illustrated. In the second, how these perceptions
are translated into an offer price by an issuing house are illustrated.
In terms of pricing an IPO, the issue of Cortworth in December 1995 provides an
interesting case. To quote Christopher Price in the FT (17/11/95), 'Cortworth is an
example of classic new issue pricing. Take a solid performing company with a good
track record and reputable management and subtract 10% from the current market
and sector rating. At an issue price of 150p the forecast earnings per share are 12.2p,
giving a p/e of 12.2. This compares with an engineering sector average of 12.8. The
discount and the fact that good demand from institutions allowed the offer price to be
increased, should get off to a good start'.
Indeed, brokers often use a pricing 'matrix' to help them decide exactly where to set
the strike price for a flotation. Such a matrix follows.
The following new issue pricing matrix was obtained from Kleinwort Benson











35 35.88 36.75 37.63 38.50 39.38 40.25 41.13 42.00
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New % % % % % % % % %
Money equity equity equity equity equity equity equity equity equity
(£m) issued issued issued issued issued issued issued issued issued
to to to to to to to to to
placees placees placees placees placees placees placees placees placees
12 34.29 33.45 32.65 31.89 31.17 30.48 29.81 29.18 28.57
13 37.14 36.24 35.37 34.55 33.77 33.02 32.30 31.61 30.95
14 40.00 39.02 38.10 37.21 36.36 35.56 34.78 34.04 33.33
15 42.86 41.81 40.82 39.87 38.96 38.10 37.27 36.17 35.74
16 45.71 44.60 43.54 42.52 41.56 40.63 39.75 38.91 38.10
16.5 47.14 45.99 44.90 43.85 42.86 41.90 40.99 40.12 39.29
New No. of No. of No. of No. of No. of No. of No. of No. of No. of
Money shares shares shares shares shares shares shares shares shares
(£m) issued issued issued issued issued issued issued issued issued
to to to to to to to to to
placees placees placees placees placees placees placees placees placees
12 6.0m 5.853m 5.714m 5.581m 5.454m 5.333m 5.217m 5.106m 5.000m
13 6.5m 6.341m 6.190m 6.046m 5.909m 5.777m 5.652m 5.531m 5.416m
14 7.0m 6.829m 6.666m 6.511m 6.363m 6.222m 6.086m 5.937m 5.833m
15 7.5m 7.317m 7.142m 6.976m 6.818m 6.666m 6.521m 6.382m 6.250m
16 8.0m 7.804m 7.619m 7.441m 7.272m 7.111m 6.956m 6.808m 6.666m
16.5 8.25m 8.048m 7.857m 7.674m 7.500m 7.333m 7.173m 7.021m 6.875m
All data sourced from Kleinwort Benson Securities, London
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4.3 Special Situations in the IPO Market
While the valuation of the stock is obviously of prime importance, there are some
instances where the valuation is of secondary importance to the manager of certain
funds.
Specifically, if a corporate flotation is particularly large, such as in the case of the
recent government Privatisation issues, then another factor comes into the equation.
In the UK the index fund phenomenon has become increasingly prevalent. Index
funds make no attempt to actively manage portfolios of stocks. Their investment
objective is to match the performance of a certain specific index, such as the FTSE
100 Index. Indeed, index funds which mirror the FTSE are the most popular by some
margin. In this circumstance, when an IPO is so large that it would enter the index,
then those index fund managers have to participate in the flotation so that their funds
correctly mirror the underlying index. The problem that many fund managers face is
that while they may be able to secure some stock in the issue at hand, they may not
be able to get enough stock in the inevitable rationing process to match the weighting
of the stock in the index. This very predicament was outlined in an article by Norma
Cohen25.
'For most fund managers, the imminent flotation ofUK Mobile telephone company
Orange requires making a straightforward decision about value and price. Not so
managers of index funds - those who manage a basket of stocks the performance of
which is designed to mimic that of a key index, such as the FTSE. These managers
have little option but to buy, no matter what the price.
From late June (1996), Orange, with a market capitalisation of between £2.2bn and
£2.4bn, will almost certainly be included in the FTSE100 and any fund manager
committed to matching this index will have little option but to own the shares. The
problem is that Orange shares will be scarce: only a quarter of the shares will be
offered to the public.
London Stock Exchange rules have long allowed companies to obtain a listing
provided that they have a 'free float' of at least 25% of their share capital - in other
25
'Not enough Orange to go round', Norma Cohen, Financial Times 11/3/96
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words, that 25% of their share capital is available for trading. The same percentage
threshold applies to inclusion in the FTSE100 Index, which is made up of the largest
UK companies, measured by total market capitalisation. Thus a company with a total
capitalisation of £1,7bn, but with traded capital of only £425m can find itself in the
FTSE.
Last September (1995), Pearson, publisher of the Financial Times, sold its 8.5%
stake in BSkyB, which pushed that company's traded capital just above the 25%
threshold. The stake was placed almost entirely with indexers. While BSkyB shares
have traded for the most part, above the price at which they were issued, passive fund
managers have been less happy about the performance of their shares in National
Grid. Last December (1995) recently privatised regional electricity companies sold
enough shares in the Grid for it to cross the 25% threshold and enter the index. But
the December sale price of 208p has not been seen since. Prices for shares in Orange,
BSkyB and National Grid were arrived at through a 'book building' exercise
designed to reflect actual demand. Without demand from the index funds, one can
only speculate what the share prices might have been...'
For their part, the advisers say it is not in their interest to simply obtain the highest
possible share price. After all, they must approach index fund managers again and
again to buy new issues and antagonising them is likely to backfire. Moreover, they
are required to maintain an orderly aftermarket and setting too high a price could cost
them dearly. However, the issue remains that Index funds, which own an estimated
7-8% of the UK stock market, need to buy new issues to maintain their performance
objectives.
A further 7-8 percent of the market is dominated by quasi-indexers - fund managers
whose strategy requires them to hold a weighting in every share in the index so that
their annual returns do not deviate too far from it. Thus, very little of a company's
shares may be subject to the bargaining between buyer and seller which helps
determine the new issue's price.
'If 15% of the UK market is indexed, that's half ofwhat's available' said Mr Rick
Lacaille, director of structured products at NatWest Investment Managers. The fact
the Orange shares are almost certain to be admitted to the FTSE 100 index...makes
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them '...a pretty safe one-way bet.' This point has not been lost on investment
bankers who are responsible for distributing new shares to investors. 'The problem in
the UK is that the fund management community is more concerned with relative
performance than absolute performance', said one investment banker. 'That is what
causes the real squeeze'. The pre-occupation with performance returns close to the
index, or the industry median, means that even non-index fund managers want more
than anything to buy shares below or at the price the shares enter the index.
68
4.4 Allocation of Shares in an Initial Public Offering
Needless to say, the process of allocating shares in an initial public offering is far
from straightforward. The difficulties stem in the first instance from the fact that the
institution marketing the issue will inevitable generate more interest in the IPO than
there are shares available to allocate. This is an direct consequence of the desire of
the issuer to get the issue away. In 'normal' market conditions and with an issue of
'normal' quality most brokers seem to settle on a figure of 7 out of 10 institutions
presented with the opportunity of getting involved with the IPO actually taking
stock26. The problem that arises is that appetite for each individual varies quite
dramatically over time and across institutions. However, by way of illustration, the
process would work something like this.
The institution would look at its list of institutional corporate clients and would set
up a schedule for visiting them all. The broking institution would know the size of
funds managed by the different institutional clients and from this the broking house
charged with 'selling' the issue will have a rough idea of how much stock each client
might demand if they decided to get involved in the issue. From this process they
will be able to work out the notional maximum demand for the issue. Now the
problem which the broker will have to address is that each individual client will
probably have a different attitude towards the issue in hand. Consequently, the
notional sterling value of each clients interest may not materialise. Similarly, within
each institution, different fund managers may be more or less inclined to get involved
depending on their individual style. Some managers prefer stocks which produce
strong earnings, others those with high asset backing. This complicates matters
further for the issuing house. These complications are further exacerbated by the fact
that if an institution is particularly keen on an issue they will ask for a very large
amount of stock in the knowledge that as the issue is likely to be quite small, they are
unlikely to get the stock that they ask for. This phenomenon means that although the
average issue is only taken by 70% of the institutions shown the company, the
26
Evidence to support this claim was provided by Mr Adam Pollock, Director, NatWest Markets,
London
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average issue is subscribed at least twice, (i.e. institutions ask for twice as much
stock as is actually available)
This situation creates a problem for the broker dealing with the issue. How does
he/she allocate the issue among those institutions? The question is a hard one to get
an answer to. Brokers are reluctant to reveal the formula they use to allocate stock in
the fear that their clients will find out and try to take advantage of the situation.
27
Despite the difficulties, stockbrokers Cazenove and Co . were willing to disclose
privately how the process is accomplished. They used the example of Macdonald
Hotels, a recent IPO which was six times over subscribed. The brokers decided to
allocate the stock to institutions in five bands. These were 835,000, 515,000,
310,000, 125,000 and 60,000 shares. Each client was placed in a band depending on
the amount of regular commission the client placed with the broker in the course of
normal business. Cazenove agreed that the procedure was far from ideal but they
regarded the system as the best way to solve a difficult problem.
This approach was also familiar to Credit Lyonnais, another eminent brokerage. They
intimated that they split the list of their institutional clients into 'divisions' and then
allocated the shares according to the divisional structure.
These has been recent academic work in this area which is of interest. Brennan and
28
Franks examine how separation of ownership and control evolves as a result of an
IPO and how the underpricing of the issues can be used by insiders to retain control
of the entity. Using data from their sample of 69 IPOs undertaken in the UK, they
show that underpricing of the IPO is used to ensure oversubscription and rationing in
the share allocation process so as to allow owners to discriminate between applicants
for shares and to reduce the block size of new shareholdings. The authors also find
evidence that companies subject to a wide degree of dispersion of ownership are less
likely to be subject of a take-over bid in the period up to ten years after the IPO. This
evidence sets the institutional allocation process in somewhat of a different light. It
27
Interview with Antony Mulliner, Director of Corporate Broking, Cazenove and Co. 8/3/96
28
M Brennan and J. Franks, 'Underpricing, ownership and control in initial public offerings of equity
securities in the UK', Journal of Financial Economics Vol 45 1997 p391 - 413
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may be that the client firms have far more of a vested interest in the manner in which
this process is conducted that might be immediately apparent.
71
4.5 The Market's Problems with the Pricing of Initial Public Offerings
As is now clear, the pricing of Initial Public Offerings is difficult. Most new firms
have a relatively short trading history pre-flotation and all have no pre-float price
with which investors can set expectations. If the price is set too low, the issuer does
not get the full advantage of the ability to raise capital. If the price is set too high then
the investor will get an inferior return and may in fact reject the offering. More
significantly, perhaps, sponsoring agents who tried to sell overpriced offers would
soon see their market shares slip. Without accurate pricing the chances of a market
failure are high. This would inevitably lead to capital rationing for new entities which
29
would, of course, be sub optimal. Ibbotson et al intimate that there are three
anomalies relating to IPOs. Namely, the first day returns of 10-15%, the cycles in the
volume of new issues and the magnitude of the first day returns and finally, the long
run underperformance of IPOs. The authors argue that the three anomalies are inter
related in the following way.
Periodic over-optimism by investors creates 'windows of opportunity' during which
many firms rush to the market, which results in disappointing long term returns to
investors as these companies subsequently fail to live up to inflated expectations. In
contrast, firms which issue during low volume periods typically experience neither
high initial price run ups nor subsequent long term poor performance. Moreover, the
patterns intimated are more pronounced for younger, smaller firms than for the more
established.
The best known anomaly associated with the process of going public is the large
initial returns. The literature on IPO underpricing is voluminous and traces back to at
least 1963 from a US perspective. The UK evidence is a few years more recent with
the first real work undertaken by Merritt, Howe and Newbould in 1967. The
phenomena has persisted throughout the 70's, 80's and 90's. Average excess returns
for these time periods has been 9.0%, 15.2% and 10.9%. The cyclical nature of the
29
R. G. Ibbotson, J. L. Sindelar and J. R. Ritter, 'The Market's Problems with the Pricing of Initial
Public Offerings', Continental Bank Journal ofApplied Corporate Finance, Vol 7 No. 1 Spring 1994
p 66 - 74
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volume and initial returns to IPOs is also easy to identify from trend data. Ibbotson et
al note that in their database of IPOs stretching back to 1960 and including some
10,626 IPOs the first-order correlation of initial returns is 0.66 for the 33 year period.
Similarly, the first-order correlation for the volume of issues is even higher at 0.89.
The data on the number of offerings each year and the trajectory of returns generated
is shown below.
Table 3






- No. of Offers
-Ave. Initial Return (%)
Year
Source: Ritter ibid
The authors also identify a number of other anomalies of which we should be aware.
They note that smaller offerings tend to be more underpriced than larger ones. They
examine a sample of 2439 firms which went public in the 1975-1984 period and
derive the following result.
Table 4
Average Initial Returns Categorised by Annual Sales of Issuing Firm
Annual Sales of Issuer Number of Firms Average Initial Return (%)
0 386 42.9
0 - $lm 678 31.4
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$lm - $5m 353 14.3
$5m - $15m 347 10.7
$15m - $25m 182 6.5





The purpose of this chapter was to introduce some of the issues relating to the
complex and difficult task of pricing and valuing an IPO. The reader should now be
aware of just how difficult and subjective the process is.
There are many institutional factors that further complicate this already difficult
problem. These are introduced in this chapter.
The reader will now have an appreciation of how the flotation price is arrived at. This
should add to the understanding when the issue of excess returns relative to this pre¬
determined float price is addressed.
Obviously, the many problems involved in pricing an IPO play a part in the
phenomena of observed IPO excess returns. A number of explanations have been
advanced to try to reconcile the observed results with economic theory. They are




As is by now clear, at some stage in the life of a growing corporate entity it is likely
that it will seek to attract the interests of equity investors. The initial public offering
process has interested financial economists for some three decades. The reason why
this subject has aroused so much interest is that the observed phenomena of abnormal
average initial returns to equity investors in IPO companies is contra to one of the
theories at the heart of the Modern Theory of Finance. The Efficient Markets Theory,
30
first outlined by Flarry Roberts at the University of Chicago in the late sixties,
implies that one should not be able to generate an excess return from following a
trading rule. Research on IPOs shows that the average excess return from
participating in all IPOs is significantly greater than zero. This phenomena has
focused the minds ofmany financial economists to try to find an explanation for the
observed events. As yet no explanation has been put forward in the United Kingdom
or the USA which answers the question unequivocally. This chapter seeks to examine
the theories advanced to date.
30
HV Roberts 'Statistical v Clinical Prediction of the Stock Market' Unpublished paper presented to
the seminar on the Analysis of Security Prices, University of Chicago, May 1967
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5.2 Definitions and Evidence
As a starting point for the discussion it would seem sensible to describe in more
detail exactly what is meant by 'initial excess returns' and to provide more data on
what values for this statistic have been found in the UK and in the USA, where a
great deal ofwork has been undertaken.
The studies listed concentrate on the excess returns generated over a discrete time
period. The length of the time period ranges from one day to thirty days (in the
normal manner for event studies) after the IPO starts trading on the market. Some of
the early work was somewhat constrained by a lack of daily pricing data. The
aftermarket returns for these studies are therefore weekly or monthly and are
consequently somewhat less accurate. Fortunately, with the passing of time data
availability has become much greater and as such most modern studies have the
luxury of daily pricing data. For the purposes of the studies outlined, the absolute
return to equity investors represents the comparison of the sponsor determined
flotation price to the closing middle-market price in any finite time period after the
stock has started trading.
Most, but not all of the studies compare the absolute movement in the stock price to
the movement in some market index (e.g., the FTSE100 in London or the NASDAQ
in New York) to get some feel for the excess return. This is a logical step. Ifwe
assume that the Beta of the IPO firms is unity then any excess return observed over
and above that produced by the benchmark index indicates an abnormal, and
unexplained, return. The use of such 'benchmarking' is common to many studies.
There have been attempts to correct for the assumption of a Beta of unity via some
form ofCAPM based derivative but these models run into as many problems as they
solve. By definition CAPM calculations require the comparison of the market returns
of a stock to the returns of the market itself. This is 'a priori' unobservable. Flence
some form of surrogate for 'risk' as would be measured by Beta is required. A
popular candidate for this is the indicated number of uses for funds raised in the float.
However this criterion is somewhat arbitrary and as such of limited benefit in the
analysis. Index relative benchmarking remains the preferred alternative.
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5.3 Tables of Reported Excess Returns from Previous Studies
Table 1
Review of Indicated Excess
Returns of IPOs (USA)
United States
Author Paper Study Period Indicated Numbe
Published Initial Return Issues
(%)
Reilly and Hatfield 1969 1963-1965 9.6 53
Stoll and Curley 1970 1957-1963 42.4 205
McDonald and Fisher 1972 1969 28.5 142
Logue 1973 1965-1969 41.7 250
Reilly 1973 1966 9.9 62
Reilly 1973 1963-1965 9.6 53
Neuberger and Hammond 1974 1965-1969 17.0 816
Ibbotson and Jaffe 1975 1960-1970 16.8 128
Bear and Curley 1975 1969 12.9 140
Ibbotson 1975 1960-1969 12.8 112
Reilly 1977 1972-1975 10.9 486
Block and Stanley 1980 1974-1978 6.0 102
Neuberger and LaChapelle 1983 1975-1980 27.7 118
Ritter 1984 1980-1981 48.4 325
Ritter 1984 1977-1982 26.5 1028
Beatty and Ritter 1986 1981 - 1982 14.1 545
Chalk and Peavy 1987 1975-1982 21.7 649
Miller and Reilly 1987 1982-1983 9.9 510
Tinic 1988 1966- 1971 11.1 134
Johnson and Reilly 1988 1981 - 1983 10.5 962
Balvers, McDonald and Miller 1988 1981 - 1985 7.8 1182
Tinic 1988 1923- 1930 5.2 70
Beatty 1989 1975-1984 22.1 2215
Muscarella and Vetsuypens 1989 1970-1987 7.1 38




Author Paper Study Period Indicated Number of
Published Initial Return Issues
(%)
Merritt, Howe and Newbould 1967 1959- 1963 13.7 149
Davis and Yeomans 1976 1965- 1971 10.6 275
Buckland, Herbert and 1981 1965-1975 9.7 297
Yeomans
Levis 1990 1985-■ 1988 8.6
Keasey and Short 1992 1984-• 1988 14.0
Holland and Horton 1993 1986-■ 1989 12.8
As can be seen from the results presented above, the average return across all the
studies regardless of the exact methodology is positive in all cases and appears non-
stationary through time.
This non-stationarity is confirmed by the following table.
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The excess return persists through time both in the United States and in the United
Kingdom.
31
Calculated as cumulative excess return from all studies in the sub-sample period divided by the total
number of companies used in the constituent studies for the sub-sample.
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5.5 Theories Presented to Explain Abnormal Returns from IPOs
5.5.1 The Implicit Insurance Hypothesis
The American economist Shea Tinic presented an intuitively appealing argument in
32 r*
his 1988 paper . Tinic, whose empirical evidence came from two sub-samples from
the 1930's and 1960's in the USA, postulated that the observed underpricing of IPOs
was due to the legal risks to the sponsoring (issuing) house ofmis-pricing the deal.
The key to this idea lies in the stipulations of the 1933 Securities Act on the US
statute books. This law essentially opens the issuing house up to liability for deals
which go wrong, and limits the size of potential damages to a multiple of the size of
the initial deal.
Tinic observed that, unlike the issue of equity by quoted stocks, there is little or no
publicly available information available on firms who decide to raise money in the
markets. While there may be at least some financial information about the entity
available, there will be none about the quality of the management and the potential
agency effects of a move from a private to a quoted company. The quality of the
33
management is paramount . The sponsor has a tough job to do to ascertain the
quality of the management but can do so far more economically than individual
investors. The information produced by the sponsor would carry weight with
investors as the sponsor puts its reputation capital at risk. However, beyond the
normal market forces which force the sponsor to obtain accurate information, the
aforementioned Securities Act obliges sponsors to conduct thorough 'due diligence'
to avoid liability for any false or misleading statements in the flotation documents.
Tinic's data concentrates on two time periods, one before the 1933 Act and one after.
He splits the sponsors into two groups, one representing those sponsors with higher
reputations (and consequently with more reputation capital to lose) and one with
12
S. M. Tinic, 'Anatomy of Initial Public Offerings ofCommon Stock' Journal of Finance, Vol 28
No. 4 1988
33
This fact was recently shown in a study undertaken by KPMG. In their 'Flotation Survey Summary
Report' they found that the most prevalent evaluation criterion used by a sample of 105 fund
managers was the quality of the management.
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lower reputations. He found that there was no difference in the level of underpricing
between each group in the pre-193 3 period while the higher reputation sponsors
underpriced more in the post 1933 period as a statistically significant level. These
findings add credence to his argument as higher reputation sponsors have more to
lose by pricing the issue incorrectly and as such underprice more at the margin in
order to minimise on potential legal liabilities. Tinic extended the argument further
by examining the treatment of 'risky' firms (using the inverse of the gross issue
proceeds as a proxy for specific risk).
He found that issues of highly speculative small firms were far less likely to be done
by 'reputable' sponsors post 1933 than pre 1933. This results are intuitively
appealing but flawed. Firstly, it does not explain why the sponsors don't adjust their
underwriting spreads to compensate for risk. However the most damming evidence is
provided by Ritter'4 who found that both 'firm commitment' and 'best efforts' deals
struck in the USA were underpriced to the same extent. If the main reason to
underprice was to mitigate risk then one would expect this not to be the case as in the
'best efforts' case the underwriting sponsor is exposed to less risk. On that basis this
US35 specific explanation can be discounted.
j4
J. Ritter, 'The Hot Issue Market of 1980', Journal of Business 87 April 1984
35
'Best Efforts' and 'Firm Commitment' offers are peculiar to the USA, as is the 1933 Securities Act.
The IPO underpricing phenomenon is world wide.
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5.5.2 Excess Returns Due to Information Asymmetries
One of the more prevalent theories to explain IPO underpricing is the 'asymmetric
information' theory. The two most significant contributors to this literature are
36 37
Baron and Rock . The models advanced are not based on any idea of anti¬
competitive practices among sponsoring banks nor are they predicated on the
existence of intricate schemes of indirect compensation to explain IPO underpricing.
Baron published his findings first. His model indicates that a sponsoring bank has
two major functions. The first is to advise the IPO firm on the issue price, and second
to distribute the issue to investors once the issue price has been set. The underwriting
function provided by the sponsor is assumed to be irrelevant as the issuing firm and
the sponsor are assumed to be risk neutral. In order to provide a worthwhile service
to the IPO firm the sponsor is assumed to have more information about the demand
for the securities being issued than the issuing firm. As the issuing firm can't observe
the effort made on the part of the sponsor to underprice the issue, the sponsor can
minimise its effort in selling the securities. One way to accomplish this is to
underprice the securities. Consequently, the sponsor can trade off any compensation
from not underpricing against the benefits of underpricing in terms of the reduced
distribution effort. Given the scenario outlined above, a certain degree of
underpricing is suggested by Baron.
This explanation seems plausible but has been challenged by the work of Muscarella
38
and Vetsuypens . Muscarella and Vetsuypens examine this informational
asymmetry by comparing the initial returns from 'self-marketed' sponsoring banks
listing on the US markets for the first time with offerings made by other firms who
did not directly participate in the selling and distribution of their own shares. Given
the implications of the Baron model we would expect that the 'self underwritten'
IPOs conducted by the sponsoring banks to exhibit lower levels of initial returns
when compared to the sample of'normal' firms employing sponsors to sell the
16
K. Rock, 'Why New Issues are Underpriced', Journal of Financial Economics, 15 January/February
1986
37
D. P. Baron, 'A Model of the Demand for Investment Banking Advising and Distribution Services
for New Issues' Journal of Finance 37 September 1982
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C. J. Muscarella and M. R. Vetsuypens, 'A Simple Test of Baron's Model of IPO Underpricing'
Unpublished Manuscript, Southern Methodist University 1987
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issues. The evidence presented by Muscarella and Vetsuypens found no significant
difference in levels of underpricing between the two groups thereby placing a shadow
of doubt as to the explanatory power of Baron's model.
Rock's 1986 paper presented a different explanation to the IPO underpricing
phenomenon while remaining broadly within the theme of asymmetric information.
Rock focused upon the information held by two distinct investor groups. He
postulated that the 'informed' held more information than the 'uninformed'. For
Rock the sponsor pricing the issue is regarded as an exogenous factor. Rock
considers a hypothetical issue of unseasoned stock where all potential investors are
uninformed as to the true value of the stock. Investors can, however, acquire
knowledge of the true value of the stock but do so at the expense of incurring
investigation costs. Investors who commit to acquiring such information only
subscribe for shares if the actual true value of the stock (net of investigation costs) is
strictly greater than the float price. In issues where the actual value of the stock is
less than the float price only uninformed investors will be willing to subscribe for the
stock and as such will receive a full allocation. Where the issue is underpriced (i.e.,
the revealed true value to the informed investors is more than the float price) both the
informed and the uninformed investors will apply for shares and there will be
rationing. In this context the uninformed investors are faced with a 'winner's curse'.
They will have a greater chance of being allocated a full quota of shares in an
undersubscribed (and hence overpriced) issue than in an oversubscribed issue. Rock
argues that uninformed investors will only enter the IPO market if their expected
return form so doing is greater than the risk-free rate. To achieve this, he argues,
IPOs must be underpriced. Essentially the logic behind that argument is simple.
Sponsors have to offer securities at a discount to their aftermarket prices in order to
keep the uninformed investors in the market. Rock's analysis indicates that
uninformed investors may be characterised as those who apply for shares across all
offerings in a non-discriminatory manner. He argues that the expected returns from
such a strategy can be proxied by weighting the initial returns by the probability of
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obtaining an allocation of shares. Given the 'winner's curse', uninformed investors
should earn an average return across all issues equal to the risk free rate.
Rock's model offers an interesting explanation to the underpricing phenomenon.
However, like all theoretical models, it is open to criticism. A paper by Keasey and
39
Short evaluates the model and concludes that it rests on a number of conflicting
assumptions and furthermore that it produces propositions which are difficult to test.
Rock's analysis starts from the premise that IPOs are inherently mispriced. From this
mis-pricing, the uninformed investors obtain a disproportionate amount of overpriced
IPOs because the demand of the informed investors for underpriced IPOs causes the
latter offerings to be rationed. Needing the interest of the uninformed investors in
order to ensure that offerings in general are fully subscribed, the issuers underprice
offerings to attract their custom. This raises the question of whether the 'winner's
curse' is to be seen as specific to individual issuers or general to the new issue
market. If it is to be considered a market phenomenon, then the argument suffers
from the classic 'free rider' problem: why should individual investors solve a general
market problem at a cost to themselves? As the uninformed will expect all IPOs to be
underpriced to circumvent their 'winner's curse', it is in the individual issuer's
interest to cheat and not underprice the offering. From a market perspective, Rock's
model does not explain how the equilibrium of underpricing by all issuers is
maintained in the presence of a free rider problem. For Rock's argument to hold, the
existence of a visible agent is required in the form of an investment banker who has
incentives to ensure that the underpricing equilibrium is maintained. However, if the
issuing market is at all competitive, there will be pressures on investment bankers to
be more accurate in their pricing, as firms who are seeking a listing will be unwilling
to bear the costs of initial mis-pricing. Therefore, in the presence of competition,
investment bankers will be unable to pass on the costs of their potential to misprice
via underpricing IPOs. However, their ability to do so lies at the heart of the
'winner's curse' model.
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A second key assumption of the 'winner's curse' model is that there are two groups
of investors, the informed and the uninformed. The listing firm and its advising
agents are both assumed to be members of the uninformed set. The informed investor
is portrayed as undertaking costly investigations and being able to spot and profit
from mis-priced securities. Rock argues that informed investors earn a positive return
which may be seen as 'remuneration for showing where capital should best be
allocated'.(pi 87) However, in terms of the model as Rock defines it, it would be
useful to know why all investors do not become informed as both the informed and
the uninformed are assumed to have the same wealth and utility functions. Its hard to
see how this can hold in the long run given that informed investors earn positive
returns on their investments while the uninformed earn the riskless rate. Similarly, it
would be of interest to know why uninformed investors would consider investing in
IPOs knowing that they can only earn a return equal to the riskless rate.
In addition to the points made above the authors note that the 'Winner's Curse'
model is dependent on the assumption that the issuers are part of the uninformed set.
For Rock's model to hold, the informed investors must have more information than
the issuers for if this were not the case, issuers would not make pricing mistakes
which could be recognised by investors as being profitable to themselves. Rock relies
heavily on the importance of this assumption and offers two reasons for regarding the
issuers as being uninformed.
First, he argues that issuers give up their information advantage by revealing and
certifying their proprietary knowledge to investors in the market, both directly (via
the prospectus) and indirectly (by how aggressively the offer is priced). However,
whilst the firm reveals its proprietary knowledge to the market, this information is
revealed to all participants, both informed and uninformed. Therefore, no
informational advantage need be gained by any group of investors. Moreover, the
firm will be unable to reveal all such knowledge to the market by such direct means
as the prospectus.
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Second, Rock argues that, whilst the firm and its advising agents have more
information regarding the prospects for the firm than any single individual, they
know less than the individuals in the market combined. However, there is no obvious
mechanism to share information when contemplating buying shares in an IPO. The
assumption that the pooled knowledge of the market is greater than that of the firm
and its advising agents would be acceptable once trading has started. However, prior
to commencement of trading in the secondary market, Rock's model does not explain
how the knowledge held by single participants can be transferred to the market as a
whole, especially in light of the explicit assumption than informed investors cannot
sell their private information.
In his model, Rock achieves the consistency between beliefs and actual probabilities
necessary for the existence of an underpricing equilibrium by assuming that the
uniformed investors are sufficiently large in numbers. In his formal proofs of the
conditions pertaining to an underpricing equilibrium, the size of the uniformed
investor set is allowed to approach infinity in the limit and therein may lie a key
difficulty with Rock's analytical model of the 'winner's curse'. If the uninformed set
of investors approaches infinity in the limit, then this implies, given that the
individual unit of demand is bounded from below, that overpriced shares as well as
underpriced shares will be rationed. Furthermore, given the assumed limit placed on
the size of the informed demand the impact of informed demand on the rationing
process approaches zero as uninformed demand approaches infinity. Thus as the
number of uniformed investors approaches infinity in the limit, the bias toward
rationing underpriced issues approaches zero in the limit. Thus, achieving the
consistency necessary for an underpricing equilibrium leads Rock's analysis to
undermine the argument at its core: namely that IPOs are underpriced because of the
'winner's curse'.
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A further recent addition to the literature further undermines Rock's theory. Recent
work by Hanley and Wilhelm40. They present evidence that suggests that institutional
investors capture a large fraction of the short run profits associated with IPOs.
However, the note that this 'favoured status' carries with it a 'quid pro quo'
expectation that institutions will participate in the less attractive offers as well. They
use this finding to add further weight to the thesis that underwriters behave
strategically in their allocation of IPOs. However, this finding also runs against the
intuition of the Rock model where 'informed' institutions use their informational
advantage to avoid overpriced offerings. The finding of this study point to them not
being able to avoid the overpriced offers.
Carter and Manaster41 present a model similar in spirit to the Rock model. Rock
argues that IPO underpricing compensates uninformed investors against the risk of
trading against superior information. In their model, consistent with Rock, the greater
the proportion of informed investor capital participating in the IPO, the greater the
equilibrium underpricing. If investors have scarce resources to invest in information
acquisition, they specialise in acquiring information for the most uncertain
investments. Since informed investor capital migrated to the highly uncertain IPOs,
the underpricing and subsequent price run-ups for these firms are greater.
Underpricing is costly to the issuing firm. Therefore low risk firms attempt to reveal
their low risk characteristics to the market. One way of doing this is to select
underwriters with high prestige. Carter and Manaster present evidence that
underwriter prestige is associated with the marketing of low risk IPOs. Explicitly the
authors examine two hypotheses. These are a) that on average prestigious
underwriters are associated with IPOs of low dispersion of possible firm values and,
b) that on average, prestigious underwriters are associated with IPOs which
experience less of a price run up in the aftermarket.
40
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To test these assertions the authors examine a sample of 501 issues which floated in
the period 1/1/79 to 17/8/83. For the authors, price run up is defined as the price
appreciation in the first twenty days of aftermarket trading. Sponsor reputation is
taken from the positions each of the underwriting syndicated attain on the
'tombstone' announcement made in the financial press42. The authors then ran a
series of regressions to determine if there were any significant relations along the
lines of those hypothesised. The evidence found by the authors for their sample could
not allow either of their hypotheses to be rejected at normal levels of significance.
Studies by Koh and Walter43 and Levis44 test implications of the Rock model. In both
of these studies the initial returns from underpricing of new issues are weighted by
the probability of obtaining shares for applications of a given size. The evidence
from Koh and Walter from Singaporean offerings indicated that the significant
excess returns disappear across all application order levels once rationing is
incorporated into the initial returns. In particular, investors adopting the uninformed
strategy of applying randomly for shares fail to achieve significant initial returns on
average for all order sizes. This result would appear to be consistent with the model
advanced by Rock. The Levis study, which focused on UK IPOs, produces some
evidence of positive scale adjusted returns across a number of application sizes. This
indicated that if Rock's model is correct it only accounts for some of the
underpricing observed in the UK market.
Carter and Manaster45, in their 1990 paper, postulate that the greater the proportion of
informed investor capital participating in an IPO, the greater is the level of
underpricing. Their model is not dissimilar to the Rock model where he argues that
underpricing compensates uninformed investors for the risk of trading against
superior information. In this paper the authors argue that if investors have a scarce
42
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resource to invest in information acquisition, they focus their activities on the most
uncertain investments. Since informed investor capital migrates to the highly
uncertain IPOs, the underpricing and the subsequent price run up for these IPOs are
greater. Underpricing is costly to the issuing firm. Therefore, low risk firms attempt
to reveal their low risk characteristic to the market. One way of doing this is to select
underwriters of high prestige. In this paper the authors provide evidence that supports
the theoretical result that underwriter prestige is associated with the marketing of low
risk IPOs
The model that the authors derive predicts that the price run up for issuing firms will
be less for underwriters with greater prestige. Implicit within this model is the
supposition that investment banking firms choose to develop reputations and that
issuing firms will employ underwriters with a reputation appropriate for the a level
of their IPO.
One economic environment that supports the specialisation of underwriters with
respect to risk levels is similar to that put forward in the Titman and Trueman46
analysis. In this environment, informational asymmetries play a major role. The risk
level of the issuing firm is private information to the firm, and the ability of
underwriters to estimate the values of risk and to communicate it via the issue
prospectus varies with their skills.
Prestigious underwriters are adept at identifying risk. They avoid high risk firms in
order to increase the precision of the issuing particulars, to minimise participation of
informed investors and to maintain their reputation. As a result they charge higher
fees but are able to offer low risk corporate clients relatively low levels of
underpricing. Additionally, the maintenance of relations with low risk firms increases
the expected value of future offerings. Prestigious underwriters earn economic
returns in equilibrium. Non-prestigious underwriters undertake IPOs of those issuing
firms that are unsuitable for their prestigious counterparts. As in Titman and
Trueman, investors are provided information about risk levels and, therefore, the
level of informed investors through the issuing prospectus and the reputation of the
46
S. Titman and B. Trueman, 'Information Quality and the Valuation ofNew Issues', Journal of
Accounting and Economics, June 1986 pi59-172
90
marketing underwriter. Public information about the firm and its risk level is more
precise for issues marketed by prestigious underwriters. Because more prestigious
underwriters charge higher fees while more precisely revealing risk levels, only low
risk firms find it worthwhile to use their services. Even in the presence of higher fees,
the increase in the relative offering price (a decrease in underpricing) makes the
choice of prestigious underwriter worthwhile for low risk firms. This generates a
signal regarding the issuing firm's risk level. Thus, attempts by high risk firms to
signal falsely by employing prestigious underwriters are not beneficial. The
prestigious underwriter will identify a firm's risk level, assess the appropriate level of
underpricing and charge a higher fee than if the firm had gone to a non-prestigious
underwriter. Conversely, low risk firms cannot be lured to the lower fee structures of
non-prestigious underwriters. In order to maintain their investor base, non-prestigious
underwriters must maintain their usual levels of underpricing. The lower fees are not
sufficient to offset the increased costs of underpricing.
There are scenarios that could motivate the development of underwriter reputations.
Investment bankers typically engage in many activities, not merely the underwriting
of IPOs. It is possible that the development of reputation may be to protect the value
of other non-IPO activities. Fortunately, from the point of view of IPO underpricing,
all scenarios that result in underwriter reputations being correlated with risk are
observationally equivalent. The model the authors present allows for the empirical
verification of the following hypotheses.
1) On average, prestigious underwriter are associated with IPOs of low dispersion of
possible firm values.
2) On average, prestigious underwriters are associated with IPOs which experience
less price run up.
The authors sample consists of 501 issues which commenced trading between the
first of January 1979 and the seventeenth ofAugust 1983. The price run up used in
the testing of the second hypothesis concerns the price appreciation in the initial two
week period in the aftermarket.
The first hypothesis was tested using a linear regression model. The standard
deviation of the price run up was defined as the independent variable and the
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reputation variable used as the dependent variable. The model suggests that the
reputation variable provides incremental information about the possible dispersion of
possible firm values. As an examination of its contribution, the reputation variable is
included in the regression with additional control variables.
1. Insider shares: This is the average fraction of the total dollar offering that is
represented by shares being sold by management. The level of share sales by
these individuals is held to convey some information.
2. Offering Size: This is the natural log of the average gross proceeds, in billions of
dollars, of an underwriter's issues. Its been suggested that more prestigious
underwriters are able to market larger offers of equity.
3. Average Age: This is the average of the years of existence of the firms marketed
by the underwriter. A firm's age has been suggested as a proxy for the difficulty
in valuing a firm.
As predicted , the coefficient of reputation is negative and significant. This indicates
that the standard deviation of price run ups were higher for IPOs handled by less
prestigious underwriters. This variable provides more explanatory power than any
other variable in the regression model. However, insider shares, firm age and offering
size all produce significant results. In the multivariate analysis, none of the individual
coefficients is statistically distinguishable from zero. However, the hypothesis that all
coefficients are jointly zero is rejected at the 10% level. Evidently, mutual correlation
among the dependent variable makes interpretation of the regression coefficients
difficult.
Table 4
Regression of the Standard Deviations of IPO Returns on Selected Explanatory
Variables





1 0.455 -0.025 0.262 9.53
(-3.09)
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2 0.376 -0.339 0.175 6.10
(-2.47)
3 -0.045 -0.077 0.245 8.79
(-3.39)
4 0.399 -0.009 0.194 6.77
(-2.60)
5 0.152 -0.004 0.028 -0.051 -0.006 0.226 2.75
(-0.15) (0.13) (-0.80) (-1.23)
Source: Carter and Manaster, ibid
To test the proposition that the price run up is negatively related to reputation, the
sample is divided into two groups, prestigious and non-prestigious. A difference in
means test is then performed for each group. The mean return for the prestigious
underwriter group was 0.1316. For the non-prestigious group the mean was 0.1950.
The means are different at the 5% level.
Therefore the authors successfully extend the Rock model by showing that the
greater the proportion of informed capital participating in an IPO, the greater the
equilibrium price run up. As investors have scarce resource to invest in information
acquisition, they will specialise in acquiring information about the most risky
investments. With a migration of informed capital to the IPOs with the largest
dispersion of possible secondary market values, these firms will experience the
largest price run up. As the price run up is injurious to the issuing firm, low
dispersion firms will attempt to reveal their low risk characteristics to the market.
They do this by selecting high prestige underwriters. To maintain their reputation,
prestigious underwriter only market IPOs of low risk firms. As a result, a signal in
the form of underwriter reputation, is provided to the market.
An interesting adjunct to the literature in the area of information asymmetry has been
put forward by Chemmanur47. He attempts to formalise a popular explanation for the
47
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underpricing of IPOs which is popular with practitioners. This is that underpricing
generates publicity about the IPO and induces investors to learn more about the firm.
This then leads to a runup in the secondary market share price, and consequently is in
the best interests of the firm going public. Chemmanur attempts to formalise this
model by developing a scenario in which underpricing is generated by the desire of
firm 'insiders' to induce information production about their firm. In this model the
organisational insiders have private information about the quality of their firms
projects, outsiders may acquire information at a cost to reduce this information
asymmetry. The firm sells stock in an IPO and again in a second offering, made after
trading begins in the secondary market. Insiders of high value firms are motivated to
maximise outsider information production so that this information will be reflected in
the secondary market price of their firm's equity, increasing it's expected value.
However, since such information production is costly, only a lower IPO share price
will induce more outsiders to produce information. The equilibrium offer price,
which may involve underpricing, emerges from this trade-off.
His model generates implications which are consistent with some of the more recent
empirical work on IPOs. Namely, that IPOs that are oversubscribed to a greater
degree are subject to greater underpricing; that underpricing is greater for those firms
with projects that are harder to evaluate and thirdly that it is often in issuers interests
to price equity in the IPO below the highest price that they can sell and this results in
higher proceeds from the combined primary and secondary offerings.
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5.5.3 Underpricing as a Function of Ex-Ante Uncertainty
American economist Ritter provides a thesis that builds on some of the arguments
presented in the previous section. Ritter notes that the greater the ex-ante uncertainty
surrounding the after-market price in an offering, the greater the amount of
underpricing needed to persuade investors to get involved. The persistent
underpricing noted by Ritter (and many others) does not imply that an investor can
expect to realise excess returns due to the institutional features of the equity markets.
This is mainly concerned with the capital rationing normally symptomatic of IPO
issues. The majority of IPOs are subject to this rationing. If rationing were random
across all issues then there would be no real problem as it would merely mean that
the atypical investor received a smaller percentage of these investments on which
high initial returns were made. However, the rationing process is not random. Also
IPOs are subject to a 'winner's curse' phenomenon (i.e., the investor tends to get
allocated proportionately less of the IPOs which subsequently perform best in the
aftermarket.) In equilibrium investors incurring investigation costs attempt to identify
which of the potential IPOs are indeed the 'best investments' as then these investors
should earn a sufficient return to advocate the incursion of these costs. However, it is
these actions which create the winner's curse for the other 'representative' investors
who have not incurred the investigation costs. Faced with this 'winner's curse'
problem, the representative investor will only submit a purchase order to participate
in an IPO if on average all IPOs are underpriced. The magnitude of the underpricing
and hence the conditional returns is directly related to the level of ex-ante uncertainty
surrounding the issue. Generally, Ritter's argument runs that there is more to lose as
levels of ex-ante uncertainty increase. Consequently, in order to be willing to submit
a purchase order for shares in an offering with greater ex-ante uncertainty, a
representative investor demands that more money be 'left on the table' in an expected
value sense, via underpricing. Ritter attempted to incorporate this uncertainty by
using two measures to proxy for uncertainty.
Firstly, and perhaps more intuitively, Ritter argues that one can use the age in
conjunction with some mix of the price to book ratio and the annual turnover to
proxy for risk. Secondly, he argues that one can look to the standard deviation of
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returns post the flotation (first 20 days) to proxy risk. Ritter regressed initial returns
on the two proxy risk measures for a sample of 545 firms which went public in the
USA in the period from April 1981 to December 1982. The weighted least squares
regression method was used to overcome difficulties with heteroscedastic error
terms. The derived results are included in the table below.
Table 5
Weighted least squares regression - initial return as dependent variable





-0.0268 0.0691 83.578 0.07
(0.0360) (0.0209) (18.561)
Source: Ritter, ibid
The positive coefficients on the independent variables indicate that investors interpret
these measures as positively correlated with ex-ante uncertainty. Of particular note is
the coefficient of 83.578 relating to the inverse of the gross proceeds. This clearly
indicates that smaller IPOs produce higher average initial returns, all other factors
being held constant. The R squared of 0.07 is very low. We would of course
normally associate this with a low level of explanatory power. However, the low
value is in line with what we should expect. A high value would have been
interpreted as the actual initial return on an investment being able to be determined
before the fact. The hypothesis states that there should be a positive relation between
ex-ante uncertainty and initial return. The positive relation is a function of the
difficulties investors face in evaluating the actual initial return from a high risk issue
a priori. Consequently, the low R squared is consistent with the theory. In this paper
Ritter also sought to test a related proposition. He postulated that if the underpricing
equilibrium was enforced by sponsoring institutions with reputation capital at stake
then any sponsoring firm which cheats by underpricing too much must lose
customers (i.e. see its market share decline) or else there would be no incentive not to
cheat. Similarly, if on average the sponsor undeiprices too little average excess
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returns will be too small the investors under the 'winner's curse' will stop doing
business with this underwriter. Ritter used regression analysis once again to test this
theory and was able to conclude that the market did indeed penalise underwriters
who cheat on the underpricing equilibrium.
Ritter found that initial returns were negatively related to sales values and that the
relation of post issue deviation of returns to initial excess returns was of some
statistical significance. The intuition of these results is that the more ex-ante
uncertainty that persists surrounding an issue then the greater the initial excess return
can be expected to be. This results would seem to add credence to the asymmetric
information work advanced by Rock to explain the phenomena.
Further work by Ritter in his 1984 paper revealed that a 'hot issue' market existed for
new issues in which excess returns were significantly greater than the indicated
'normal' excess of around 10%. The evidence found also adds weight to the
uncertainty related explanation. Ritter looked at a 15 month period between January
1980 and March 1981 and found an excess return of over forty eight percent. The
reason for this was probably due to the large number of natural resource firms which
floated in the period. Ritter argues that these firms, which have associated with them
very high risk profiles, led to such anomalously high excess returns. He notes that
underpricing is compensation to investors for the cost of becoming informed (by
performing security analysis). Consequently, the greater the uncertainty surrounding
an issue, the greater the required compensation to investors for the costs of
becoming informed. Logically, therefore, high risk offerings should be underpriced
more than low risk offerings. Indeed this is the intuition behind the Rock model.
Further examination by Ritter revealed that there existed significant differences in the
returns generated by these firms in 'hot' as opposed to 'cold' issue periods.
Interestingly, Ritter found that while the returns of the 'hot' issue time frame IPOs
were monotonic the were also highly non-stationary. Specifically, Ritter found that
the returns of the high risk stocks were highly heteroscedastic. For other (i.e., non
natural resource firms) significant differences in returns on 'hot' and 'cold' periods
were not apparent. In essence the results of this study produce two insights. The
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existence of 'hot' issue markets is interesting. However, perhaps ofmore relevance is
the support for the findings of Rock that ex-ante uncertainty and initial returns are
positively related across issues. The reasons for the non stationary in the returns of
the natural resource firms in the 'hot' period remain unexplained.
An interesting conclusion of the Ritter survey is that it would appear that firms can
'time' their flotations. The concept of relating ex-ante uncertainty to underpricing is
further advanced by Beatty and Ritter48 and by Miller and Reilly49. The proxy
measures used in the Beatty and Ritter study were the number of uses of the funds to
be raised as indicated in the prospectus document and the inverse of the gross
proceeds of the issue. Both of these leading indicators were expected to be negatively
related to the level of underpricing. This relation was found to hold.
48
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5.5.4 Underpricing as a Function ofAuditor Quality
The perceived quality of the reporting accountants and/or the auditors of the firm to
be floated may have some influence on the levels of underpricing of initial public
offerings. The argument advanced by Titman and Trueman50 suggests that higher
quality auditors reveal more information than lower quality auditors and,
accordingly, earn higher fees. On that basis higher quality auditors should mean that
there is less ex-ante uncertainty over the prospects of the new issue. Accordingly,
within the framework ofBeatty and Ritter there should be an inverse relation
between auditor quality and levels of underpricing and the levels of excess returns
should be lower.
Simunic and Stein51 provides some evidence that higher quality auditors advise
larger, less risky, issues. They studied 490 IPOs in 1981 and used a regression model
where a dummy variable coded for 'big 8' or 'non big 8' auditors was regressed
against a number of explanatory variables using a cross sectional model. The
dependent variable, as well as being positively related to the total assets of the
issuing firm and negatively related to its leverage ratio, was also positively related to
a dummy variable valued one for 'firm commitment' issues and zero for 'best efforts'
deals, and to a dummy variable valued one for issues sponsored by 'major'
investment bankers and zero otherwise. Given these results it appears that higher
quality auditors tend to advise issues with lower ex-ante levels of uncertainty. An
interesting feature of the work carried out by Simunic and Stein is the positive
relation they revealed between auditor and sponsor reputations. This relationship is
52further analysed by Balvers at al who looked at 1182 IPOs in the USA in the period
1981-1985. In this study the quality of the auditor was proxied by using a 'big-8/non
big-8' dummy variable. The sponsor quality variable was determined using the
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Hayes method" and the database was coded for sponsors falling into the 'bulge' and
'major' categories. To capture the effect of auditor and sponsor quality, the product
of the binary quality variables described was formed. Regressing initial returns on the
binary quality variables and the interaction variable revealed that the binary variable
was insignificant and negative while the interaction term was significant and
positive. The implication of these results is that as the quality of either the sponsor
or the auditor increases, the impact of the other agent quality variables on the
underpricing diminishes. This view was taken by Balvers et al. to support the view
that the quality of the auditor's reputation helps to signal the quality of the sponsor to
an issue. Therefore, controls for joint effects between the agents to IPOs should be
made in empirical work to strip out the effect each may have on the other. Finally,
more recent evidence of a significant inverse relation between auditor quality and
levels of underpricing was found by Beatty54 in his 1989 paper. He examined 2215
IPOs undertaken in the USA in the period from 1975-1984. He defined the initial
return for a firm going public as the gross return to an investor who acquires a share
and sells at the closing bid price at the close of the first day of dealings. For the
sample indicated the excess return was 22.1%. He used the traditional methodology
employing a multiple regression analysis with auditor quality as a dependent
variable. While he found the general relation to hold he commended to the reader that
there were implicit relationships between the risk classes of the potential IPOs and
the 'quality' of the audit firms, i.e., the less risky firms were more likely to be
audited by the larger accountancy firms (those with the most reputation capital at
stake)
Work on auditor reputation has also been carried out in the UK. As with the studies
carried out in the USA the notion of auditor reputation being used as a signalling
variable is what practitioners test for. The status of the professional advisor to a
flotation could influence the level of the IPO discount in two ways. The use of
'higher quality' advisors could reduce the owner's opportunity to cheat by providing
53
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accurate information to the market. This sacrifice by the managers may be taken to
mean that the owners have some favourable private information about the firm that
they wish to reveal. Also, higher quality advisors with their relatively greater
expertise may be able to forecast the market clearing price with greater accuracy than
lower quality ones. In one UK based study Holland and Horton55 examine a sample
of 230 IPOs which floated in the period from 1986 to 1989 on the Unlisted Securities
Market. They detected a significant relation between the level of the discount and
the 'quality' of the audit firm. Higher quality audit firms were associated with lower
levels of discount. This result is contra to that found by Keasey and McGuiness56 in
57
their 1991 paper and the results of Keasey and Short's 1992 paper . Holland and
Horton argue that it may be due to methodological issues that work previous to their
own has failed to come up with any discernible difference. The authors do conclude
in line with the previously aforementioned authors that there is no relationship
between sponsor discount and the level of IPO outperformance.
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Balvers, McDonald and Miller introduce a model of the auditor reputation puzzle
from the perspective of the investment banking sponsor where the reputation of the
auditor effects the signalling environment. In their paper they concentrate on the
interaction between the investment banker and the auditor. In practice they note that
the sponsoring investment bank, frequently determines auditor selection either
through tacit approval of the firm's existing auditor or by requesting auditor change.
Both the issuing firm and the investment banker have a vested interest in the auditor
selection decision. Indeed, the optimum choice of audit quality ifmanagement and
underwriters were to select auditor independently, should be consistent between the
two groups. The investment banker wanting to preserve its reputation capital prefers
55
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a high quality auditor to assimilate and verily financial information in the issuance
process and thus prevent mispricing of the issue. Accordingly, the authors view the
investment banker selecting the auditor and indirectly compensating the firm in part
for the cost of hiring a high reputation auditor. The authors are not suggesting that
investment bankers always select an issuing firm's auditor. The firm frequently has
already made the choice and may well have their own agenda for making such a
decision. However, the investment banker subsequently decides whether this auditor
is acceptable for taking the firm public. Indeed Beatty, quotes from an A.I.C.P.A
survey 'Almost universally, the reason expressed [for a change of auditor] was that
the underwriters informed the client that a 'nationally known' firm was necessary to
sell their offering at the highest possible price'. The authors differentiate audit
services using the typical 'big 8 / non big 8' dependent variable to classify firms. The
role of the audit firm in the authors model is based on the effect of auditor reputation
on perceived investment banker reputation, and the ability of the auditor to effect ex
ante uncertainty. The authors testes their theory on a sample of 1182 initial public
offerings carried out in the USA by 118 sponsoring institutions. 'Big 8' auditors
dominated the sample, accounting for 78% of the issues. The average level of
underpricing for the 'big 8' IPOs was 7% versus 11% for the 'non big 8' IPOs. The
authors evidence supported the four main hypotheses of their model, namely.
1) Investment bankers with higher reputation tend to be associated with high
reputation auditors.
2) Investment bankers with high reputations underprice less.
3) The observed measure of auditor reputation helps reduce underpricing.




In an extension of the 1986 paper, Beatty and Ritter offer a theory which suggests
that sponsoring banks who fail to maintain the monotonic relationship between ex-
ante uncertainty and the indicated excess return subsequently lose market share. In
order to examine this 483 issues in the period 1977-1983 were examined, and the
market shares of underwriting houses involved in four or more new issues over the
period were calculated. Predicted initial returns were then computed for each firm (j)
taken public by underwriter (i). These predicted returns were then compared to the
actual return to give a residual return R(ij) for all issues. For each of the forty nine
underwriters who fulfilled the criterion of having performed four IPOs in the time
frame the average residual was computed. From these results standardised average
residuals were then computed for each underwriter. Beatty and Ritter suggested that
the twenty four with the largest standardised average returns were pricing 'off the
equilibrium line and the twenty five remaining on the line. For the twenty four
pricing of the line Beatty and Ritter noted that their subsequent market share fell by
forty seven percent between the two sub-periods (1/1977 - 3/1981 and 4/1981 -
12/1984). For the twenty five 'on the line' the percentage drop in market share was
only twenty three percent. Given these finding Beatty and Ritter found that
sponsoring banks have an incentive to enforce the equilibrium relationship between
ex-ante uncertainty and levels of underpricing. A feature of the work carried out by
Beatty and Ritter59 is that differences in the quality of the sponsoring banks does not
appear to be directly related to underpricing levels. Logically, banks with less
'reputation' capital to lose on 'cheating' according to the Rock model have less
incentive to do so than the banks with higher levels of reputation capital. One method
of cheating, as indicated by Baron, is for the sponsor to economise on distribution by
deeply discounting the issue. Bearing in mind that the incentive to cheat is a
decreasing function of sponsor prestige, levels of underpricing and sponsor
reputation should be negatively correlated. Early evidence of differential pricing by
sponsoring banks was first introduced by McDonald and Fisher60. Evidence was also
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provided by Logue61, Neuberger and Hammond62, Neuberger and LaChapelle63,
Johnson and Miller64 and Carter and Manster65 who all found evidence of negative
relations between sponsor quality and underpricing levels. However, Johnson and
Miller66 note that the negative association might reflect the fact that less prestigious
underwriters sponsor issues where ex-ante levels of uncertainty are higher and as
such require a higher degree of underpricing to compensate for this risk. As such, the
67
less prestigious sponsoring banks are not so much violating the Beatty and Ritter
equilibrium as in fact enforcing it.
A further interpretation of the signalling type models discussed so far is provided by
68
Jegadeesh, Weinstein and Welch . They provide evidence to support the claim that
firms deliberately underprice their IPOs to allow secondary equity offerings to
proceed more easily. Recent signalling models, such as that proposed by Grinblatt
and Hwang69, present the following scenario surrounding signalling models.
Typically, in models such as his, the firm raises capital through IPO and expects to
raise additional funds in the aftermarket through seasoned equity offering (in the UK,
rights issues). 'High-quality' firms underprice their offers more than 'low-quality'
firms to increase investor affinity and make it easier for them to raise additional
finance in the future. The price at which the 'high-quality' IPO expects to raise its
secondary finance is strictly higher than if it did not participate in the signalling
process with its IPO. The authors examine the relation between the returns around
the initial public offerings of firms and their subsequent decisions to raise additional
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capital through seasoned equity offerings. Under the signalling models we expect
that firms with greater IPO underpricing are a) more likely to subsequently issue
seasoned equity, b) likely to raise larger amounts of equity in their seasoned
offerings, c) likely to offer seasoned equity more quickly after the IPO and d) likely
to experience a smaller price drop when the seasoned equity offering is announced.
Consistent with these predictions, the authors find that firms that underprice their
IPO relatively more are more likely to issue seasoned equity, and on average to have
larger seasoned offerings; in addition, these firms experience smaller price drops on
the seasoned offering announcement dates. These relations, however, are rather weak
from an economic perspective. For example 15.6% of the firms in the lowest IPO
underpricing quintile (average underpricing of 6.4%) issue seasoned equity, whereas
23.9% of the firms in the largest underpricing quintile (average underpricing 42.9%)
reissue equity. The lack of a strong association between IPO underpricing and
subsequent seasoned equity offerings calls into question the explanatory power of the
signalling hypothesis. Moreover, there are other explanations for these empirical
irregularities. In fact, the results of these additional tests favour these alternatives.
One alternative explanation that the authors consider is the 'market feedback'
hypothesis. This position that the market is better informed than the issuer and hence
a high return on the IPO date implies that the issuer has underestimated the marginal
return to the project. The issuer uses this information and increases the scale of the
project by raising additional capital through additional offerings. Alternatively, in the
spirit of the 'pooling equilibrium' in Allen and Faulhaber, it is possible that all issuer
types pool (or set the same IPO price) and the high quality firms issue seasoned
equity if and when the market discovers their true quality.
To explore whether the observed relations between IPO returns and seasoned
offering activity can be explained by market feedback and/or pooling hypotheses, the
authors examine whether the returns in two twenty day trading periods immediately
after the IPOs are related to subsequent equity offerings. Under the two alternative
hypotheses it is postulated that the abnormal share price reaction during the
immediate post-issue period to have the same effect on future equity issues as similar
price changes on the issue date. Under the signalling hypothesis, in contrast, the
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return on the IPO date plays a unique role: the issuer signals its quality only through
IPO underpricing. Therefore, under the signalling hypothesis we expect IPO
underpricing to affect subsequent equity offered differently from the returns in the
period immediately after the IPO date.
The authors find that firms with higher post-IPO abnormal returns are more likely to
return to the seasoned equity market and to return with larger offerings. In fact, the
point estimates indicate a stronger relation between the aftermarket return in either of
the 20 day periods and in the likelihood of future seasoned offerings. Further, firms
that experience higher returns in the aftermarket issue seasoned equity sooner. These
results support the market feedback hypothesis, and suggest that the association




An interesting adjunct to the literature on asymmetric information has been provided
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by Ivo Welch . He introduces the concept of informational 'cascades'. Here,
investors do not follow a course of action predicated by their own private information
so much as they act having observed the actions of those around them.
Welch introduces a situation in which an issuer is selling a new security of uncertain
value. While the value of the new security is highly uncertain to individual investors,
investors hold perfectly accurate information when aggregated. Moreover, there are a
number of potential investors and a small number of these investors can jointly
determine the value of the firm with high precision. In such an environment it would
seem that in this scenario, underpriced offerings would succeed and overpriced
offering would fail.
However, the Welch paper shows that, if the distribution channels of investment
banks are limited (as they are), underpriced offerings can fail and overpriced
offerings can succeed. With limited distribution channels, it takes the underwriter
time to approach interested investors. Therefore, later investors can observe how well
an offering has sold to date, or at least how successful it has sold relative to offerings
previously undertaken by this underwriter. Hence, investors approached after some
time can infer information from investors who were approached earlier. An
individual investor can interpret a successful initial sales effort to imply that earlier
investors had favourable information about an offering, in turn giving the later
investor additional incentive to invest. Analogously, slow initial sales discourage
subsequent investing. The conditioning of information on the decisions of earlier
investors is a positive informational externality.
As a result, offering proceeds depend on the ordering of information among
investors. Holding aggregate information constant, if earlier investors are more
inclined to invest then the issuer will receive more proceeds.
The inferred value would converge to the true value if investors could observe the
signals held by those investors approached earlier. However, it is not realistic to
701. Welch, 'Sequential Sales, Learning and Cascades', Journal of Finance, Vol XLVII No. 2 June
1992 p695-732
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assume that investors can observe these signals. They can only observe and believe
earlier investors actions from early sales. Then an investor who has observed
previously high or previously low demand will rapidly base his decision to purchase
exclusively on earlier sales and ignore his private information. Given that the
individual finds it in his own best interests to ignore private information and relies on
the information inferred from the actions of previous investors in framing his own
purchasing decision, all subsequent investors will face the same decision and will act
alike.
As a consequence, if a few early investors believe that an offer is overpriced than
they can swamp the information held by all other investors and more or less doom
the offering to failure. Or, if a few early investors think the offer a bargain, they can
create almost unlimited demand for the issue.
The essence of his argument is that the value of a new security is highly uncertain to
individual market participants but all the market players together hold perfect
information when aggregated. Also, there are many potential investors and a
relatively small number of them acting together can determine the value of a firm
with some accuracy.
With such limited distribution channels, it takes time for the underwriter to approach
potential investors. Therefore the later investors can observe how well an offering
has sold to date - or at least gauge its relative success. Hence, investors approached
after some time can gauge from the reaction of those investors who were approached
earlier what the view of the new investment opportunity is. The individual can
interpret a successful initial sales effort to imply investors had positive information
about the firm, giving the later investor additional incentive to invest.
A good example of this phenomenon is given by Welch. He quotes a story from
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Fortune Magazine relating to the IPO ofMicrosoft where the underwriting
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institution was obviously aware of the effect of price on the likely initial success of
the IPO. Quoting from the text..
'..Eric Dobkin, 43, the partner in charge of common stock offerings at Goldman
Sachs felt uneasy about Microsoft's counterproposal (to increase the offering price).
For a hour he tussled with Gaudette (Microsoft's representative), using every
argument he could muster. Coming out $1 to high would drive off some high quality
investors. Just a few significant defection could lead to the offer losing its lustre.'
From this we can see that the underwriter, in this case Goldman Sachs was very
aware of the effect of a potential 'cascade'.
There are many similar stories in a UK context. One in particular relates to the IPO
of the House of Fraser retail store chain. In that issue the sponsors S. G. Warburg
were so concerned with the potential effects of the success of the float and the
associated effects failure would have on their reputation capital that when confronted
with an ultimatum from the vendors of the business to raise the float price they
threatened to pull the flotation twenty four hours before impact day.
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5.5.7 Excess Returns as a Function of Speculative Bubbles
Perhaps the most basic explanation of the underpricing of IPOs is that excess returns
are created as a function of 'speculative' bubbles in the market during the early
72
period of trading in the IPO shares . A 'bubbles' phenomena would suggest that
stock prices are temporarily overvalued as irrational investors bid up the market
prices for the stocks over and above the value represented by the discrete businesses
themselves. Within the context of this review a 'speculative' bubble may emerge in
secondary market trading as the market exaggerated the required price needed to
compensate for the perceived level of underpricing. Over-optimistic buying may also
emerge in response to an issue being oversubscribed (and hence rationed) prior to
trading so that when trading commences there is a demand from investors who were
unsatisfied by their allocation in the float. This has a necessarily upward effect on the
stock price. (This speculative response to the initial rationing of shares was outlined
73
in Shiller in the form of a 'shortage illusion' hypothesis). Eventually, however, the
speculative bubble must burst as market efficiency causes stock prices to adjust
downwards to their true 'intrinsic' value. Further work on this phenomenon has been
carried out by Miller in his 1987 paper74 . He argues that if a minority of optimistic
potential investors can absorb the finite supply of share in an offer then stock prices
may be inflated in the initial offer period. Miller demonstrates that this effect will be
more pronounced the greater is the divergence of investor opinion with regard to
stock prices. However, investor opinion should converge as progress is made through
the post listing period given the gradual dissemination of information relevant to
stock value. This, in turn, causes prices to adjust downwards towards their intrinsic
value. Given the scenario outlined the speculative trends as described require a
period of rising prices in the immediate post issue period followed by a reversal later
in the post issue period. This pattern has been observed by a number of studies
including those carried out by Bear and Curley75, Aggarwal and Rivoli76 and Ritter77.
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In Aggarwal and Rivoli the empirics they present support the hypothesis of the
'bubble bursting' in the context of the US market. They find evidence that the
bubbles burst between five and twelve months after listing. More importantly,
investors who buy stocks after the reaction to the initial underpricing are likely to
experience negative returns as investors revise stock prices downwards in the
aftermarket. Ritter notes a similar pattern of post listing price behaviour but he
postulates that the observed negative trend in price performance in the aftermarket is
due to investors periodically over-estimating the earnings potential of small high-
growth companies and that firms take advantage of such opportunities to time their
moves onto the market. Eventually, the necessary correction of this exuberant pricing
produces a downward move in stock prices. This set of arguments mirrors closely
Ritter's 1984 paper in which he introduces the concept of 'Hot Issue' markets where
over certain periods initial returns are highly non-stationary. Ritter notes that in the
15 month period commencing in January 1980 the mean return on initial public
offerings was a staggering 48.4%. This compared to a mean return of 16.3% during
the remainder of the 6 year period 1977 - 1982. This 'hot issue' market was a strange,
but not unique, phenomenon. Ritter tries to explain away this event along the lines of
Rock. In that model some types of unseasoned new issues are underpriced far more
than 'normal', namely the highly risky ones.
Aggarwal and Rivoli offer a different explanation of the speculative effect. They
theorise that sponsors attempt to place the issue among 'safe hands' who are unlikely
to 'stag' the issue rather than those who might trade in the stock in the immediate
after-market and hence create volume induced volatility. As such, if the sponsors are
able to identify 'strong hands' then the supply of stock to those individuals who were
rationed in their holdings when allocations were made (and are as such natural buyers
of the stock) will be reduced and the price will be bid up by the aggressive buying
from rationed institutions. The scenario outlined in not dissimilar to that put forward
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by Ritter in his 1984 paper and by Shea Tinic in his 1988 paper. These papers
introduce the concept of 'monopsony power' where large, reputable sponsors
exercise power in the pricing of small speculative issues. By exploiting the 'power'
they have the large sponsoring banks can over allocate to their favoured clients who
then reward the sponsor in some indirect manner (e.g., by providing the sponsor with
more commissioned business) One can draw a connection between the 'monopsony
power' theory and the argument offered by Aggarwal and Rivoli. It could be that the
favoured customers of the sponsoring bank provide 'safe hands' in the Aggarwal and
Rivoli model by retaining equity in the immediate after-market. While intuitively
appealing, this argument loses some of its practical applicability as in the US market
there is the opportunity for the investment banker to pre-sell equity to selected
customers. In the UK market the procedure is not the same. The requirement is for an
equitable allocation of equity. While there is a considerable body of evidence
presented to back-up the 'speculative' bubble argument there is an equally
compelling body of evidence which stands against the theory. There are a number of
studies which indicate relatively efficient pricing of equities in the aftermarket. e.g.,
80 81 82
Ibbotson , Block and Stanley and Dawson . These studies provide evidence that
the market quickly eliminates any excess returns from initial underpricing so that
systematic excess returns are unachievable in the secondary market (adjusting for he
risks of IPO companies). Furthermore the body of evidence indicates that the returns
from any initial underpricing are independent of subsequent returns. Given this
picture, underpricing arises simply as a function of downward bias in the pricing of
unseasoned new issues. Finally, it the efficient market explanation for underpricing
can be accepted, one can explain the underpricing in terms of the initial mis-pricing
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of the IPO firm in the context of informational asymmetries in the context of the
models ofBaron and Rock.
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5.5.8 Excess Returns from 'Stabilisation'
Nearly all of the empirical studies outlined provide evidence that IPOs are
underpriced and provide abnormal returns to investors in the immediate post-issue
period. It would appear that firms 'leave money on the table' in significant amounts.
While this is quite satisfactory from the point of view of investors, it is far from ideal
from the point of view of the small, growing firms raising the funding.
In contrast to the majority of the studies already discussed there may be another
explanation of the observed underpricing in which neither the issuer nor the sponsor
deliberately underprices the offering and the flotation price does reflect the true
intrinsic value of the firm. This is often referred to as 'stabilisation'.
What is 'Stabilisation?'
Stabilisation attempts to smooth, mitigate or even avoid short run share price
declines. The underwriter of the offering may indeed believe that stabilisation in the
first few days of trading can avert or mitigate price declines indefinitely, particularly
if there is particularly heavy selling in the immediate post issue period.
Since information of stabilising activities is not directly observable, authors such as
Schultz and Zaman83 and Ruud84, examine the effect of 'stabilisation' using indirect
measures. They use their inferences on the behaviour of the variables they monitor to
test for the presence of 'stabilisation'. A number of authors including the
aforementioned, argue that stabilisation truncates the distribution of post offering
stock returns in the short run. In other studies, the authors investigate the presence of
stabilisation by examining the effect of this distributional truncation on the bid-ask
spread.
o c
To deal with the last point firstly, numerous studies, including Copeland and Galai
demonstrate that the width of a bid-offer spread for a stock is at least partially
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determined by the volatility of the underlying stock price process. One explanation
for this relation is the 'inventory cost' explanation. Dealers who post firm bid-ask
quotes buy at the bid and sell at the ask. Subsequent price moves expose dealers to
two types of losses.
First, if the price subsequently increases, dealers suffer opportunity losses by selling
at an ask which subsequently turns out to be too low. Second, and of greater
importance to the authors' study, if the price subsequently decreases, the dealers'
inventory of shares declines in value thereby crystallising a capital loss.
'Stabilising' activities reduce the second cost. If dealers believe that, at least in the
short run, stabilising activities will prevent the market price from falling below some
floor price, then inventory losses from price declines will be mitigated. For example
assume that a dealer posts a bid price of 200p, believing that there is floor price of
180p at which the stabiliser is willing to buy stock for the potential seller. In such a
scenario, the maximum loss the dealer believes he will incur on the shares purchased
at his quoted bid is 20p. Assuming that the dealer is market competitive, this
reduction in potential losses will be reflected in the cost of providing liquidity
services, i.e., the bid-offer spread will narrow. The value of this truncated loss
depends on a number of factors. One important factor is the difference between the
posted quote price and the floor price, which represent the maximum possible
inventory loss. As this difference narrows, inventory losses are reduced, as are the
costs of providing liquidity services. Therefore, holding all other factors constant,
there should be a positive relation between the width of the quoted bid-ask spread
and the distance between the current posted quotes and the floor price.
Stabilisation is capital intensive and moreover, stabilising activities must, by law86,
be terminated once the distribution of securities is complete. Stabilisation, therefore
should last for only a short time. Hence the positive relation between the width of the
quoted bid-offer spread and the distance between the current posted quotes and the
86
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floor price, as well as the negative relation between the width of the quoted bid-offer
spread and the value of the put option written by the stabiliser, should decay over
time. Finally, stabilisation is effectively a legal form of price manipulation.
Therefore, ending such activities allows the unobstructed forces of supply and
demand to dictate fair market prices. Since stabilisation only exists to retard price
declines, those issues which have not been stabilised should experience observable
price declines once stabilisation is discontinued. Note, however, that in order to
observe post stabilisation price decline the value of the stabilisers bid must exceed
the intrinsic value of the security when stabilisation ends.
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Shultz and Zaman view stabilisation as a complement to underpricing. The reasons
for maintaining an aftermarket price at or above an offer price can be the same as
those for originally setting a price below the initial aftermarket price.
Some buyers of the IPO will renege if the issue is overpriced. If the aftermarket price
is less than the offer price, or if it appears that the underwriter is having trouble
selling the issue, investors who have placed non binding indications of interest would
rationally decline to purchase shares in the initial offering and would instead buy
stock in the aftermarket. In addition, even if an investor confirms a buy order when
the offering becomes effective, they can renege without penalty for five business
days. If aftermarket support is perceived as effecting a permanent increase in price by
reducing supply, investors will not see an advantage in waiting to purchase an IPO in
the aftermarket and will be less likely to renege.
The option to cancel an indication of interest or renege on an order leads to
underpricing under some circumstances. An IPO investor effectively has a Put option
to sell stock back to the underwriter for the issue price by declining to take up shares
after placing an indication of interest or by reneging on an order. Underwriters must
be compensated for the provision of such Puts, in addition to the other services.
However, in the US, State limits on underwriting commissions are 10-15% so it may
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be necessary to underprice IPOs to lower the implicit exercise price and minimise the
value of the Put written to IPO purchasers.
In addition, the costs of re-selling an issue after investors have reneged can be
minimised by underpricing. If these costs are large enough, it will be cheaper to
reduce the value of the Put and the costs of reselling the reneged shares by
underpricing than to explicitly compensate the underwriter for writing the Put.
Aftermarket support prevents cascades. Welsh argues that potential purchasers of
IPOs use their knowledge of whether other investors participate to make their own
investment decisions. If sales take place sequentially, then a long enough tail of
investors who don't go for an IPO will induce the tail to forgo the IPO. On this basis
an IPO can fail, even if its fairly priced. In practice, investors who are asked to
confirm indications of interest in firm commitment offerings can observe the reaction
of previously approached buyers through the movements of the aftermarket price. If
the aftermarket price is not over the offer price then the investors can infer than the
investors had negative information about the stock and can renege on their purchase.
By supporting the stock in the aftermarket, the underwriter may be able to prevent a
cascade form happening if investors who are first approached to buy the issue pass on
the issue. Similarly, the potential for cascades provides an incentive to underprice an
issue to ensure that a run of investors who pass on an offer does not develop in the
first place.
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Schultz and Zaman distinguish between two different methods of supporting an
IPO in the aftermarket. Underwriters can either bring about a permanent change in
the stock price by reducing the supply of stock or temporarily prop up the price by
buying stock later for resale.
The two techniques of aftermarket support, stabilisation and reducing the supply of
shares in the aftermarket, both imply that underwriters will quote at the inside bid
more often than at the inside ask, particularly if the IPO is 'cold'.
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Also, both methods suggest that there should be a disproportionate amount of selling
of cold IPOs when underwriters quote prices which are too high to equate supply and
demand. Additional implications of the hypothesis that underwriters restrict supply in
the aftermarket are that they repurchase large quantities of stock when the
aftermarket price is below the offer price and that they exercise over-allotment
options if the stock trades at higher prices than the offering price.
Evidence on the Existence of Stabilisation
89
Clear evidence of this phenomenon was put forward by Ruud in her 1993 paper
where she introduces the concept of 'stabilisation' as an explanation of the excess
abnormal returns made by IPOs. Due to the difficulties in studying the phenomenon
directly, her study examines not only the mean level of initial returns made by IPOs
but also the distribution of these returns. The findings of the study are that instead of
forming a symmetric curve, the distribution of one day returns is found to peak
sharply at zero and include very few observations in the negative left hand tail. In
contrast with the view that IPO underpricing is undertaken deliberately, the findings
presented here suggest that the apparent underpricing may be attributed to
underwriter price support.
When prices are subject to support in the aftermarket, observations which would
normally appear in the negative left hand tail of the distribution may be 'propped up'
to zero or slightly negative by a standing purchase order put on by the sponsor at the
offer price. As already indicated, researchers have in the main ignored the impact
stabilisation could have on IPO returns to date. Such support is legal (in the USA)
under the stipulations of the Securities Act of 1934. The effects of stabilisation would
be to reduce the number of negative initial returns that would be observed in normal
market trading. This 'censoring' of the negative tail of the distribution of returns
could produce a positive mean initial return even if issue prices were set at the true
intrinsic value.
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As mentioned , underwriter price support involves transactions that prevent or retard
a decline in the market price of a security and is intended to facilitate a distribution.
In the US, as in the UK, the relevant authorities tend to frown upon price
manipulation. However, on both sides of the Atlantic it is allowed. The SEC justify it
on the grounds that it mitigates underwriter losses stemming from temporary
downward pressure during the selling period90. The London Stock Exchange also
permits it, requiring only that an announcement be made each day by the company
concerned to the fact that 'stabilising' transactions are taking place.
Although supporting prices may tie underwriter's capital in the short run, it has been
suggested that the practice enhances underwriters' reputations with issuers and
investors. The SEC has taken the position that stabilisation is not manipulative so
long as the possibility of stabilisation is included in the offering documents.
Statistical analysis provides a means of evaluating whether IPO underpricing is a
deliberate strategy or a consequence of support activities undertaken by underwriters.
If IPO underpricing were undertaken across the board on a deliberate basis then the
distribution of returns (one-day) would be roughly bell-shaped with the peak of the
distribution centred some way greater than zero. However, Ruud finds that few IPOs
fall below their offered price immediately and instead of the bell-shaped curve which
we would expect, Ruud found that the distribution of returns peaks steeply at zero
and that the left hand (negative) tail of the distribution declines sharply. This
observed distribution is symptomatic of support. The consequences of support would
be for the number of negative returns to be very few (as sponsors support the prices)
and for those which would perhaps have produced a negative return to be propped up
to near zero, hence producing the spike in the distribution at zero. The statistical term
for the phenomenon described is 'censoring'. A sample is said to be censored if there
is some threshold level above which actual values are not observed, it is only known
that the true value lies above the observed levels. In the case of IPOs, the censoring
level is a return of zero. Initial returns of zero are observed in instances where returns
less than zero would have been observed in the absence of support. In this way
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systematic support allows the right tail (positive returns) to be observed, but not the
left tail. The censoring of the left tail could produce a positive mean initial return
even if the IPO offering prices were set at true 'intrinsic' value.
Ruud examined 469 IPOs in the 1982/83 period and specifically looked at returns
over one day, one week, two weeks, three weeks and four weeks. Using the statistical
measure of skewness, kurtosis, she found that the distribution of returns was indeed
skewed in the way in which she postulated and that the level of skewness declined
over the time periods outlined. This is symptomatic of price support taking place and
then being slowly withdrawn as time passes. Ruud then goes on to try to correct for
the effects of skewness on the returns observed. The idea here was to provide a
measure of the level of excess returns generated net of the effects of stabilisation.
When this exercise was performed the one day return fell from 6.4% to 1.5%, not
enough to allow a profitable trading strategy net of transactions costs. In summary,
Ruud's evidence points to stabilisation producing excess returns in otherwise
correctly priced issues91.
However, it should be said that there is evidence which undermines to a degree the
strength of the findings put forward by Ruud. There are two aspects of her work
which have caused a degree of disquiet. The first relates to the fact that she chose to
use log returns when examining the return distribution. Taking logs has an effect on
the distribution and commentators have voiced concern over the impact of this on the
strength of the inference which can be made from the results. The second issue
relates to the final part ofRuud's analysis where she concludes that, net of the effect
of stabilisation, there is no excess returns to be gained from investing in IPOs.
Evidence contra to that advanced by Ruud was in fact introduced by Miller and
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Reilly in 1987 . Using a sample of 510 firms covering almost the identical period to
the Ruud study they report that 30% of their sample had non-positive market
adjusted day one returns. These issues underperformed by an average of 3.9% during
the next four weeks whereas the other 70% of issues outperformed the market by 1%
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over the same time period. Given that the average initial return for their sample was
9.9%, they concluded that the effect of the stabilising activities was to decrease the
average initial return to 9% at worst, clearly leaving a 'tradable' abnormal return for
investors to exploit.
Earlier in this section some of the testable implications of 'stabilisation' were
introduced. The results of the tests conducted by Shultz and Zaman are now reported.
This study examines the aftermarket transactions from the first three days of trading,
along with quotes of underwriters and other market makers, and find direct evidence
that underwriters support IPOs in the aftermarket.
This finding is important for two reasons. First, it provides indirect evidence on why
IPOs are underpriced. Second, it allows a fuller characterisation of the role of
underwriters in the IPO process.
Their sample consists of every trade and every quote update for the first three days of
trading for 72 IPOs from 31/3/92 to 1/6/92. This intra-day data allows them to
determine how much of the volume can be attributed to buys, how much to sells and
how trading patterns move over the first three days of trading.
To compare underwriter behaviour across IPOs that are more or less likely to be
supported, the sample is split at each point in time into IPOs which trade above their
offering price (hot) and those which trade below (cold). By this definition an IPO can
change from hot to cold if the stock price drops from above the offer price to at price
at or below the offer price in the aftermarket.
Consistent with aftermarket support the authors find that the underwriters spend a
larger proportion of their time at the inside bid (the highest price any dealer will pay
for stock) for cold IPOs than they do for cold IPOs. Other market makers spend a
significantly smaller proportion of their time so doing. When the inside quotes are
recalculated after omitting underwriter quotes, they find that average inside bids are
usually lower, particularly for cold IPOs. Inside ask quotes are generally the same
either with the inclusion of underwriters or without.
They also split the sample of IPOs into those with positive initial returns and those
with zero or negative initial returns to examine the time-series behaviour of IPOs and
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the aggregate buying and selling of underwriters. This analysis provides further
evidence of aftermarket support. A greater proportion of aftermarket volume is from
sell orders from fully priced IPOs than for underpriced IPOs. Underwriters appear to
take the opposite side of these trades and on average to repurchase large quantities of
stock.
Hanley et al provide another useful survey. Their sample consists of some 2758 firm
commitment IPOs undertaken in the US on the NASDAQ market in the period
January 1982 to September 1987. The authors model the effect of stabilisation on
bid-offer spreads using a method which allows for variation over time in this
variable. Since they hypothesise that the duration and intensity of stabilisation
activities will decay over time, they compute cross sectional regressions for each day
for days 1 to 30 in the aftermarket trading period, using the relative bid-offer spread
as the dependent variable and factors known to affect the bid-offer spread as
independent variables. The authors estimate 30 separate cross-sectional regressions
(one for each of the 30 event days) of the form:
ln(Relative Spread^) = a + |31tln(volumejt) + p2,ln(No. ofmkt. makers^) + P3tln(pricejt) +
P4,ln(volatilityjt) + p5,ln(stabilisation proxy,,)
The first measure of potential stabilisation which the authors focus upon is the log of
the ratio of the closing bid price to the offer price, or the nearness of the market price
to the 'floor' price. When this measure is large and positive, the current market price
is above the hypothesised floor price and the associated reduction in inventory losses
attributable to stabilisation is small. As the ratio approaches zero or turns negative,
however, the floor price becomes a more relevant boundary and the spreads should
narrow. Consequently, the authors examine the behaviour of p5„ the estimate of the
effect of ln(bid price/offer price) on quoted spreads. If price stabilisation exists and
effects the bid-offer spread, then we expect the p5t estimate should be positive and
that any significance in the relation should diminish over time.
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Consistent with the hypothesis, the authors find that P5t estimates are positive and
significantly related to bid-offer spreads for the first ten days of trading after
controlling for volume, the number of market makers, the mid point of the bid-offer
spreads and volatility. Since the model specification is log-log, coefficient estimates
are unit free and can be interpreted as elasticities. Consequently, the magnitudes of
the coefficients are related to he relative economic importance of the independent
variables. The authors find that the largest elasticity over the first few days is
associated with the stabilisation variable. These results are uniformly consistent with
the propositions that the relation between the width of the posted bid-offer spread and
the distance between the posted quotes and the floor price is significantly positive
and this relation decays by day 10 of the aftermatket period.
The second testable implication of the hypothesis is that the effect of a stabilising bid
on dealer's losses can be modelled as a 'put' option. In other words, the presence of
price stabilisation effectively truncates dealers' potential downside losses from
adverse price movements. For each firm on each event date, put option values are
calculated and then used as proxies for stabilisation in the cross-sectional regressions.
Since these 'puts' are written by the stabiliser and held by the remaining dealers,
spreads should narrow as the option value increases. Consequently, if price
stabilisation exists and affects the bid-offer spread, the authors predict that the (35t
estimates should be negative immediately after the offer and should diminish in event
time. The authors find that the estimates are negative and significant over the first 10
event days with the exception of day 7. Therefore, spreads are significantly related to
the value of the put option written by the stabiliser, conditional on volume, the
number ofmarket makers, the price level and variance.
Finally, the authors examine returns following the hypothesised end of stabilisation
to determine whether the removal of stabilisation leads to immediate price declines.
The authors follow this course for two reasons. Firstly, return based evidence
consistent with stabilisation complements the spread results and increases the
likelihood that the spread results are due to stabilisation. Secondly, though numerous
studies examine the returns for various IPO based investment strategies, few
explicitly recognise the potential impact of stabilisation.
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Since we cannot determine exactly when stabilisation ceases for each offer the
authors perform two tests based on different assumptions about when the
stabilisation ends. In the first test the authors assume that stabilising activities cease
after event day 10. If stabilisation is successful in maintaining prices above their
intrinsic value, then price declines should, on average, occur after the end of
stabilisation, and such declines should occur only for those firms most likely to have
been exposed to stabilisation. The results for the first test are consistent with process
for the stabilised issues being maintained above their equilibrium value.
In the second test, the authors allow stabilisation to end at any time in the first 15
days of aftermarket trading. However, they assume that stabilisation only occurs at
the offer price. Therefore, observing a closing bid price below a closing offer price is
taken as evidence that stabilisation activities are terminated. Splitting that sample
into two groups representing those where stabilisation is hypothesised to have taken
place and those where it is not, the results show that the issues hypothesised to have
been stabilised show significant negative returns in the five days after stabilising
activities are posited to have ended.
Establishing that stabilisation is common in the after issue market for IPOs is
important from a public policy perspective. Investors who engage in what they
believe are open market transactions at prices determined by the freely acting forces
of supply and demand may find instead that they have purchased shares at artificially
inflated prices and suffer subsequent losses.
Further work on price stabilisation in the IPO market has been undertaken by Weiss
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Hanley, Kumar and Seguin . Using a sample of some 1523 NASDAQ listed IPOs
listing between 1982 and 1987 they found that the bid - offer spread narrowed when
the market price was close to the offer price. In addition they found that significant
negative returns accrued at the time when stabilising activities are hypothesised to
come to an end. The authors provide a useful definition of 'stabilisation'. The quote
the 1940 Securities and Exchange Commission release which defines stabilisation as
93
K. Weiss Hanley, A. A. Kumar and P. J. Seguin, 'Price Stabilisation in the market for new issues',
Journal of Financial Economics Vol 34 1993 pi 77 - 197
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'..the buying of a security for the limited purpose of preventing or retarding a decline
in its open market price in order to facilitate its distribution to the public.' To absorb
open market selling and to prevent a drop in market prices, the underwriter of an
offer enters a 'syndicate bid', usually at the issue price. If selling pressure is large
enough to preclude buying the securities at the issue price, the underwriter may either
decrease its bid to successively lower levels or cease its efforts at stabilisation
altogether. Given that such activities are 'capital intensive' and their duration is
governed by regulation, the underwriter can engage in stabilisation only for a short
period of time. The actual stabilising purchases in the study undertaken by the
authors are unobservable. However, the authors provide indirect evidence of
stabilising activities through the size of the bid-ask spread. The authors hypothesise
that the bid-ask spreads are smaller for issues hypothesised to be most effected by
stabilisation. Furthermore, stabilised offers decline in value following cessation of
stabilisation.
Although information on the timing or amount of stabilising purchases has never
been reported to the S.E.C. in the U.S.A., managing underwriters were required to
inform the S.E.C. if they engaged in stabilising activities. Stoll94 and Hess and
Frost9'9 use this information to examine the influence of stabilisation on returns. Stoll
finds that, for a sample of 50 new equity issues, the stabilised issues underperform
the non-stabilised issues by 4.2% over the first ten days of trading. However, this
difference is insignificant. He concludes the '...stabilisation appears to occur in
response to falling prices and presumably make one wonder why it is engaged in.' It
would seem then that while the phenomenon exists, it is hard to rationalise.
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of underwriters', Journal of Financial Economics Vol 28 1976 p96 - 103
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5.5.10 Long Term Performance of Initial Public Offerings
While not specifically an area of direct relevance to this study the subject of the long-
run performance of IPOs is extremely interesting and is included in this literature
review for completeness.
Jay Ritter, in his 1991 paper96, introduces strong evidence to suggest that while IPOs
in general produce average excess returns in the short term (see Chapter One for
some detail) they underperform a matched sample of seasoned firms on a three year
view. Ritter finds this to be true for his sample of some 1526 IPOs which went public
in the USA in the 1975-1984 period.
There are several reasons why the long run underperformance of IPOs is of interest.
Firstly, from an investors viewpoint, the existence of price patterns may present
opportunities for active trading strategies to produce superior returns. Secondly, a
finding of non zero aftermarket performance calls into question the informational
efficiency of the IPO market. It also provides evidence on the existence of'fads'
Thirdly, the volume of IPOs displays large variations over time. If high volume
periods are associated with poor long run performance, this would indicate that
issuers are successfully timing new issues to take advantage of 'windows of
opportunity'. Fourthly, the cost of external equity capital for companies going public
depends not only on the transaction costs incurred in going public but on the returns
investors receive in the aftermarket. To the degree that low returns are earned in the
aftermarket, the cost of equity capital is lowered for these firms.
To summarise the empirical finding of this paper, the average holding period return
for a sample of 1526 IPOs of common stock in the 1975-1984 period is 34.47% in
the 3 years after going public, where this holding period return is measured from the
closing aftermarket price on the first day of dealings to the market price on the third
year anniversary. Ritter's control sample of firms matched by industry and size
produces a total return of 61.86% over the same holding period.
Possible explanations of the anomaly are 1) risk mis-measurement, 2) bad luck or 3)
fads and over-optimism. To ascertain whether risk mis measurement could be an
96
J. Ritter, 'The Long Run Performance of Initial Public Offerings', Journal of Finance, Vol XLVL
No. 1 March 1991 p 3 - 27
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explanation for the phenomenon, alternative benchmark portfolios are used. To
distinguish between the bad luck explanation and the fads and over-optimism
explanation, various cross-sectional and time series patterns are documented. The
pattern that emerges is that underperformance is concentrated among relatively
young, high growth companies, especially those which went public in the high
growth years of the eighties. While this pattern does not rule out bad luck being the
cause of the underperformance, it is wholly consistent with a scenario where firms go
public when investors are irrationally overoptimistic about the future potential of
certain industries, which following Schiller, Ritter refers to as the 'fads' explanation.
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Further support for this explanation is found in Lee, Shleifer and Thaler who find
that the annual number of operating companies going public in the 1966-1985 period
is strongly negatively related to the discount on closed end mutual funds, which they
interpret as a measure of individual investor sentiment.
At least three published academic articles plus a series of articles in Forbes magazine
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have examined the long run performance of IPOs. Stoll and Curley used a sample
of 205 small offerings and found that '..in the short run, the stocks in the sample
showed remarkable price appreciation...In the long run, investors in small firms did
not fare so well...'(p314-315)
The initial work on the subject of long run underperformance was undertaken by
Roger Ibbotson99. Ibbotson, using one offering per month for the 10 year period
1960-1969, computed excess returns on IPOs with an offer price of at least $3.00 per
share. He concludes that the results 'generally confirm that there are no departures
from market efficiency in the aftermarkef (p265). However, he does find evidence
that there is 'generally positive performance in the first year, negative performance in
the next three years and positive performance in the fifth year.'(p252), although the
standard errors of his test statistics are such as to make rejection of the null
hypothesis that the market is efficient difficult.
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Buser and Chan100 evaluate the two year performance of over 1078 IPOs on
NASDAQ in the 1981-1985 period. Their sample has an initial positive return of
some 6.2% and a mean 2 year market adjusted return of 11.2%. Their study does not
find evidence of a negative after market performance from investments made in
IPOs.
Ritter finds in his study that the long run underperformance of IPOs is significant at
an economic and statistical level. He finds 31 of the 36 monthly adjusted returns to
be negative, with 13 t-statistics greater than -2. Later in his paper Ritter examines the
relation between gross offer proceeds and underperformance. His results are
tabulated below.
Table 6
Mean Performance Measures for sample IPOs in 1975-1984 Categorised by
Gross Proceeds
Gross Proceeds $ Ave. Adj Initial
Return
Ave. 3yr Holding




lm - 3m 27.45 17.94 67.54
3m -5m 18.00 20.89 58.72
5m- 10m 11.28 40.06 69.87
10m - 15m 7.51 46.25 55.99
15m - 25m 10.09 43.97 50.56
25m + 9.96 39.81 62.60
All (mean) 14.06 34.47 61.86
All (median) 4.61 16.67 38.54
Source: Ritter 1991, ibid
Investigation of this table discloses a tendency for the smaller offers, which have the
highest average matching firm adjusted initial returns to have the worst aftermarket
performance. All gross proceeds categories display long run underperformce.
100
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and the price performance of initial public offerings' Columbus, Ohio Department ofCommerce and
the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc 1987
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DeBondt and Thaler101 have presented evidence that, at least for low capitalisation
stocks, there is a negative relation between past and subsequent abnormal returns on
individual securities using holding periods of a year or more, which they interpret as
evidence ofmarket overreaction. Ritter tests this hypothesis. He takes the initial
returns for the sample stocks and puts them into quintiles and compares them to the
aftermarket performance for the same groupings. There is some tendency for firms
with high adjusted initial returns to have the worst aftermarket performance. This is
mildly supportive of the overreaction hypothesis.
Table 7
Aftermarket Performance Categorised by Initial Return Quintiles
Matching firm adj. initial return
quintile (%)
IPO ave. 3 year total return (%) Matching firm ave. 3 year total
return (%)
23.70 < IR< 373.98 9.45 61.39
8.10 < IR< 23.70 27.94 65.52
2.37 < IR< 8.10 41.56 55.82
-0.84 < 1R< 2.37 45.51 60.88
-92.38< IR< -0.84 47.95 65.70
Source: Ritter 1991, ibid
In some respects, the finding is that there is a tendency for the offerings with the
highest initial returns to do worst in the long run may be related to the 'implicit
insurance' hypothesis. Ritter also provides evidence on the relation between returns
generated and the number of IPOs occurring in each year. In general he finds a
negative relation between annual issuance volume and aftermarket performance. This
is consistent with the 'windows of opportunity' argument whereby firms take
advantage of investors temporarily being willing to pay excessive amounts for IPOs
reflecting overly optimistic assessments of future cash flows. The subsequently
disappointing net cash flows produce the long term underperformance.
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Ritter also looks at the relation between aftermarket performance and age of issuing
firm. He finds that the younger firms produce the highest initial returns but the
divergence of their long term return to shareholders when compared to the
appropriate match sample is the greatest. The derived results are reported below.
(Note that the data has been purged of potentially confusing industry effects)
Table 8
Aftermarket Performance Categorised by the Age of the Issuing Firm
Age in years Sample Size Ave. Matching
Firm Adj. Initial
Return (%)
Ave. 3 yr total
return - lPOs(%)
Ave. 3 yr total
return - Matched
Sample (%)
0- 1 177 23.87 16.19 76.31
2-4 338 14.87 19.22 53.20
5-9 305 13.71 33.01 65.47
10- 19 300 9.32 42.97 67.66
20 and over 154 5.41 63.76 70.37
Source: Ritter 1991, ibid
Further work on the longer term performance of IPOs has been undertaken by Jain
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and Kini . This paper investigates the change in operating performance of firms as
they make the transition from private to public ownership. A significant decline in
operating performance subsequent to the public offering is found. The authors find
that IPO firms exhibit a decline in post issue operating performance, as measured by
the operating return on assets and operating cash flows deflated by assets, relative to
their pre-IPO levels, both before and after adjusting for industry effects. The decline
in operating performance of IPO firms comes with a caveat. These firms exhibit high
growth in sales and capital expenditures relative to firms in the same industry in the
post-IPO period. Thus, the declining operating performance of IPO firms cannot be
attributed to a lack of sales growth opportunities or cut-backs in post IPO capital
expenditures. The authors also find that IPO firms where entrepreneurs retain higher
ownership generally demonstrate superior performance relative to other issuing firms
102
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both before and after adjusting for industry effects. The authors find no relation
between post-issue changes in operating performance and initial returns at the IPO.
The decline in post issue operating performance is inconsistent with the fact that IPO
firms are initially priced at high price-earnings (P/E) multiples, implying that
investors have expectations of high earnings growth in the future. IPO firms start out
with high price to book and P/E ratios relative to their industry counterparts but
experience a decline in these ratios after the IPO. In addition, earnings per share also
decline over time. Overall, these results suggest that investors appear to value firms
when going public based on the expectation that earnings growth will continue, while
in reality the pre-IPO profit margins, on which expectations are formed are not even
maintained.
There are a number of possible explanations for the decline in the aftermarket
performance. One explanation is related to the potential for increased agency costs
when a firm makes the transition from private to public ownership. The reduction in
management ownership that occurs when a firm goes public is likely to lead to an
agency problem. As a result of the heightened conflict of interest between owners
and managers, the performance of the firm could suffer. One instance of such a
phenomenon being realised might be the use of funds in non value maximising
projects. A second explanation might be that the managers 'window-dress the
accounts of the entity prior to going public. This leads to pre-IPO performance
overstatement and post-IPO performance under achievement. A third explanation is
that entrepreneurs time the IPO to coincide with periods of extremely good
performance which are ultimately unsustainable.
The common theme running through each of the three explanations forwarded is that
they are predicated by the existence of information asymmetry among the agents and
conflicts of interest between the new owners of the business and the incumbent
management.
The natural question that arises is whether the long run decline in operating
103
performance subsequent to the IPO is anticipated by the market. Stein , using a
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signal jamming model, shows that even in efficient capital markets, myopic
behaviour like 'window dressing' may persist. In the context of IPOs, his model
implies that managers may attempt to manipulate investors' beliefs by pumping up
pre-IPO earnings. In equilibrium, the market is not fooled by this behaviour and
correctly anticipates and accounts for it in its valuation of the firm. Stein's signal
jamming model can also be extended to show that, in equilibrium, managers may
attempt to time issues and that rational investors anticipate and account for this
behaviour. If the market is able to account for such actions, the long-run investment
performance of IPO firms should be neutral. However, the long run investment
underperformance document above suggests that the decline in operating
performance is not anticipated and investors are constantly surprised by the poor
performance of IPO firms. The findings of the authors suggesting declines in post
issue price to book ratios, P/E ratios and earnings per share are consistent with this
interpretation, suggesting that potential investors initially have high expectations of
future earnings growth which are not subsequently fulfilled.
The documented positive relation between managerial ownership retention and post-
issue operating performance is consistent with several explanations. Primary among
these are the Jensen and Meckling agency theory hypothesis and the Leland and Pyle
signalling hypothesis. According to the agency hypothesis, higher ownership
retention by managers reduces their incentives to undertake non value maximising
projects. Leland and Pyle suggest that, by retaining a significant ownership stake in
the firm, entrepreneurs can signal project quality since false representation can be
costly. Both hypotheses therefore, predict relatively superior operating performance
of IPO firms with higher entrepreneurial ownership. The authors results are
consistent with the predictions of both the agency theory and the signalling theory, it
is difficult, if not impossible to separate out their individual effects.
Recently, Allen and Faulhaber, Grinblatt and Hwang and Welch have suggested that
issuers use underpricing as a mechanism to signal their quality to the market. These
models posit that high-quality firms underprice their stock at the IPO and
subsequently conduct a seasoned offering when market prices are established and
when there has been an opportunity for information revelation. The cost of
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underpricing and a positive probability of their type being revealed between the two
offerings prevent the low quality firms from following suit. Thus, signalling models
of underpricing predict that IPO firms that underprice should exhibit superior
operating performance in comparison to those who do not.
The sample used by the authors consists of 683 firm commitment IPOs which went
public in the period from 1976 to 1988. Within this sample the mean (median) initial
return is 7.25%(1.17%). The mean (median) gross proceeds raised by the firms is
$26.46m($12.8m). The fraction of the firm retained by the original entrepreneurs
(and venture capitalists) after listing has a mean value of 71.04%, with a median
value of 73.12%. These numbers suggest that the original entrepreneurs continue to
hold a significant proportion of the entity post the IPO.
The authors employ two measures of operating performance. They use operating
return on assets (defined as operating income before depreciation and taxes) divided
by total assets at the end of the financial year. The second measure used is operating
cash flows deflated by total assets at the end of the financial year. This ratio equals
operating income minus capital expenditure divided by total assets. The former
provides a useful measure of the efficiency of asset utilisation whereas the latter is a
useful measure of operating performance as operating cash flows are a primary
measure in the NPV calculation.
The authors find the following results. The median changes in operating returns are -
3.58%, -7.60%, -10.58%, and -9.09% (all statistically different from zero at the 1%
level) for years 0, +1, +2 and +3 relative to year -1. The industry adjusted figures
show a similar trend. The median industry adjusted returns are -2.91%, -6.24%, -
8.12% and -6.81% (again all significant at the 1% level) for years 0, +1, +2 and +3
relative to year -1. Hence the inferior operating performance of IPO firms cannot be
attributed to industry effects. The operating cash flows deflated by total assets
decline by -3.92%, -7.92%, -7.40% and -6.44% (all significant at the 1%) level for
years 0, +1, +2 and +3. The industry adjusted numbers show a similar pattern of
significant underperformance for each year subsequent to the IPO with a decline of -
4.72% (significant at the 1% level) over the year -1 to +3 period.
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While it is difficult to pinpoint the exact reason for the inferior operating
performance of the IPO firms, several possibilities come to mind. Declines in post-
issue operating performance can be expected if the IPO firms cannot generate pre-
IPO levels of positive NPV projects or ifmanagers fail to maintain required levels of
capital expenditure. Alternatively, positive NPV projects may have negative earnings
early, so that operating performance declines while investment is occurring. To
examine this issue, the authors study the growth in sales, asset turnover and capital
expenditure for IPO firms to see if they can explain the underperformance
documented in the study.
Operating Performance of Initial Public Offering Firms
Table 9
1. Operating Return on Assets
Measure of
operating perf.






-3.58*** -7.60*** -10.53*** _9 09***
Median ind. adj.
change (%)
-2 91 * * * -6 24*** -8.12*** -6.81***
No.of obs 667 637 593 550
Table 10
2. Operating Cash Flows / Total Assets
Measure of
operating perf.






-3 92*** -7 92*** -7 40*** -6.44**
Median ind. adj. _2 99*** -6.67*** 7o*** -4 72***
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change (%)











37.22*** 69.96*** 108.09*** 143.15***
Median ind. adj.
change (%)
19.80*** 38.70*** 60.97*** 80.67***
No.of obs 673 647 603 561
*** = significant at the 1% level
** = significant at the 5% level
Although the results reported in parts 1 and 2 of the table indicate that the operating
performance of the IPOs declines relative to their pre-IPO levels, it is not clear that,
in the post issue period, the IPO firms levels of operating performance continue to
be higher than their industry counterparts. The median levels of operating return on
assets for the IPO firms decline over time, while the corresponding levels for their
industry counterparts decline by a lesser amount. Further, in each of the four years
examined, the IPO firms outperform their industry counterparts, although the
difference declines with time. This difference is significant until year +1 and is
insignificant after that point. In part 2 of the table a similar pattern of pronounced
decline in operating cash flows deflated by assets for the IPO firms is observed,
while the industry counterparts maintain relatively stable levels of performance. IPO
firms, however, do not significantly underperform their industry counterparts in any
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year subsequent to year -1. In fact, the industry matched firms significantly
outperform them in years +1 and +2. Thus, while IPOs start out at higher levels of
operating performance, they do not continue to outperform their industry
counterparts.
In part 3 of the table above the median percentage change in sales growth is reported
for years 0, +1, +2 and +3 relative to year -1, both before and after industry
adjustment. The median increases in sales measured relative to year one are 37.22%,
69.92%, 108.09% and 143.15% for years 0, +1, +2 and +3 respectively. The industry
adjusted figures show a similar, if less pronounced, trend. These results suggest that
the increase in sales for IPO firms cannot be attributed solely to industry effects.
In part 4 of the table the median percentage change in asset turnover is reported. The
median percentage change in asset turnover declines by 23.44% over a four year
period from -1 to +3, while over a similar period the industry adjusted decline in
asset turnover is 19.98% (both significant at the 1% level). Despite the high sales
growth, the decline in asset turnover is indicative of the fact that IPO firms increase
their assets faster than their sales.
In part 5 of the table the growth in capital expenditure is provided and the results
suggest a significant increase over all time windows. For instance, the median
percentage change in capital expenditure is 167.33% (significant at the 1% level) for
year +3 relative to year -1. Even after adjusting for industry effects, IPO firms have
significantly higher growth in capital expenditure in comparison to similar firms.
In summary, the study finds evidence that IPO firms exhibit inferior post IPO
operating performance relative to the year prior to going public. This occurs despite a
pattern of high growth in sales and capital expenditures over the time period studied.
The decline in operating performance is consistent with 1) ownership structure
changes resulting in increased agency problems and a tendency for the entrepreneur
to over-invest. 2) managers attempting to 'window dress' pre IPO performance and
3) managers timing their issues to coincide with periods of unusually good
performance.
The author note that in the context of the signalling models already discussed,
management equity retention should serve as a signal of IPO quality. The authors
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examine this phenomenon in the context of their data set by slitting the sample into
two groups around the mean level ofmanagement equity retention. The derived
results are that while the operating returns on assets for the high and low ownership
groups decline after the IPO, the high-ownership group shows superior operating
performance relative to the low ownership group for each of the four year relative to
year -1. Comparing operating cash flows we find again that the high-ownership
group shows significantly less deterioration in operating cash flows in comparison to
the low ownership group.
The results of heavily superior operating performance from the high-retention group
is wholly consistent with signalling theory. However, the authors find no evidence
that firms which underprice more produce superior operating performance after the
IPO.
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5.5.10 Direct Costs ofGoing Public
Going public is a costly exercise for any firm. The costs associated may be split into
two. There are the 'direct' costs associated (i.e., sponsoring banks fees) and also the
'indirect' costs of underpricing. Ritter104, in his 1987 article, examined 1028 firms
which went public in the USA. He found that the total costs of going public averaged
21.22% of the realised issue proceeds for 'firm commitment' offers and 31.87% for
'best efforts' offers.
The two contract types are a feature of the US IPO market. These will be explained
in the following passage.
Both contract types the initial phase in the flotation process is the filing of documents
with the Securities and Exchange Commission. In the case of a firm commitment
offer, the issuing firm and the sponsor then issue a preliminary prospectus and solicit
initial indications of interest from potential investors. After SEC approval has been
granted the issuing firm and the sponsor hold a pricing meeting to set the offer price
and the number of shares to be sold. Only when the final prospectus is issued does
the sponsoring bank agree to deliver the proceeds to the issuing firm whether or not
the offer is fully subscribed at the issue price. With a 'best efforts' contract the
issuing firm and the sponsoring bank agree on the pricing level and then set a range
of share issuance. Following the approval of the SEC the sponsor then attempts to
sell as many of the shares as possible. If within some time period (usually 90 days)
minimum number of shares has not been sold, the offer is withdrawn and moneys
refunded to investors. Costs of going public are much higher for best efforts offers.
However, it should be made clear that best efforts offers tend to be smaller then firm
commitment ones and so the economies of scale may produce a slightly misleading
picture.
Ritter found that in his sample the average firm commitment offer raises almost four
times the amount of funds raised by a best efforts offer. Also, firms following the
firm commitment route tended to be larger and to have more asset backing (a proxy
for risk?). Ritter found the following data on issuing costs and initial returns.
104
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Table 12










100k - 2m 68 9.84 9.64 19.48
2m - 4m 165 9.83 7.6 17.43
4m - 6m 133 9.1 5.67 14.77
6m - 10m 122 8.03 4.31 12.34
10m - 120m 176 7.24 2.1 9.34
All offers 664 8.67 5.36 14.03
Source: Ritter 1987, ibid
Table 13
Direct expenses of going public as a percentage of gross proceeds - best efforts
Gross Proceeds
($)






100k-2m 175 10.63 9.52 20.15
2m - 4m 146 10.00 6.21 16.21
4m - 6m 23 9.86 3.71 13.57
6m - 10m 15 9.8 3.42 13.22
10m - 120m 1 8.03 2.4 10.43
All offers 364 10.26 7.48 17.74
Source: Ritter 1987, ibid
The evidence indicates that the direct costs of going public are approximately
$250,000 plus 7% of the gross proceeds. The total costs of going public are the sum
of the direct costs and the indirect costs of underpricing. These are reported for the
sample in the table below.
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Table 14
Ave. percentage cash expenses and initial returns, and total transactions costs as
a percentage of realised market values - firm commitment
Gross Proceeds
($)






100k-2m 68 19.48 26.92 31.73
2m - 4m 165 17.43 20.70 24.93
4m - 6m 133 14.77 12.57 20.90
6m - 10m 122 12.34 8.99 17.85
10m - 120m 176 9.34 10.32 16.27
All offers 664 14.03 14.80 21.22
Source: Ritter 1987, ibid
Table 15
Ave. percentage cash expenses and initial returns, and total transactions costs
as a percentage of realised market values - best efforts
Gross Proceeds
($)






100k - 2m 175 20.15 39.62 31.89
2m - 4m 146 16.21 63.41 36.28
4m - 6m 23 13.57 26.82 14.49
6m - 10m 15 13.22 40.79 25.97
10m - 120m 1 10.43 -5.42 -0.17
All offers 364 17.74 47.78 31.87
Source: Ritter 1987, ibid
The disparity in average day one returns is quite startling.
Ritter goes on to investigate the reasons for the disparity. Using the standard
deviation of the aftermarket returns (over the first 20 days of aftermarket trading) as a
proxy for risk he finds that the null hypothesis that the fraction of firms using best
efforts contracts is the same for both high and low standard deviation firms can be
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rejected with greater than 99% confidence. This gives strong evidence to suggest that




What the preceding discussion should make clear is that there are a number of
different theories advanced to explain the phenomenon of IPO excess returns. As yet
no one theory can be regarded as providing the solution to the problem.
Each theory has its merits and indeed a great deal of time and effort has been
expended in the last three decades advancing and often subsequently discrediting
theories as they have been advanced.
The only statement one can make with certainty is that the phenomena, as observed,
continues to persist and that the search for a theoretically compelling and practically




The purpose of this chapter is to examine the Initial Public Offerings market in the
United Kingdom with particular reference to 'stabilisation'.
As is now clear, the post-issue performance of IPOs has puzzled financial economists
for some time. In the UK, Merrit, Howe and Newbould first revealed the existence of
an abnormal return generated by new issues in their 1959-1963 study. In the United
States evidence of abnormal returns stretches back even further. As was disclosed in
the previous chapter, the level of the abnormal return reported varies considerably
from one study to the next but it would be reasonable to suggest that a return of 10%
from the issue price to closing middle market price at the end of the first day of
dealings is typical.
There have been a number of attempts to explain this phenomena. As now has been
demonstrated, no definitive explanation has as yet been put forward. Theories
essentially fall into two camps. These are that stock issues are deliberately
underpriced by sponsoring investment banks (for a number of reasons) or that IPOs
are priced 'accurately' by the sponsors but then the set prices are bid up by
exogenous market factors such as purely speculative purchases by investors. As
indicated, no explanation belonging to either of the theoretical camps has managed to
explain the phenomenon properly.
The purpose of this paper is to introduce a different explanation (in a UK context).
The 'new' theory is that of 'stabilisation'. Analysis of this theory has been put
forward in the USA by authors such as Ruud, Schultz & Zaman, Hanley and
Benveniste. Their findings are mixed but are of sufficient interest to merit
investigation in a UK context.
Stabilisation is a hybrid of the existing theories in that its existence constitutes
deliberate action by sponsors to manipulate the pricing of the shares but does not
involve underpricing (i.e. no deliberate pricing below 'fair' value). In essence
'stabilisation' involves the broking house responsible for the issue supporting the
price of the underlying stock in the aftermarket.
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To find evidence of stabilisation we do not look explicitly at returns generated by
IPOs but at the distribution of these returns. If there was no stabilisation taking place
we would expect the distribution of log returns to form a symmetrical curve with a
positive mean. If the distribution is skewed then the left hand tail of the distribution
will be censored out. On that basis if analysis reveals a positively skewed distribution
and if the extent of the skewness declines over time then we may well deduce that
stabilisation is taking place.
This chapter is organised in the following manner. Section two provides a brief
review of the literature specific to the methodology adopted in this study. A full
review of the literature in respect of stabilisation can be found in chapter five.
Section three contains the pricing model used in the analysis with section four
containing data and results. The conclusions can be found in section five.
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6.2 'Stabilisation'
Excess Returns from 'Stabilisation'
All of the empirical studies outlined provide evidence that IPOs are underpriced and
provide abnormal returns to investors in the immediate post-issue period. It appears
firms 'leave money on the table' in significant amounts. This is obviously a source of
capital market inefficiency.
In contrast to the evidence of the many studies done to date it appears that there may
be an explanation of the observed underpricing in which neither the issuer nor the
sponsor deliberately underprice the offering and the flotation price does reflect the
true intrinsic value of the firm. Compelling evidence of this phenomenon was put
forward by Ruud (1993) where she introduces the concept of 'stabilisation' as an
explanation of the excess abnormal returns made by IPOs. Her study examines not
only the mean level of initial returns made by IPOs but also the distribution of these
returns. The findings of the study are that instead of forming a symmetric curve with
positive mean, the distribution of one day returns is found to peak sharply at zero and
include very few observations in the negative left hand tail.
In contrast to the widely held view that IPO underpricing is undertaken deliberately,
the findings presented here suggest that the apparent underpricing may be attributed
to underwriter price support. When prices are subject to support in the aftermarket,
observations which would normally appear in the negative left hand tail of the
distribution may be propped up to zero or slightly negative by purchases undertaken
by the sponsor at the offer price
This 'censoring' of the negative tail of the distribution of returns could produce a
positive mean initial return even if issue prices were correctly set.
As was discussed earlier, underwriter price support involves transactions that prevent
or retard a decline in the market price of a security. In the US, as in the UK, the
relevant authorities tend to frown upon price manipulation. However on both sides of
the Atlantic it is allowed. Although supporting prices may tie underwriter's capital in
the short run, it has been suggested that the practice enhances underwriters'
reputations with issuers and investors. The SEC has taken the position that
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stabilisation is not manipulative so long as the possibility of stabilisation is included
in the offering documents.
Statistical analysis provides a means of evaluating whether IPO underpricing is a
deliberate strategy or a consequence of support activities undertaken by underwriters.
If IPO underpricing were undertaken across the board on a deliberate basis then the
distribution of returns (one-day) would be roughly bell-shaped with the peak of the
distribution centred some way greater than zero. However, Ruud finds that few IPOs
fall below their offered price immediately and instead of the bell-shaped curve which
we would expect, Ruud found that the distribution of returns peaks steeply at zero
and that the left hand (negative) tail of the distribution declines sharply. This
observed distribution is symptomatic of support.
In the case of IPOs, the censoring level is a return of zero. Initial returns of zero are
observed in instances where returns less than zero would have been observed in the
absence of support. In this way systematic support allows the right tail (positive
returns) to be observed, but not the left tail. The censoring of the left tail could
produce a positive mean initial return even if the IPO offering prices were set at true
'intrinsic' value.
Ruud examined 469 IPOs in the 1982/83 period and specifically looked at returns
over one day, one week, two weeks, three weeks and four weeks. Using the statistical
measure of skewness, kurtosis, she found that the distribution of returns was indeed
skewed in the way in which she postulated and that the level of skewness declined
over the time periods outlined. This is symptomatic of price support taking place and
then being slowly withdrawn as time passes. Ruud was then able to determine that,
net of the effect of stabilisation, the underlying share price gains were not enough to
allow a profitable trading strategy net of transactions costs. From the evidence
presented Ruud argues that the average abnormal return is not a function of pure
underpricing by underwriters.
A number of other studies have identified 'stabilisation'. The differing approaches
adopted by these studies and the results thereof have been reported already in chapter
five and consequently, while mentioning their existence, no further comment will be
made in this chapter.
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6.3 The Pricing Model
A great deal of previous work on abnormal returns from IPOs rests on the premise
that these issues are deliberately underpriced by the sponsoring banks. This has
implications for the mean return which we would expect from our sample of IPOs. If
the issue prices were unbiased estimates of the true valuations of the underlying
companies, we should expect that the distribution of returns from the sample would
have a zero mean.
If issues are deliberately underpriced then we would expect the distribution of
returns105 to have some finite mean greater than zero. However, despite the shift in
the mean level of returns due to underpricing it should remain the case that the actual
distribution of returns remains strictly normal.
Ifwe assume that the estimated price, Pest is an unbiased estimate of the true market
price (with error, a) of the true market price Ptrue such that
pest=ptruex£ where log s ~ N(0,c>2)
Then by taking logs of each side of the above equation we derive
log Pest = log Plrue + logs
In the process we are assuming a log - normal distribution of errors. This should be
appropriate in consideration of the nature of the pricing process. The process
involves the collection ofmany random pieces of information which it is reasonable
to assume are random and have no relation to one another. We can then use the
findings of central limit theorem, namely that the sum of a large number of
independent random variables is distributed approximately normally.
If the offering price, P0 is the unbiased forecast of the true price, Pest, then the
expected value of the log price relative (the ration of the actual market price to the
offering price) should be zero and the variance a , the variance of the forecast error
term.
Indeed, as we know that P0 = Pest = Ptrue x s, it follows that
log(ptrue/po) = logPtrue " logPfue " ^gS
= - logs
105




which has, by definition, expected value zero and variance a .
Now assume that the initial offering price P0, is set by the sponsor to be some
positive fraction, 0, of the unbiased estimate, Pest, where the fraction is strictly more
than zero and less than one. The expected value of the log price relative will be an
unbiased estimator of -log0, since (0 < 0 <1, -log0 is a positive number), but its
variance is still a . We can verify this mathematically.
Given that the offering price is set as
P0 =0x Pest
= 0 x Ptrue x s
it follows that..
log(Ptrue/Po) = log Ptrue " l«g0 " logPtrue " logs
= -log© - logs
which has expected value -log© and variance a . The formula above is simply the
same as the formula quoted earlier shifted by the amount of the underpricing, 0. The
distribution of the returns should, therefore, not be altered by the underpricing.
The distribution of returns should be unaffected by the underpricing and this should
be reflected in the statistical measurements of the returns distribution.
Therefore, underpricing should only shift the mean of a distribution of initial returns.
The statistical measures of higher moments, variance, kurtosis and skewness, should
not be effected.
In reference to the criticisms which have been advanced in the recent past over the
validity of using a log return model, a second set of analysis is provided using
standard 'non-logged' data.
Here, the excess return is defined as..
Return = (Pj - F})/ Fj
Where Pj is the closing mid-market price of the shares in the aftermarket and Fj
is the flotation price. The results of this second study are presented along with the
main study results.
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6.4 Data and Evidence
This section of the paper presents the evidence that market operators affect the
returns on initial public offerings via their stabilising activities. Information on
companies which floated in the UK was provided by the Quality of Markets
Department of the London Stock Exchange. This information was cross-referenced
against similar information provided by KPMG Corporate Finance in London who
also provided financial information on the flotations and the flotation prices of the
companies concerned.
The sample consists of 287 initial public offerings made on the London Stock Market
and including issues made on the Unlisted Securities Market in the UK between July
1989 and December 1994. Of the 287 firms in the sample, 257 floated on the main
market and 30 on the USM. The sample accounts for some twenty eight billion
pounds worth of new equity issued at the flotation price. The sample specifically
excludes all corporate entities which merely moved from the USM to the main
market in the sample period. Also excluded are 'reverse take-overs' and
introductions. The sample was further restricted to issues of common stock. For the
purposes of the study it was necessary to obtain after-market pricing data for the
stocks which came to the market within the sample period. Three data sources were
used to obtain the pricing data. Information was downloaded from DataStream,
Bloomberg and FactSet systems and cross-referenced to ensure accuracy.
Information on middle-market closing prices one day, one week, two weeks, three
weeks and four weeks after the issue started trading was obtained. In accordance with
normal event study methodology, these dates corresponded to event days 1,5,10,15
and 20. The data set was then examined for possible erroneous data items. Erroneous
data points which produced excess returns outwith the range greater than +75% or
less than -50% were excluded. As a result twelve of the sample were excluded from
the analysis.
Returns are measured as the natural log of the ratio of the price in the aftermarket at
time t divided by the offering price, log(Pt/P0). As such if a stock's middle market
closing price is the same as the offered price than the return will be zero. The log
return as defined is the continuously compounded yield from holding the security.
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The following histograms (figure 1) show the distribution of returns over the defined
event periods from the sample of IPOs as discussed. The distributions are peaked at
or around the zero return level and asymmetry in the distribution of the returns at the
one day level can clearly be seen.
Day 1 Returns
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Table 1 (above) - Histograms of initial returns of IPOs.
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Table 2
Statistical Analysis of Returns Distributions for the IPO sample.
Day 1 Return Week 1 Return Week 2 Return Week 3 Return Week 4 Return
Mean 8.37% 8.88% 7.90% 8.04% 8.33%
Median 5.67% 7.06% 7.15% 7.70% 7.62%
Minimum -38.57% -30.11% -39.64% -43.45% -45.20%
Maximum 74.00% 71.11% 71.47% 70.75% 70.75%
Std. Dev 0.137 0.144 0.144 0.151 0.156
Skewness 1.339 1.253 0.738 0.653 0.401
Kurtosis 5.000 3.925 3.319 2.857 1.925
The table above summarises the statistical properties of the return distribution for the
IPO sample. The first point of interest is the relationship between the mean and the
median returns as shown. If a distribution of returns is symmetrical then we would
expect that the mean and median measures of return would be the same. In the table
above we can see that while for the two, three and four week returns this is broadly
the case at the one day and one week levels the two measures are quite different. This
may indicate positive but declining skewness. However the evidence that we would
expect to see in that the level of the minimum return should increase over time is not
as clear. While the minimum return does get worse over longer time periods it
appears to get better on a one week view. This is contra to expectations. The fact that
the maximum return is broadly the same over all time periods is as expected as
'stabilisation' will have no effect on the price on the upside.
Further evidence on the existence of stabilisation, which is at first significant and is
then gradually removed, is provided by examination of the higher moments of the
distributions, namely their skewness and kurtosis.
Skewness is based on the third moment of a distribution. Ruud uses Kendall and
Stuart to provide a definition. They define skewness as follows.
23 2 • 3
p! = p 3 / p 2 > where p 3 is the third moment about the mean squared and p 21S the
variance cubed. If a distribution is symmetric then we would expect Pj = 0. If pj > 0
then the distribution is said to be positively skewed. Likewise if P! <0 then the
distribution is said to be negatively skewed. From the data presented in Table 1
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above, it can be seen that the distribution of returns is positively skewed and that this
skewness decreases over time. This finding is wholly consistent with price support.
Supporting the price would cause the left hand tail of the distribution to be censored
out and for the whole pattern of returns to be skewed positively. Gradual abatement
of support would see the distribution of returns tend to that exhibited by a normally
distributed random variable. This would seem to be confirmed by the decreasing
reported skewness of the sample over longer time periods.
Underwriter support, if it takes place, should result in more returns at or near zero (as
negative returns will be 'propped up' to this level). We can examine this via use of
measures of kurtosis. Kurtosis may be defined as follows.
p2 = |U4 / p 2 > where p2 is the ration of the fourth moment about the mean divided by
the variance squared. If a distribution is normal then we would expect its kurtosis to
be three. If kurtosis p2 > 3 then the distribution is said to be leptokurtic (more
peaked than normal). If P2 < 3 then the distribution is said to be platykurtic (flatter
than normal). From the data in table one we can see that the distribution is
significantly peaked over the one day return period, consistent with stabilisation
taking place. The distribution continues to exhibit positive kurtosis over the one
week time period but then the kurtosis falls away and reverts to a near normal level.
These findings are consistent with underwriter price support taking place.
The following pictures illustrate the effect of positive skewness and kurtosis as found
on the returns distribution.
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Illustrative Diagrams ofNormal / Skewed Distributions
As previously alluded too, there has been some concern voiced with regard to the
validity of using the log return model with reference to determining whether
stabilising activities were being undertaken by investment banks. To that end the
analysis undertaken, whose results have been reported above, was repeated using
non-logged returns. The results of this analysis are reported in the table below.
Table 3
Statistical Analysis of Returns Distributions for the IPO sample (Non-logged Returns)
Day 1 Return Week I Return Week 2 Return Week 3 Return Week 4 Return
Mean 8.43% 9.01% 8.51% 8.66% 9.39%
Median 5.59% 7.00% 7.26% 7.79% 7.68%
Minimum -47.22% -40.95% -47.62% -35.24% -36.36%
Maximum 70.00% 72.35% 75.00% 66.00% 75.00%
Std. Dev 0.145 0.146 0.154 0.151 0.164
Skewness 0.896 0.948 0.835 0.636 0.670
Kurtosis 4.120 2.930 3.226 1.339 1.304
The results of this analysis reveal that the distributions do indeed appear to be less
positively skewed when non-logged returns are used. It also appears as if the
distributions are marginally less peaked by virtue of the lower reported kurtosis.
This positively skewed distribution, where the left hand tail of the returns distribution
is censored out, is symptomatic of stabilising activities taking place.
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Statistical tests were performed on the data as collected to test for the significance of
the departures from normality as suggested by the reported skewness and kurtosis
statistics. The full test details are reported in the statistical appendices but the
following tables summarise the results found. 'FAIL' signifies that the results of the
test are not consistent with those as applied to a normally distributed random
variable.
Logged Data
Day One Day 5 Day 10 Day 15 Day 20
Normality FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL
Skewness FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL
Kurtosis FAIL PASS PASS PASS PASS
'Overall' FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL PASS
Non - Logged Data
Day One Day 5 Day 10 Day 15 Day 20
Normality FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL
Skewness FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL
Kurtosis FAIL FAIL PASS PASS PASS
'Overall' FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL FAIL
Interpreting the results of the tests, it is clear that as has already been suggested, the
distributions are highly skewed over all time periods. This result is consistent for
both the logged and non-logged data. The distributions also show initial statistically
significant positive kurtosis but, as can clearly be seen, this soon reduces. This is
evidenced by the data passing the Anscombe-Glynn kurtosis test for the later time
periods. This is consistent with declining price support.
In summary, the results do point to the presence of stabilising activities with the
returns distributions being initially highly skewed and peaked but with this reducing
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with time to the extent that the peakedness of the distributions returns to that
associated with a normally distributed random variable. The positive skewness also
declines over time but not to a sufficient degree to pass normality tests. This may be
due to share prices in general having a returns distribution which is not strictly
normal and hence even in the absence of stabilising activities the distribution of
returns may exhibit some degree of skewness.
In addition to the principal analysis, further work was undertaken to examine the
sample for any size characteristics. Specifically, it was sought to determine whether
investment banks were more or less inclined to support larger IPOs (such as in this
case government privatisation issues). For the purposes of this analysis the database
was segregated at the level where new IPOs would fail to qualify for entry into the
FTSE Small Cap. index of shares. The results of this analysis are presented below.
Table 4 - Returns Statistics (Split Sample)
Logged Returns Split Sample
Big Stocks
(logged)
Mean 9.19% 10.78% 9.37% 10.33% 10.10%
Median 13.18% 16.48% 14.00% 15.17% 14.70%
Minimum -13.84% -9.01% -14.19% -16.34% -18.39%
Maximum 19.61% 34.73% 35.07% 34.57% 34.23%
Std. Dev 0.100 0.110 0.109 0.121 0.124
Skewness -0.760 -0.301 -0.304 -0.405 -0.505
Kurtosis -0.540 -0.622 -0.001 -0.461 -0.440
Small Stocks
(logged)
Mean 8.27% 8.63% 7.71% 7.74% 8.10%
Median 5.33% 6.45% 6.69% 7.32% 6.80%
Minimum -38.57% -30.11% -39.64% -43.45% -45.20%
Maximum 74.00% 71.11% 71.47% 70.75% 70.75%
Std. Dev 0.141 0.148 0.148 0.155 0.160
Skewness 1.427 1.347 0.802 0.737 0.469
Kurtosis 4.996 4.055 3.348 3.002 1.997
Non logged returns Split Sample
Big Stocks
(non logged)
Mean 10.14% 12.03% 10.45% 11.65% 11.44%
Median 14.09% 17.92% 15.03% 16.39% 15.84%
Minimum -12.92% -8.62% -13.23% -15.08% -16.80%
Maximum 21.67% 41.53% 42.00% 41.29% 40.82%
Std. Dev 0.106 0.121 0.119 0.132 0.135
Skewness -0.637 -0.078 0.013 -0.156 -0.264




Mean 8.20% 8.61% 8.26% 8.27% 9.12%
Median 5.30% 6.35% 6.67% 7.50% 6.92%
Minimum -47.22% -40.95% -47.62% -35.24% -36.36%
Maximum 70.00% 72.35% 75.00% 66.00% 75.00%
Std. Dev 0.149857 0.148423 0.158657 0.153587 0.167489
Skewness 0.977595 1.050117 0.895614 0.723635 0.746603
Kurtosis 4.158808 3.206192 3.28098 1.537712 1.406037
Results for both logged and non-logged returns are reported but, as with the previous
analysis on the whole data set, there is little material difference between the two sets
of results.
What is of interest is the differences in reported skewness across the company size
spectrum. It would appear that the skewness we would associate with price support is
most prevalent among the smaller stocks in the sample. The statistics reported above
indicate little by way of positive skewness reported in relation to the larger flotations
undertaken in the sample period. In some ways this is a disingenuous fact as
stabilising activities are likely to be far easier and more able to have the desired share
price effect on smaller companies where injections of relatively small amounts of
capital by investment banks can arrest a price decline. Obviously, for larger IPO far
more capital must be risked by the banks concerned. One possible conclusion which
can be arrived at from the evidence provided is that the large issues (many
government privatisation issues in this case) did not need intervention when they
commenced trading. Institutional and public demand was sufficiently strong to see
them trade comfortably above their flotation prices (a government objective) and
hence the sponsoring banks were not asked the difficult question of whether they
would undertake stabilising transactions.
The following data on the variances of the returns from within the two sub-sample
groups adds weight to the argument that the larger stocks appeared to have more
stable return characteristics.
Table 5 - Sample Variances
Day 1 Day 5 Day 10 Day 15 Day 20
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Big Stocks Variance 0.99% 1.20% 1.18% 1.45% 1.55%
Small Stocks Variance 2.00% 2.20% 2.20% 2.40% 2.56%
(logged)
The following table of enumerated data adds to the argument in the sense that is
shows that the percentage of negative returns for both the small and large stocks is
broadly the same across the different time frames. However, the strength of the
inference which can be drawn from this is limited by the relatively small number of
'big' stocks in the analysis.
Table 6 - Enumerated Data'06
Number of Negative
Returns
Big Stocks Number % Small
Stocks
Number %
Day 1 6 18.75% Day 1 49 17.50%
Day 5 2 7.41% Day 5 52 19.48%
Day 10 6 19.35% Day 10 66 24.81%
Day 15 7 21.88% Day 15 73 25.98%
Day 20 8 25.81% Day 20 76 27.34%
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The results presented in section four above are most interesting. They give
considerable support to the existence of some form of stabilisation in the UK.
This is an explanation for IPO excess performance which has not as yet been
advanced in the UK context. Stabilisation is allowed by the London Stock Exchange
in the same way as it is in the USA. However, anecdotal evidence suggests that
actual indications of stabilisation (in terms of an official announcement which has to
be made) are far fewer. For instance Stoll, in his US based study in the late sixties
indicated that 54 of 229 IPOs he examined were stabilised. The number of issues
subject to stabilisation in the UK as a proportion of IPOs is much lower. It would
appear then that we must look for a different explanation in the UK to explain the
returns distribution which is characteristic of stabilisation taking place. The answer
may lie in the quote driven order system in the UK and in the ability ofmarket
makers to buy stock back onto their own market making books at their own behest.
As the average market capitalisation of IPO firms is relatively small, this could be
achieved without putting significant capital at risk. Such a procedure would not
constitute stabilisation per se (and would therefore not need to be communicated to
the Stock Exchange) but would have the same net effect.
Extending this study to examine the relationship between the size of the IPO firm (or
more explicitly, the size of the issue) and the level of abnormal return has revealed an
interesting result. Intuitively, sponsoring firms should be less able to support larger
issues as these issues will involve tying up a greater proportion of the firm's free
capital. Indeed, this is the logical conclusion of the analysis conducted here. It does
appear that sponsoring banks are far more willing and able to support the shares of
smaller IPOs than they are those of large IPOs. While caution needs to be read into
the analysis as a function of the market's desire for such shares at the time of
flotation (and hence, as intimated to earlier the potential absence of any need to
undertake stabilising transactions in any case) the evidence does point to little or no
stabilising activity amongst larger IPOs.
Clearly, however, there is strong evidence to suggest that stabilisation is a feature of




Moving on from the last chapter where persuasive evidence on the existence of
stabilisation in the UK IPO market was presented, this chapter seeks to move the
analysis forward by seeking to identify a further anomaly within the UK IPO market.
Using the same data set as in the previous chapter, the aim of this chapter is to
examine the data set to determine if IPO firms attempt to 'signal' their quality as
potential investments through their choice of flotation advisers. By doing so they
may be able to reduce indirect costs of underpricing.
A secondary issue which will be examined is that of whether IPO companies get
'value for money' from the advisors they choose to appoint. The point at issue here is
that if there is no positive advantage to using high reputation sponsors, is there a
direct cost disadvantage being borne by those companies which choose to use one?
Section two contains a literature review of the work carried out in the areas of
'asymmetric information' and signalling. Section three contains details on the study
methodology and the data set. Section 4 contains the empirical results and
conclusions.
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7.2 Review of the literature
7.2.1 Underpricing - Informational Asymmetries and Signals
7.2.1.1 'Lemons'
An excellent starting point for a debate on the role of informational uncertainty and
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signalling is the paper presented by George Akerlof in 1970 . In his paper he uses
the example of the car market to illustrate his argument. He focuses on the reasons
why a 'nearly new' car suffers such a severe price decline after leaving the
showroom.
Akerlof sets up a model in which there are four types of car. There are new cars, used
cars, 'good' cars and 'bad' cars (which he refers to as 'lemons'). Both new and used
cars may be 'good' cars or 'lemons'. The individual participants in this market are
ex-ante uninformed about the quality of their potential purchase; it may be 'good' or
'bad'. However, they do know that the car is 'good' with probability q and bad with
probability (1-q) as these represent the probability distribution of cars produced
falling into the appropriate categories as they leave the factory. After owning the
vehicle for a short period of time the owner is aware of the quality of his purchase. In
other words if the car is a 'lemon' this information is now revealed. Consequently,
the owner revises his probability distribution concerning the quality of the purchase.
This estimate benefits from the additional information now available to the owner
and is, consequently, more accurate. An asymmetry of information has now
developed. Should the current owner choose to sell the vehicle he has more
information than any potential purchaser. However, this information is private and
therefore good cars and bad cars must continue to sell at the same price. Logically, a
used car cannot have the same valuation as a new car. If this were the case it would
be advantageous to trade a 'lemon' at the price of a new car and buy another new car
at a higher probability of being good and a lower probability of being bad. In that
way the owner of a good car faces a dilemma as the price he will be able to attain for
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the good vehicle will be less than its true value. Therefore, most cars traded will be
'lemons' and good cars may not be traded at all. The bad cars have driven out the
good.
The process can be taken further. Specifically, with the example of cars Akerlof used
a binary 'quality' variable. However, 'quality' could easily be a continuous variable.
In such circumstance as opposed to the 'bad' driving out the 'good', the 'bad' could
drive out the 'not quite so bad'... and so on in a sequence of events the culmination of
which would be no market trade taking place at all.
The asymmetry problem is a feature of the initial public offerings market. A priori,
potential investors are uninformed as to the quality of the potential entrant onto the
market. There is no share price information available with which to assess risk and
access to detailed financial information is limited. Obviously, it is in the interests of
the firms involved to attain a valuation equivalent to their intrinsic 'quality'. To that
end some means of'transmitting' the quality of the firm must be found. Insiders to
IPO flotations need to 'signal' the true quality of the firms as an investment in some
manner before the flotation.
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7.2.1.2 Signalling by 'insiders' and their agents
The original work on 'signalling' in this context was undertaken by Leland and
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Pyle . The authors develop a model of capital structure and financial equilibrium in
their 1977 paper which seeks to help resolve the asymmetry problem. In their model
entrepreneurs seek financing of projects whose true qualities are known only to the
entrepreneurial 'insiders'. They show that the willingness of the entrepreneur to
invest can act as a signal of true project value. Such 'signalling' incurs welfare costs
but the authors show that the set of investment projects which will be undertaken is
the same as the set which would be undertaken in an environment where direct
information transfer were possible. In essence, the entrepreneurs signal the
underlying quality of the prospective IPO by assuming greater amounts of specific
risk in their own portfolios than would be ideal, i.e., the entrepreneurial insiders bias
the asset allocation of their personal portfolios in favour of the IPO firm and in that
way send a credible signal to uninformed potential investors.
The model advocated by the authors is specified below.
V(oc) = l/(l+r).[p(a)-A,], (1)
where V(a) defines the value of the firm given information signal a, r is the risk free
rate, p(a) the market valuation schedule, expressing the market's perception of the
true expected return as a function of a, the fraction of equity retained by the
entrepreneur and X represents the market's adjustment for the risk of the project.
Information disclosures by 'insiders' (pre-offering entrepreneurs) may also transmit
information to uninformed market participants if these information disclosures are
verified by agents who have reputation capital at stake. Institutions which stand to
lose their reputation capital and future income through erroneous disclosures should
be able to send a powerful signal to the markets concerning the quality of
information released. This role for advising agents is modelled in Titman and
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H. E. Leland and D. H. Pyle, 'Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure and Financial
Intermediation', Journal of Finance, Vol XXXII, May 1977 p371 -385
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Trueman109 (TT). They demonstrate that entrepreneurs with more favourable private
information choose higher quality 'agents' to float their firms than entrepreneurs with
less favourable private information. This results because higher quality agents are
deemed to be more accurate in assessing the firm prospects (and consequently value)
than lower quality agents. If investors can detect these agent quality differences then,
as TT suggest, agent quality (and cost) should be positively related to initial firm
value.
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S. Titman and B. Trueman, 'Information Quality and the Valuation ofNew Issues', Journal of
Accounting and Economics, June 1986 pi59 - 172
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7.2.2 Empirical Studies - USA
Leland and Pyle's paper was theoretical. They introduced theory but did not provide
any empirical support for their work. One of the first empirical tests of the LP model
was provided by Downes and Heinkel"0 (DH) in their 1982 paper. The authors study
297 firms which went public between 1965 and 1969. Taking the LP model, (1), they
estimated the following empirical form.
Vj = b0 + b,K] + b2otj + Uj , (2)
Where V, defines the total market value of equity at the offer price, K represents the
funds raised, Oj (= a + In (1-a)) is the percentage of equity retained by the pre
offering shareholders and U: is the disturbance term. From the LP model its clear that
coefficient b2 should be negatively signed11'. Initial ordinary least squares (OLS)
analysis supported this conclusion but the model coefficients were found to be
inefficient due to the effects of heteroscedasticity. Consequently, the process was re-
estimated using the weighted least squares (WLS) technique without any loss of
support for the initial conclusions. The authors were consequently able to provide
initial evidence in favour of the LP model.
Downes and Heinkel took the analysis one stage further by extending their original
model to include variables for firm risk and for the signalling effects of dividends
and underwriter quality. Within this structure, firm value was assumed to be a
multiplier function of these explanatory variables and normalised firm earnings (E).
The following revised functional form was estimated.
Vj = (a0 + a.], a + a2.Yj + a3.DEBTj + a4.INDj + a5.AGEj + a6.SLSj + a7.GRWj +
a8.UWQj + a9.HOTj).Ej + Uj ,(3)
110
D. H. Downes and R. Heinkel, 'Signalling and the Valuation of Unseasoned New Issues', Journal
of Finance March 1982 pi - 10
111











Coded one if a dividend declared in the issue prospectus and zero
otherwise
Ratio of total debt to total assets for the equity issue
Coded one for firms in electronics, manufacturing and computing and
zero otherwise
Logarithm of the firm's age in years
Logarithm of the latest full year's sales
Compound growth rate in sales over the three years of accounts pre
issue
Dummy variable coded one for a prestigious underwriter and zero
otherwise
Dummy variable coded one for the 'hot' issue market of July 1967 -
Dec 1969
The model was so specified with parameters Y and UWQ to try to capture possible
dividend signalling and underwriter reputation effects. To account for the presence of
heteroscedasticity, the model parameters were divided by E and the method of non¬
linear least squares used in estimation of the model in its logarithmic form. The
estimated parameters provided support for the LP model and also for the relationship
proposed with regard to sponsor quality by Titman and Trueman. The dividend
signalling hypothesis was not supported.
The support for the LP model advanced by DH was soon questioned by Ritter in his
1984 paper. Ritter argued that the positive relation between firm values and the
percentage of equity retained by the entrepreneurs could be consistent not only with
the LP signalling hypothesis but also with 'agency' and 'wealth' effects. In Ritter's
'wealth' effect, firms of higher value need offer less equity to obtain a given level of
issue proceeds. His 'agency' argument is based on the notion that higher levels of
equity retention lead to higher firm values because management will be more
inclined to act in the best interests of the firm. In the wealth effect, a is treated as the
endogenous variable and V as the exogenous variable whilst the reverse is the case in
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the agency effect. For the LP signalling effect, the direction of causation is the same
as in the wealth effect as the entrepreneur selects a based on firm value, V, which is
assumed to be exogenous.
In Ritter's study, 559 US firms issuing equity in the period 1965 - 1973 were studied.
For these issues a direct test of the valuation equation presented by LP was
conducted. The first post offering market value of equity, V, in the offerings was
regressed on the percentage of equity retained, a, the net proceeds raised by the firm,
K, and the level of the firms earnings in the year prior to issue. Ritter then deflated
the model by the firm's pre issue book value to adjust for heteroscedasticity.
Estimating the WLS equation derived, a positive relation between V and a was
recorded. This positive relation is consistent with the signalling, agency and wealth
hypotheses as outlined.
A useful advance on the Ritter paper is that of Krinsky and Rotenberg, who
published their findings in 1989. The authors used a mixture ofWLS and 2SLS
techniques on a sample of 115 Canadian IPOs in the period from 1971 to 1983. The
results of their analysis allowed them to reject both the agency and wealth effect
hypotheses in the context of the Canadian market. The signalling effect was also
rejected by the authors in an earlier part of their paper in a direct test of the LP
model. The second part of the KR paper focused on the Titman and Trueman
argument that quality of advising agents could help signal form value in the context
of an IPO.
An important finding of the KR study is the support it offers for the Titman and
Trueman signalling model. Further support for the TT model is provided by Simunic
112
and Stein (SS) who examined 490 unseasoned US offerings during 1981. From
this data, the approach ofDownes and Heinkel in modelling initial firm value as a
function of expected earnings was employed.
112
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They estimate the model
Vj = mrHi 1 ui (5)
To remove the heteroscedasticity from (5) the model was deflated by company
earnings (E) to give a WLS form. Within the multiplier, m, dummy variables for the
quality of the investment bankers (UNQ) and auditors to the issue (AU) were
defined. In addition a variable for the proportion of listed shares retained by insiders
(INSIDE) was defined as well as a set of control variables. From the estimated
equation, the signal variables UNQ, AU and INSIDE were all insignificantly related
to firm value at the 5% level.
SS then estimated a modified model with E, above, replaced by B, the book value of
shareholders equity. The new model was deflated by B. WLS estimates showed that
UNQ, AU and INSIDE were all positively related to the dependent variable. While
this does indeed lend some support to the LP and TT hypotheses, the volatility of the
model means support cannot be given unequivocally.
At this intermediate stage it seems logical to consider the implications of the
evidence presented from the USA. It seems that there is empirical support for both
the LP and TT models as indeed has been discussed above. As the methodology is
relatively simple it has been replicated in a number of empirical studies. It seems that
there is evidence that insider equity ownership retention and flotation advisor quality
can serve to indicate to potential investors the higher quality (and hence value) of a
potential IPO company. However, the evidence is not unequivocal, as has been
discussed. In particular, the empirical tests of the LP model present mixed results as
to its validity .
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7.2.3 Empirical Studies - UK
The UK stockmarket is very different in a number ofways from the markets in the
USA.
Apart from being smaller in absolute terms there are differences in the way the
markets are organised and in how business is transacted upon them. Specifically, the
113
US market is characterised by a number of different exchanges .
Stocks can be quoted on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the American
Stock Exchange (AMEX) or the NASDAQ index. In the UK there is only one
principal market, the London Stock Exchange. At an operational level, the US
markets are 'order driven' where as the UK market operates on a 'market maker'
system.
In summary, the US market is far larger than the UK market and trade is conducted
in a slightly different manner. It seems proper therefore to consider some of the
evidence on signalling from a UK perspective.
The results of Leland and Pyle's work were underpinned and extended in a UK
setting114 by the results of research conducted by Keasey and McGuinness"5. They
investigated the role of signalling in the valuation of unseasoned public offerings on
the Unlisted Securities Market in the UK in the period from 1984 to 1986. They
analyse data on 190 companies floating on the Unlisted Securities Market over the
period. The model adopted by the authors is specified as follows
V = B0 + B,.RE + B2.NEW + B3.UND + B4.ACC + B5.SP + B6.BR + B7.MER +
B8.DF + B9.IND + BI0.NA + B„.E + B12.GRO
Where
113
More importantly, perhaps, certain stocks are more likely to be listed on certain exchanges than
others. For example, the NASDAQ Exchange contains a great many high technology stocks.
114
The first US based test was carried out by Downes and Heinkel in 1982
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RE = Percentage of post offering equity retained by pre-listing shareholders
NEW = New money raised by the firm divided by gross proceeds raised
UND = Excess market return between issue and t+5 trading day
ACC = Dummy variable for quality of accountant - 1 = high quality
SP = Dummy variable for quality of sponsor - 1 = high quality
BR = Dummy variable for quality of broker - 1 = high quality
MER = Dummy variable for presence of an additional merchant bank - 1 =
presence
DF = Dummy variable coded 1 if firm disclosed an earnings forecast
IND = Dummy variable coded 1 if firm in electricals, textiles, oil and gas and
misc. industrial sectors
NA = Net assets on flotation
E = Earnings for the accounting year immediately pre flotation
GRO = Log of 1 plus % change in market index for two months preceding
float
The results of this study were in line with the LP model. The coefficient ofRE was
significantly positive at the 5% level. The coefficient of the explanatory variable
ACC was also significant at the 5% level, indicating support for the TT model.
From the signals considered in the analysis, the percentage of equity retained, the
level of planned capital expenditure, the degree of underpricing and quality of the
reporting accountants and the costs of flotation were all positively and significantly
related to firm value.
The significance of the underpricing variable is of particular interest. The evidence
presented suggests that firms may choose higher quality agents in the flotation
process to reduce the need for underpricing.
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7.2.4 Quality. Risk and Underpricing
The preceding discussion on signalling behaviour has shown that entrepreneurial
insiders appear to have an incentive to use high quality advising agents to float their
firms on the stockmarket. Use of such agents maximises valuations of the firms
because uncertainty over the quality of the businesses is minimised through the use
of 'highly' reputable advisors who put their reputation capital and income streams at
stake every time they act as advisors to a flotation.
In this part of the analysis it will be hypothesised that use of such 'quality' agents
should reduce excess returns (underpricing) in the aftermarket. The notion behind
this statement is that higher quality advisors should only be interested in working
with high quality potential IPO firms. These firms should have a lower risk
(uncertainty) profile and consequently the levels of excess returns from these
investments should be lower.
The starting point for this analysis is the asymmetric information model presented by
Kevin Rock116. This model was discussed at some length in chapter five.
It is some of the inferences of the Rock model that are of particular interest for the
117
purposes of this study. Of particular note are the studies by Ritter and Beatty and
118
Ritter (BR) who note that the greater the ex-ante uncertainty surrounding the
aftermarket price of an offering, the greater the level of underpricing required to
compensate investors for becoming informed. Both these papers test the theory that
higher ex-ante uncertainty should lead to higher excess returns and both offer support
for this hypothesis.
A second proposition developed and tested in Beatty and Ritter is that sponsors who
fail to enforce the relation between initial return levels and ex-ante uncertainty levels
subsequently lose market share. To test this proposition 483 issues were examined
116
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over the period 1977 - 1981 and the market shares for the underwriters involved in
four or more offerings computed. Predicted initial returns were then computed for
each firm j taken public by sponsor I. These predicted initial returns were then
subtracted from the initial returns to leave a residual Ri. For each of the 49
underwriters an average residual was computed and then standardised residuals
(SARs) computed for each sponsor. From this process, BR argue that the 24
underwriters with the largest SAR were pricing 'off the equilibrium line' with the
remaining 25 pricing 'on the line'. For the 24 'off the line' BR noted that their
market shares fell by 47% between the two sub-periods of the study.
Given that the incentive to 'cheat' and price IPOs off the 'equilibrium line' is a
decreasing function of sponsor quality (prestige), a negative relation between sponsor
reputation and underpricing levels should be expected. However, in this context the
sponsors may not be 'cheating' per se. The relationship may reflect the fact that the
less prestigious sponsors deal with issues with higher ex-ante uncertainty.
Consequently, the less prestigious sponsors may in fact be enforcing the BR
equilibrium and not cheating on it.
Carter and Manaster have completed some empirical work in the USA on the
reputation - pricing phenomenon. They test a sample of 501 issues in the period 1979
- 1983 to determine if'prestigious' underwriters are associated with issues which are
subject to less 'price run-up' (excess return). The hypothesis tested revealed that the
mean return for the prestigious underwriter group in the sample was 13.16% whereas
the mean return for the other sponsors was 19.5%. The means were found to be
statistically different at the 5% level. The authors also tested their hypothesis via
regression analysis.
They regressed the excess return against a set of explanatory variables including a
reputation variable. The reputation variable was negatively signed and found to be
significant at the 5% level.
There has been similar work carried out in the context of the UK market by Holland
and Horton and by Keasey and Short. Both these papers sought to identify what
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relation if any existed between excess returns and a number of explanatory variables
hypothesised to reduce uncertainty.
Holland and Horton use a sample of 222 IPOs from the period 1984 to 1988 in their
study. The results which they obtain do not substantiate the theoretical debate or the
empirical evidence presented from the US studies. The relationships between equity
retention and underpricing and sponsor group reputation and underpricing are either
insignificant or incorrectly signed.
Keasey and Short use a sample of 230 IPOs in the period from 1986 - 1989. The
results of their analysis are somewhat more in line with the theories presented. They
find a significant negative relation between the reputation of the audit firm appointed
as advisors to the flotation and the level of excess return. However, they find no such
relation with sponsoring banks.
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7.2.5 Concluding Remarks
In conclusion, the literature reviewed falls into two categories which are related but
different.
In sections 7.2.1 to 7.2.3 the idea of signalling is introduced in terms of a mechanism
for revealing ex-ante the quality of IPO firms. There is empirical support, which
although not unequivocal, suggests equity retention by entrepreneurs and
appointment of high 'quality' advisors signal the higher quality of the underlying
IPO company. Consequently, this firm is more highly valued. The aim of introducing
this literature is to demonstrate the efficacy of the signalling parameters.
Section 7.2.4 introduces the concept of agent quality as an explanatory variable in the
differential underpricing among IPO firms. The argument introduced here is that
higher quality IPO firms appoint higher quality advisors. The more reputable agents
are mutually attracted to the higher quality IPOs. The higher quality IPOs should
have less associated uncertainty and this should be signalled to the market via their
choice of agent. The lower uncertainty should result in lower excess returns for
higher quality IPOs. This argument has gained some empirical support but is far from
totally supported in the literature. The empirical study undertaken seeks to examine
the level of support which can be attributed to each of the two theories examined.
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7.3 Study Methodology and Data
7.3.1 The Study Data
The data used in this study is concerned with initial public offerings made on the
Main Market and the Unlisted Securities Market of the London Stock Exchange. The
study period spans six years from July 1989 to June 1995.
The dataset was constructed in the following manner. Data on companies floating
was obtained from KPMG Corporate Finance, London. The information provided
included financial information on floating companies and information on the relevant
professional advisors. This information was cross-referenced against information
provided by the Quality ofMarkets Department at the London Stock Exchange for
accuracy. Pricing data for the IPO companies was obtained from DataStream
International and cross-referenced against a second source courtesy of FactSet Ltd.
The dataset included some 302 companies.
The final sample consists of 289 companies. The average level of excess return
achieved by the sample constituents on the first day of trading was 8.3%. This level
represents the index adjusted return from the flotation price to the mid-market price
at the end of the first day's trading. All flotation methods are considered in the
analysis but as indicated in the Keasey and Short119 study, the placing method is that
most favoured by companies.
The following table indicates the flotation methods chosen by companies.
Method Number
Placing 164
Placing / Offer for Sale 45
Placing / Intermediaries Offer 43




Keasey and Short, ibid
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As one of the aims of this study is to determine the effect of sponsor reputation on
levels of excess return it is fundamental to this study the manner in which the various
sponsoring financial institutions are demarcated. For the purposes of this study, this
is achieved by using the results of an annual survey undertaken by Consensus
Research International who are based in London. The Consensus Research
methodology was selected as the most appropriate method of demarcating the
sponsors as it did not automatically associate the sponsors who undertook the most
number of deals as the best. This would have been the case if simply the number of
deals done by a sponsors was taken as the choice criterion.
The Consensus Research method ranks sponsoring institutions on the basis of the
perceptions of their quality as observed by those counterparty to the transactions they
are involved in. For instance, financial advisors would be asked to identify which
institution they regarded as the pre-eminent sponsoring bank not on the basis of
which sponsor did the most deals but which in fact did the best deals. In that sense
the Consensus Research method gives a much better feel for quality of sponsoring
agents.
However, it should be said that this methodology, while arguably the best available,
is not without flaws. It could be argued that those specialist 'boutique' investment
houses, such as Beeson Gregory, do not command a sufficient 'share ofmind' of the
counterparties to flotations to register in the survey when, in fact they are perceived
as one of the pre-eminent small companies sponsoring agents. Certainly, the
possibility of this scenario persisting is testified to be virtue of the fact that all of the
'reputable sponsors' as per the Consensus Research data are large investment banks.
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7.3.2 Models and Variables
In the analysis to follow, the level of underpricing is defined as:
DISC; = [(Pit/It)/(Pi0/Io)]-l
Where Pit= share price at the close of the t th day of trading
Pi0= offer price
It = FT All Share Index level at the close of the t th day of trading
I0 = FT All Share Index level at flotation
Measuring excess returns in this level assumes that the betas of the IPO firms are
unity. As previously discussed, this is a strong assumption, but one which has been
used previously in the literature.
For the purposes of the study, the immediate excess return was focused upon. To that
end the dependent variable is constructed to show excess return on the first day of
trading.
For the current sample of 289 firms, the average underpricing was 8.3% as indicated.
However, the standard deviation of 15.2% is illustrative of the variation in
underpricing across the individual firms. The level of 8.3% is lower than recent
studies. This may in part be reflected in the relatively large number of sizeable
flotations undertaken in the period, (such as the privatisation of the water and
regional electricity companies)
The variables used to explain the underpricing levels are included in the model
below.
EXRTN = B0 + B,.RETD + B2.GPROC + B3.PTP + B4.NAV + B5.SPONREP +
B6.SAME-SB + B7.AUDREP + B8.REPREP + B9.BIG_STOC
Where the variables are defined as follows
Dependent Variable Description
EXRTN (LOG) Level of excess return
Independent Variables
RETD % of post offer equity held by pre float shareholders
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GPROC (LOG) Inverse of gross proceeds of IPO
PTP (LOG) Pre float profit divided by net assets
NAV net asset value pre-float
SPONREP sponsor reputation variable (dummy) coded one if the
sponsor was 'reputable' and zero otherwise
SAMESB same sponsor and broker dummy variable coded on if the
same sponsor and broker were used and zero otherwise
AUDREP auditor reputation dummy coded one if the firm was in the
'big 6' and zero otherwise
SAMEAUD dummy variable coded one if the issuing firm used a
different reporting accountant to the appointed audit firm
BIGSTOC size dummy variable coded one if the firm was a government
privatisation issue
The focus of this study is to determine how agents can signal the quality of potential
investments to circumvent the problem of ex-ante uncertainty. With this in mind a
number of signalling variables have been used in this analysis to try and produce a
parsimonious model of signalling behaviour.
RETD is the percentage of equity retained in the firm post issue by original
shareholders. In a Leland and Pyle sense, the more equity retention by these agents,
120the less uncertainty and the lower the excess return . GPROC is defined as the
inverse of the gross proceeds raised at flotation. This measure was used by Beatty
12i
and Ritter to capture the possibility that small IPOs are more speculative than
122
larger IPOs and therefore are associated with increased ex-ante uncertainty. In a
similar sense PTP and NAV are included in the model to proxy the risk
characteristics of smaller firms. SPONREP is a dummy variable which indicates the
quality of the sponsoring merchant bank. The banks are coded as 'reputable' if they
123ranked in the top five in the survey used for the year in question. Again, as
120
Keasey and Short, ibid, offer an alternative explanation that if retention is too high, marketability
will be reduced and this may actually increase ex-ante uncertainty. This may be a feature of the USM
where they conducted their study.
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The data was provided by Consensus Research International. The tabulations can be found in the
appendices
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discussed, a higher reputation sponsor is hypothesised to reduce ex-ante uncertainty
and consequently the relationship is postulated to be negative. SAME_SB is a
dummy variable coded 1 if the issuing firm uses the same sponsor and stockbroker.
This variable is included to determine if by using an 'integrated' merchant bank the
firm further serves to reduce uncertainty ex-ante. AUDREP is a dummy variable
coded 1 if the auditing firm is one of the 'big 6' firms of accountants in the UK. The
SAME_AUD dummy variable is coded one if the issuing firm used the same firm of
accountants to act as reporting accountants and to audit the business. Analogously to
the sponsoring banks, the intuition here is that firms may appoint the same firm to act
in both capacities to reduce uncertainty. BIG_STOC was introduced to test for
possible differential effects between the large privatisation issues and the remainder
of the issuing companies.
As an adjunct to the primary analysis a second regression model was estimated. The
purpose of this model was to identify if there were any statistically significant
differences in the cost functions for IPO firms using 'reputable' versus 'non-
reputable' sponsoring agents. This second equation was introduced to examine
further the economic efficiency of the IPO market. Specifically, if firms proved to be
unable to use agent quality to signal quality a priori, were they overpaying for the
services provided by sponsors?
The model estimated was as follows
COSTSOF = B0 + B^SPONREP + B2.FUNDS_RA + B3.SPECDV
Where the variables were defined as follows
Dependent Variable Description
COSTSOF Costs of flotation
Independent Variables
SPONREP Dummy variable defined as in the original model
SPECDV Variable defined as SPONREP * FUNDS RA to
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allow for the identification of a differential slope
between two groupings
FUNDSRA Funds raised by IPO firm
The model introduced regressed costs of flotation (COSTSOF) on funds raised
(FUNDS_RA) and two other explanatory variables. The two further explanatory
variables introduced were SPONREP and SPECDV. The aim of the analysis was to
identify if the cost functions for companies floating differed according to whether
they used reputable or non-reputable sponsors. The coefficient of SPONREP acts as a
'differential intercept' coefficient and the coefficient of SPECDV acts as a
'differential slope' coefficient. If both these variable are found to have significant
coefficients the implication will be that the (linear) cost functions for reputable and
non-reputable sponsors have different slopes and intercepts when plotted on a graph
of costs of flotation versus funds raised.
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7.3.3 Empirical Methods
The empirical analysis conducted in the first instance was that of an ordinary least
squares regression (OLS) with excess return as dependent variable and the
explanatory variables as indicated above. Examination of the moments of the
variables EXRTN, GPROC and PTP revealed these variables to be highly skewed.
Therefore the log forms (natural logarithms) of these variables are included in the
analysis.
The model was found to suffer from a heteroscedasticity problem. Variances were
found to be non-constant. While the log transform on certain of the variables partially
alleviated the problem, a more sophisticated approach was tested to attempt to a
stronger statistical model. To that end weighted least squares analysis was used.
WLS, using funds raised as a weighting variable, reduced the heteroscedasticity
problem but the model still failed to pass the Breusch Pagan Godfrey
heteroscedasticity test (as shown in the appendices).
Consequently, White heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors were derived and
these have been used for inference purposes as presented in section four.
In the second estimated regression where the economic efficiency of the IPO market
was examined, the only methodological point worthy of note is the introduction of
the second dummy variable SPECDV. This was done to allow differential slopes of
regression lines as well as differential intercepts to be accounted for. There were no
further econometric problems.
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7.4 Empirical Results and Conclusions
7.4.1 Results of the Study
7.4.1.1 The Main Model
The model produced the following statistical results. The WLS model achieved an R
squared value of 0.52918. The value is broadly in line with that found in the other
studies mentioned in the literature review. The relatively low R squared value should
not come as a surprise as, as Keasey and Short124 point out, a high R squared would
imply that the actual initial excess return of an IPO was predictable.
The F statistic, at 26.1, allows us to reject the hypothesis that all the coefficients of
the explanatory variables are collectively zero at the one percent level.
The following parameter values and t statistics were found for individual explanatory
variables.
WLS Estimates
Variable Est. Coefficient Std. Error T-statistic
RETD -0.091309 0.023268 -3.924
LNGPROC 0.006035 0.008712 0.693
LNPTP 0.012541 0.005588 2.244
NAV 2.79755E-08 1.2171E-08 2.299
SPONREP 0.062907 0.013124 4.793
SAMESB -0.004805 0.016234 -0.296
AUDREP -0.022096 0.014693 -1.504
SAMEAUD 0.002751 0.015894 0.173
BIGSTOC -0.046818 0.014080 -3.325
124
Keasey and Short ibid
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As discussed in section three, problems of heteroscedasticity mean that inference
from the WLS model cannot be made with great reliability. The White estimates are
more appropriate for this purpose. They are shown below.
White Heteroscedasticity Consistent Estimates
Variable Est. Coefficient Std. Error T-statistic
RETD -0.027305 0.039971 -0.68312
LNGPROC -0.0039985 0.013211 -0.30266
LNPTP -0.0041487 0.011781 -0.35214
NAV 0.9895E-07 0.2841E-07 3.4835
SPONREP 0.033816 0.015954 2.1196
SAMESB 0.012230 0.015271 0.80089
AUDREP -0.012430 0.017923 -0.69353
SAME_AUD -0.038123 0.021721 -1.7551
BIGSTOC -0.034864 0.027932 0.87219
CONST 0.077626 0.091335 0.84990
Dealing with the agent reputation variables first, it appears that there is no statistical
relationship between the agents involved and excess return with the exception of the
sponsoring bank where the relationship is strongly significant but signed in the
opposite way to expectation. It would appear that, in accordance with other UK
studies, the reputations of the sponsoring advisors adds little to the resolution of ex-
ante uncertainty surrounding IPOs. Consequently, there is little evidence to support
the hypothesis that appointing agents of higher quality reduces ex-ante uncertainty.
The results of the analysis with respect to equity retention by originating
shareholders mean that there is no support for the level of equity retention by original
shareholders reducing uncertainty. There is no evidence of a statistically significant
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relation between higher retention and lower excess returns. This is contra to the
results originally suggested by Leland and Pyle.
The only other significant variable in the model was found to be NAV. This variable
was significant at the five percent level. The finding that there is a significant
relationship between the net asset value of the underlying company and IPO returns
is contra to expectations. The findings suggest that larger firms (in terms ofNAV)
are associated with more uncertainty. The lack of significance of the BIG_STOC
variable means that there is no evidence to suggest different levels of excess returns
between larger 'privatisation' issues and the remainder of the IPOs in the sample.
Finally, the lack of significance of LNPTP is indicative of this variables being
unable, for the purposes of this study, to serve as a proxy of ex-ante uncertainty.
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7.4.1.2 The 'Efficiency' Model
The results of the 'efficiency' model are interesting. The model achieves an R
squared of 0.85556. On a similar note the F test is highly significant, indicating
considerable explanatory power in the model. The following t test results were
obtained.
Variable Est. Coefficient Std. Error T-statistic
FUNDSRA 0.034251 0.001871 18.311
SPONREP 662.154148 343.668670 1.927
SPECDV -0.022711 0.001975 -11.497
The aim ofmodelling this relationship was to determine if differential cost functions
existed between the sponsor groups. To that end the t statistics of the dummy
variable coefficients are ofmost interest. SPECDV is highly significant while
SPONREP is significant at the 5.5% level. In graphical terms what this signifies is
that there are in fact two cost functions in existence, statistically dissimilar from each
other, each pertaining to a different 'class' of advisor.
Diagram One - Differential Cost Functions
The picture above acts as a graphical representation of the situation. It shows the
existence of the two cost functions as discussed. One (marked as Reput. in the
diagram) represents the cost function associated with the 'high' reputation sponsors.
The lower line represents the cost function for the other advisors. The statistics given
in the table above allow it to be concluded that these lines have different intercepts
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and different slopes at statistically significant levels and this is in fact what the
picture above attempts to convey.
The results suggest that there are differential cost functions in existence with regard
to costs of flotation per pound of funds raised between reputable and non-reputable
sponsor groupings. From the results of the analysis it appears that firms raising less
than thirty million pounds of new funds incur unnecessary costs in appointing
'reputable' advisors. Basically, they find themselves on the 'top' line when they
should be on the 'bottom' one.
This Toss zone' is shown in the diagram as area 'A'. It is the extra direct cost borne
by a small IPO when appointing a highly reputable advisor. The mathematics behind
arriving at this figure of £30m are included in the statistical appendices.
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7.4.1.3 Further Analysis
At this stage, having completed the preliminary work both on estimating the main
equation and the secondary 'cost' equation, further analysis of the dataset was
undertaken to determine if any more insight could be made into the results. Three
specific additional avenues were followed. Firstly, bearing in mind the interesting
results with regard to 'costs' as discussed in the section above, a cost of flotation
variable was added to the main equation and the parameters re-estimated. Secondly,
the main equation was re-estimated with a number of additional dummy variables in
place to account for different offer types to investigate whether differential returns
persisted across the different offer types.
Finally, the data set was divided into three sections according to the point at which
the IPOs themselves were undertaken. These periods were 1989 to 1990, 1991 to
1992 and 1993 to 1995 inclusive. The main findings of these investigations are
presented in this section. The full statistical backup to the work is provided in the
statistical appendices on pages 31 to 47.
The results show that adding additional variables to the model did little to enhance
its overall explanatory power. In fact, as the following two tables show, adding a
'costs' variable and adding variables to account for different offer types had the
effect of diminishing from the overall explanatory power of the model. The models,
as estimated in their new form, posses very low R squared values and F statistics,
symptomatic of their relatively low explanatory power.
Results of model run with added 'costs' variable.
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
******************************************************************************
Dependent variable is LNEXRTN
******************************************************************************
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob]
RETD -.059612 .038870 -1.5336[. 127]
LNGPROC -.0025681 .0099828 -.25725[.797]
LNPTP .5747E-3 .0079859 .071960[.943]
NAV -.6164E-7 .4199E-7 -1.4680[. 144]
SPONREP -.0010265 .020095 -.051084[.959]
SSB .0033909 .015038 .22548[.822]
AUDREP .014244 .018280 ,77921[.437]
SAUDREP -.010453 .025116 -,41619[.678]
BIG STOCK -.0043452 .035331 -,12298[.902]
COSTS .3283E-5 .2788E-5 1.1775 [.240]
187
CONST .058493 .078313 .74691 [.456]
*****#*****************♦******************************************************
R-Squared .047797
S.E. of Regression .099393
Mean of Dependent Variable .073621
Residual Sum of Squares 1.9264




F-Stat. F( 10, 195) ,97883[.463]
S.D. of Dependent Variable .099342
Equation Log-likelihood 188.9378
Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 159.6344
Results of model run with 'offer type' dummy variables
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
******************************************************************************
Dependent variable is LNEXRTN
******************************************************************************
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob]
RETD -.063562 .040781 -1.5586[.121]
LNGPROC -.0023563 .010189 -.23127[.817]
LNPTP .9901E-3 .0081080 .12211 [.903]
NAV -.5209E-7 .4487E-7 -1.1609[.247]
SPONREP .0086607 .022288 .38859[.698]
SSB -.0027894 .015761 -. 17698[.860]
AUDREP .014846 .018399 .80690[.421]
SAUDREP -.013053 .025321 -.51551 [.607]
BIG STOCK .0031595 .036343 ,086934[.931]
COSTS .3567E-5 .2830E-5 1.2604[.209]
CONST .10556 .12807 .82423 [.411]
OFFDY -.076473 .10641 -.71865[.473]
PLDMY -.037772 .10096 -.37411 [.709]
PINT -.047759 .10234 -.46667[.641]
P OFF -.060405 .10234 -.59023 [.556]
******************************************************************************
R-Squared .058937
S.E. of Regression .099839
Mean ofDependent Variable .073621
Residual Sum of Squares 1.9039




F-Stat. F( 14, 191)








What, if anything, the results of this additional analysis shows is the relative fragility
of the original results. By adding, in the case of the 'costs' model, just one additional
explanatory variable, the conclusions drawn from the original model cease to be
valid.
This is obviously far from ideal. However, the relatively low R squared value of the
original model in its unaltered from did indicate that the model's explanatory power
was relatively low. This is in line with the results of previous such studies as reported
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in the literature. Hence, while not ideal, it's far from surprising that the results of the
analysis were so markedly changed by changing the list of explanatory variables.
Addressing each of the re-estimated models individually, it is first clear that there is
no relation in the whole sample between the cost of the flotation and the level of
excess return. Secondly, it is equally clear that in the whole sample there no
statistically significant differential return between offer types.
The final piece of additional analysis which was undertaken was to sub-divide the
whole sample into three 'time slices' to determine whether any effects could be
attributed to specific time periods. For the purposes of this analysis the sample was
divided into three sections. Issues were sub-divided into those in the period 1989 to
1990, those in the period 1991 to 1992 and those in the period 1993 to 1995. The
results of the econometric analysis are presented below. The functional form of
models estimated is the same as reported in section 7.3.2.
Regression Results - 1989 - 1990 Sub Sample
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
Based on White's Heteroscedasticity adjusted S.E.'s
******************************************************************************
Dependent variable is LNEXRTN
******************************************************************************
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob]
RETD -.22936 .087740 -2.6141 [.013]
LNGPROC .019567 .024431 .80091 [.428]
LNPTP .029838 .019469 1.5326[. 134]
NAV .5666E-7 .6269E-7 .90384[.372]
SPONREP -.051666 .030886 -1.6728[.103]
SSB -.0060559 .029377 -.20615 [.838]
AUDREP .017314 .038716 .44720[.657]
SAUDREP .0037512 .029040 . 12917[.898]
BIG STOCK -.062156 .045512 -1.3657[. 181]
CONST .12016 .17106 ,70246[.487]
******************************************************************************
Regression Results - 1991 - 1992 Sub Sample
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
Based on White's Heteroscedasticity adjusted S.E.'s
******************************************************************************
Dependent variable is LNEXRTN


























Regression Results - 1993 - 1995 Sub Sample
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
Based on White's Heteroscedasticity adjusted S.E.'s
******************************************************************************
Dependent variable is LNEXRTN
127 observations used for estimation from 1 to 127
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob]
RETD .056441 .042826 1.3179[. 190]
LNGPROC .021226 .013736 1.5453[. 125]
LNPTP .0042083 .012078 .34843 [.728]
NAV -. 1821E-6 .2006E-6 -.90761 [.366]
SPONREP -.013950 .029572 -.47173[.638]
SSB -.0058828 .015003 -.39212[.696]
AUDREP .0062186 .014919 .41683 [.678]
SAUDREP -.0067331 .019849 -.33921 [.735]
BIGSTOCK .046736 .12552 .37233 [.710]
CONST .20952 .086160 2.4317[.017]
The results of this analysis are interesting. Perhaps the most interesting results elate
to the first sub-sample (1989-1990). While only one variable (RETD) is statistically
significant at traditional levels both SPONREP and BIGSTOCK variables are
worthy of note. To deal with RETD first, this is significant and negative,
symptomatic of the higher levels ofmanagerial retention being associated with lower
levels of excess return. SPONREP is significant and negative at just over the 10%
level, signifying that the flotations undertaken by the more reputable sponsors
showed lower levels of excess return. Finally, BIGSTOCK is also negative,
although the relatively low level of significance means that the result here must be
treated with caution.
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In summary, it appears that in this period large IPOs (where management are
naturally likely to retain more shares) floated by high reputation banks showed a
lower level of excess return. This may well be explained by the fact that a great
number of government privatisation issues took place at that time (mostly water
companies) and they made up a large number of IPOs in the context of the relatively
small (46) sub-sample used for the study. The results here are consistent with the
results achieved by other researchers alluded to earlier in this chapter.
What's clear is that while the effect is clear in this small sample, it is not sufficiently
strong to be evidenced by the results for the sample as a whole.
The other two sub-samples produce just one significant explanatory variable, LNPTP
in the 1991-1992 period. This is negative, symptomatic of less profitable firms
producing higher excess returns in that period.
Outside of the interesting results from the first sub-sample, splitting the data adds
little to the overall level of understanding. It does add further weight to the point
made earlier that the results of the original analysis are 'fragile'.
Interpreting the results in the context of the existing literature, one may draw the
following conclusions. Firstly, the fact that the models estimated appear to have
relatively low levels of explanatory power is unsurprising. In perhaps the nearest UK
based study to the work conducted in this chapter, undertaken by Keasey and
125Short , levels ofR squared were similarly low (they report and R squared of 0.17
for their model). In addition, Keasey and Short's study also produced results which
went somewhat against the theoretical implications of the work undertaken by Ritter
in that they also found their sponsor reputation variable signed positively. However,
while the coefficient in their study was positive, it was not statistically significant.
The Keasey and Short study (which is perhaps the closest of all the preceding UK
work to this analysis) also found the percentage of equity retained by entrepreneurs
to be positively related to levels of excess return, contra to the theoretical literature.
In addition, Keasey and Short found that the levels of discount were negatively
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Keasey and Short ibid
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related to discount levels at statistically significant levels. This is as theory would
suggest in that it points to smaller IPOs (which one would assume to be riskier)
producing higher levels of excess return. The fact that the results reported in this
study run against this is perhaps more evidence of the fragility of the results as
previously alluded to.
What is interesting about the Keasey and Short work is that it focused on issues on
the USM, namely the very smallest IPOs. When the sub-sample work undertaken in
this chapter is considered in that context, it is clear that the only sub-sample period
which offers support for the theoretical arguments presented in the literature relates
to a period when large, government privatisation IPOs dominated. Both the other
sub-sample periods (where smaller IPOs dominated) produced results similar to those
generated by Keasey and Short.
The results of the other major UK originated studies in this area present a similarly
confused picture in terms of their coherency with the theoretical literature. Holland
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and Horton also fail to find a statistically significant negative relation between
sponsor reputation and level of excess returns in their sample of placings undertaken
in the later eighties. They do, however, find a statistically significant relation in terms
of auditor quality. No such relation was evident in any of the analysis work
conducted in this chapter. This may well be a consequence of the manner in which
127Holland and Horton chose to segregate the audit firms . Certainly, previous UK
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studies also failed to identify and negative relation.
The empirical literature from the USA offers more support for the theory that higher
quality sponsoring agents are associated with lower levels of excess return in the
underlying IPO. Carter and Manaster find evidence of this in their 1990 study as
1 ?Q
previously alluded to in this chapter. Even as recently as 1996, Booth and Chua
Holland and Horton ibid
127
They employed a methodology that took account of firms outside the 'big 6' accounting firms.
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Keasey and McGuiness, 1991 and Keasey and Short, 1992
129
J. R. Booth and L. Chua, 'Ownership dispersion, costly information and IPO Underpricing',
Journal of Financial Economics Vol 41 1996 p291 -310
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found that in their sample of 2151 issues in the period from 1977-1988 underpricing
was negatively related to investment banker prestige.
It would be fair to suggest that that weight ofUK literature points to little or no
relation between levels of underpricing and sponsor reputation but yet evidence from
the USA would suggest that such a relation may well exist. Similarly, evidence from
the US studies discussed earlier in this chapter points to a relation between equity
retention by entrepreneurs and levels of excess return existing while UK evidence is
very mixed.
There are two possible explanations for this. Firstly, the empirical work conducted in
the USA may be affected by the fact that many researchers look only at 'firm
commitment' IPOs in their studies. Basically, this means that the samples have a bias
against 'risky' IPOs (which are conducted on a different basis known as 'best
efforts'). In essence they are using a censored sample from which inference is being
drawn to the population. This has clear implications for the statistical results of the
studies.
Secondly, and pertinent particularly to the issue of sponsor reputation, US studies
tend to use a very similar method to rank sponsoring banks. This method, which
involves examining where in the 'pecking order' the bank appears on post IPO
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announcement 'tombstones', was originally suggested by Hayes in the 1970s. The
idea is very simple. The higher a sponsoring bank ranks on a tombstone, the higher
its 'quality'. In this way reputation does to a degree become a function of the number
of deals undertaken (and hence the number of tombstones) and not the quality of the
underlying deal, a problem which the UK based studies have sought to avoid.
In summary, it may be a combination ofmethodological differences and issues with
sample construction that account for the differences between the UK based work





This chapter has investigated the level of underpricing of IPOs floating on the UK
stockmarket from 1989 to 1995. The average level of underpricing was found to be
8.3%.
Given that this excess return exists, an attempt was then made to identify its cause in
the context of a 'signalling' model
In particular, this study sought to find whether IPO companies can signal their
reputation to potential investors through entrepreneurial equity retention and, or, by
the appointing of 'superior' professional advisors. As the quality of an IPO firm is a
priori unobservable, the management of these firms may be able to signal 'quality'
by either assuming more systematic risk in their personal portfolios by retaining
equity or by employing agents who have reputation capital to 'frank' their company's
flotation with the name of the 'reputable' sponsor. Both practices should allow the
'indirect' cost of going public (the immediate excess return in the aftermarket) to be
reduced.
The results of this study do not allow any significant weight to be attached to the
argument outlined above. From the results of the analysis it appears that neither
managerial signalling via equity retention nor the appointment of 'reputable'
sponsors lowered the excess return in the main sample period, and in this sense the
'indirect' cost of going public is not reduced.
The only caveat to this is that in the small sample analysis covering 1989 - 1990
some evidence was found to support the thesis that equity retention and appointment
of reputable sponsors reduces excess returns. However, the sample used here was
small (46 issues) and contained a great many government privatisation issues.
That being said, the overall findings of the principal analysis are in common with
much of the previous work conducted in the UK.
On the basis of these findings, support for the signalling hypothesis to alleviate ex-
ante uncertainty does not appear strong.
The results concerning the economic efficiency of the IPO market are interesting.
The evidence presented from the main study suggests firms are unable to signal their
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quality prior to flotation; excess returns for more issues backed by the more reputable
sponsors are not lower than for the other IPOs. From the point of view of economic
efficiency this result cannot be interpreted in light of the cost function estimated.
Below a threshold level more reputable sponsors force extra direct cost on the issuing
firm and there is no evidence to suggest the indirect costs of underpricing are reduced
by appointing agents of'superior' quality.
Indeed, it would appear that the use of reputable sponsors actually increases the
'indirect' costs of going public for all companies. Use of reputable sponsors by
smaller companies (i.e., those raising less than thirty million pounds) forces an




The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the UK venture capital market with
particular reference to venture capital backed stock market flotations.
Recently, the number of venture capital backed companies that have floated on the
London markets has increased quite markedly. Empirical evidence from a number of
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sources including HSBC James Capel and the Centre for Management Buyout
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Research at the University ofNottingham indicated that venture capital backed
firms produces superior stock market returns when compared to the broad universe of
all new issues floating on the stock market.
With the increasing number of venture capital backed floats now trading on the
London market, the subject of the returns generated from these investments is well
worthy of investigation. The subject is closely related to the work previously
undertaken in this thesis and it forms a logical adjunct to what has gone before.
This study will attempt to test this phenomenon for the data set as previously
introduced. The organisation of this chapter is as follows. Section two introduces the
venture capital industry in general. Section three provides more detail on
management buy-outs in particular while Section four discusses the recent finding in
the area ofMBO research in more detail. Section five contains the methodology for
the study undertaken and the empirical results while Section six presents the
conclusions of the work.
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8.2 Venture Capital
Venture capital is a method of financing the start-up, development, expansion or
purchase of a company. In following the process the venture capitalist acquires an
equity stake of the company in return for providing the funds.
As shareholders in the business, venture capitalists receive their return through
participation in increasing levels of profits and on the eventual sale of the investment.
This can be achieved by selling their shares to management, by means of a trade sale,
or by the company achieving a listing on the Stock Exchange.
Venture capital has different characteristics to other sources of finance. The main
difference between borrowed money and venture capital equity relates to asset
security. Bankers are rewarded by interest and capital repayment and the amounts
borrowed are usually secured either on the business assets or the individual
shareholder directors' personal assets. As a last resort, a bank can bankrupt a business
if the business defaults.
Venture capital financing is not secured and venture capitalists take the risk of failure
just like other shareholders. Because of the risk, venture capitalists require an
appropriately high rate of return. Consequently, venture capitalists favour financially
sound investee companies led by managers of proven ability.
The investment period is usually between three and five years but can exceed ten
years. The amounts invested tend to be over £100,000 averaging just over £1 million
in 1994133.
A venture capital funding structure can allow substantial returns to management if it
performs successfully. The expectation ofmanagement is that their reduced holding
in the company will produce a greater capital gain than would have been possible if
the funding had been obtained from other sources. This return will be through capital
growth.
A popular means of tying management's ultimate reward to that of the venture
capitalist and other equity investors is via a ratchet mechanism which increases
management's' equity stake depending on company performance. Performance
133
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targets can relate to profitability, exit price or a target annual rate of return achieved
by the institutional investor. Obviously, management needs to consider carefully the
extent to which they will have control over achieving these targets.
Venture capital funding allows a company to remain in private hands, thereby
avoiding the regulation and public scrutiny associated with a stock exchange listing.
The presence of a venture capitalist as a shareholder should lend credibility to the
business and raise its profile.
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8.2.1 Raising Venture Capital Funding
Although venture capitalists claim equity is available for businesses requiring from
as little as a few tens of thousands of pounds up to hundreds ofmillions of pounds,
small amounts are very difficult to raise, particularly from institutional investors who
provide most of the funding involved. This is personified in the 'equity funding' gap
in the UK.
A properly structured venture capital arrangement should be put together in such a
way as to obtain a capital gain for both the investor and the investee that should
outweigh any measurable costs. Such costs include the shareholding and
corresponding partial control over operations that is given up to the venture capitalist
in return for funding. These may broadly be described as 'agency' costs.
Venture capital is relatively expensive because it involves a high degree of risk for
the lender. As a function of the risk profile, a venture capital provider will require a
substantial rate of return (often in excess of 25% per annum) on the amount invested.
This return will usually consist of a running yield in the form of dividends and
capital growth achieved on the sale or flotation of the company.
The precise return sought by the venture capitalist is governed by the quality and
track record of the management team and the risks associated with the nature and size
of the business. Higher returns are sought from early-stage businesses because they
represent a greater risk. Few institutions are therefore willing to provide finance of
less than £100,000. Institutional funding is most readily available for established
businesses seeking equity funding of over £500,000134
One of the key factors that providers consider is the 'entry level' of the investment
required, that is, the stage of development or evolution of the investee company and
consequently the amount of funding it requires.
In general venture capitalists are keener to finance expansions, management buyouts
and buy-ins (so-called 'development capital') than they are to finance seedcorn, start¬
ups and other early stage companies. This is due largely to the additional risk that is
134
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associated with early stage ventures and the time and costs involved in financing
smaller deals compared with the benefits. In essence, it maybe that venture capitalists
are more willing to provide development capital than venture capital.
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8.2.2 The Various Stages of Venture Capital Investment
There are a number of different stages of investment which characterise the venture
capital market. They can be summarised as follows:
Seedcorn
This concerns the research and development of a business idea before it is actually
launched on the market. It may involve producing a prototype product or the design
of a package for a service industry. It may also include initial research in order to
assess the size and scope of potential markets.
Such early stage development projects require a certain level of funding. This may
vary considerably according to the nature of the underlying product or service -
involved and the amount of research and length of time that is needed to develop and
test it fully. However, it is generally assumed that projects of this kind call for
relatively small sums ofmoney, with a possible maximum of £100,000.
It is in the nature of this development stage that the risk profile for the investor is
particularly high. In contrast with a well established company with a developed
product and share of its given market, it cannot be assumed at seedcorn stage that the
product or service will achieve acceptance or win any market share at all. In addition,
if the entrepreneur or managers do not have the right kind of experience and a proven
track record in business development, the risk for the potential funding partner rises
still further. Consequently, many venture capitalists avoid such early stage financing.
Start-Up
It is at the start-up stage that the product or service is initially marketed
commercially. A new operating company may need to be set up and staff recruited,
while the company's premises may also need to be equipped and a distribution
network established.
As in the case of seedcorn investment, its unlikely that either the product or the
company can be assumed to have proven itself commercially. Consequently, the risk




This stage involves the expansion of a company which is already established and at
least breaking even in financial terms. It may, according to the BVCA, also be
growing profits. However, its aim in seeking venture capital funding is to expand its
production capacity, recruit extra staff, extend its marketing or product development
programme or acquire additional working capital.
The company and/or the product is already well established and the company's
management can be assumed to have at least an adequate level of experience. This
kind of investment is therefore considered to be significantly less risky than the
earlier stages and, as such, it attracts venture capital much more easily.
Development Capital
Development capital is widely regarded as forming a separate category in terms of
entry levels. Here, financing is required to develop an alternative product or to
expand by acquiring one or more already established companies. If a company in this
position has a good performance record, a project of this kind will be regarded by
venture capitalists as being on a par with expansion funding as far as risk is
concerned.
Management Buyout (MBO)
In a management buyout, funding is sought to enable the existing operating
management, and possibly also outside investors, to acquire a business that is already
established and working. As an established business, such a project is regarded as a
relatively low risk in venture capital terms and MBOs have in fact been growing in
popularity among venture capitalists in recent years. This rise to prominence has at




In this case funding is sought to enable an external manager or group ofmanagers to
buy in to an existing company. Again, the business can be assumed to be well
established and the management wishing to buy it to have an appropriate level of
operating experience.
MBIs are also generally regarded as a relatively low risk proposition by venture
capitalists. However, given that the management group wishing to acquire a company
is obviously less familiar with it than are managers bidding for a MBO, their project
may be regarded by venture capitalists as a less attractive proposition than a MBO.
Consequently, required rates of return are higher for MBIs.
Secondary Purchase
The BVCA defines a secondary purchase as the purchases of shares in a company
from a venture capital firm or, alternatively, from its existing shareholders. This is
also assumed to involve an established company with an experienced management,
proven products and a good performance track record. To the extent that this is the
case, it will be regarded as a relatively low risk potential investment by the venture
capitalists.
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8.2.3 Venture Capitalists Approach to Different Entry Levels.
In 1994, some 68% of the number of financing made by BVCA members went into
the expansion stage, 18% went into MBOs and MBIs and 14% into early stage
including start-ups. However, 68% of total funds went into MBOs and MBIs, 28%
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into expansion and 5% into early stage investments
The way Venture Capitalists approach the various different entry levels may be
usefully examined by looking at them in terms of the amount of funding owners or
entrepreneurs require for their projects.
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PE-Prospects Excellent
The diagram presents two main points. Firstly, that there are very few institutional
investors interested in seed funding, start-ups and involvement in funding in general
below £100,000. Secondly, the substantial majority of institutional venture capital
funds prefer to back management teams and companies who require equity funding
in excess of £250,000. This size focus indicates the concentration of interest on
development capital.
It is clear that the most difficult end of the venture capital funding spectrum in terms
of attracting funding is the bottom end. Basically, the smaller the amount of finance
required, the harder it is to raise. This gives rise to the previously mentioned 'equity
funding' gap. This relates to the gap in the number of venture capitalists prepared to
get involved in high risk (and smaller) equity funding. Simply, there is enough
business available offering lower risk and high enough potential returns for the
venture capitalists to ignore the high risk part of the market completely. However, it
may be that this situation changes as the UK venture capital market becomes more
competitive and mature.
Some venture capital funds seek to specialise in certain industry sectors such as
biotechnology, computer related and other high-tech areas. Others actively avoid
sectors such as property or film production. In general however apart from a few
'niche' players, venture capitalists are prepared to consider most industrial sectors.
The quality of the management team and whether there is a proven product in an
expanding market is ofmore concern.
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In 1994 the general industrials sector (engineering, electronics, building
construction, chemicals, paper, textiles etc.) represented the largest industry sectors
of
investment by BVCA members in terms of number of companies financed. The
services category (leisure, hotels, transport and distribution, retail, media etc.)
represented the largest sector by amount invested.
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The amount of investment varies greatly with the stage of investment. Start-up and
other early stage investments are almost without exception lesser in amount than
expansion and MBO/MBI investments. In general few investments of less than
£100,000 are made by the industry unless there is a good opportunity for a second
round of financing.
In 1994 the average overall size of investment by BVCA members across categories
was £1.3 million, with £429,000 for early stage, £565,000 for expansion and £4.9
million for MBO/MBI investments138.
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8.2.4 Due Diligence
Due diligence is a vital part of the venture capital investment decision and extensive
work will be undertaken by the potential venture capital provider regardless of what
stage of financing is sought.
Venture capital due diligence is conventionally defined as the process of discovery,
confirmation and clarification of the key essentials of a business in the mind of a
venture capitalist. On this basis he will decide whether or not to invest and, if so, on
what terms. Consequently, as commonly stated by venture capitalists, due diligence
'begins at the first meeting'.
Due diligence is crucial to the venture capital process. This is somewhat disingenuous
as the venture capitalist will typically invest multi-million pound sums into unquoted
businesses about which he may initially know very little, which are not readily
marketable and where the prospect of any recovery on a winding-up will be remote.
When properly undertaken, venture capital due diligence should be all-
encompassing, detailed and searching. It can also take considerable time.
In overview, the venture capitalist will be concerned with all aspects of the target
business, both those aspects verified by specialists such as patent agents and when
due diligence is performed in-house.
Perhaps the most critical issue for the venture capitalist in the evaluation process will
be the quality ofmanagement. In the words of one US venture capitalist,
'there is no question that irrespective of the horse (product), horse race (market), or
odds (financial criteria), it is the jockey (entrepreneur) who fundamentally
determines whether the venture capitalist will place a bet at all'.
A key part of the venture capitalist's analysis will be to take references on
management. These can vary from the use of enquiry agents to informal social
conversations with friends or acquaintances. Typically, these services combined
with trade references, and in some cases taken without management's
knowledge. This process can be unpleasant and unnerving for the entrepreneur. It is,
however, essential and can be informative, as this type of third party endorsement
will provide the venture capitalist with in many ways his best evidence that he is
about to make a good investment.
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8.2.5 Different Types of Funding Provider
The prospective investee company must realise that there are a number of different
types of venture capital provider and each essentially has a slightly different agenda
depending on what type they are.
Some suppliers of capital are independent companies which invest funds raised
principally from institutions such as pension funds and insurance companies. Others
are subsidiaries of banks which draw on the parent's resources for the funds on whose
behalf they invest. Others again are investment trusts which take in funds from both
institutions and private individuals. The investment decisions of all types of
providers depend on the extent of their funding resources and their own particular
targets and strategies at any given time.
Like all types of investors, individual venture capital providers have their own areas
of interest and it is often possible for an investee company's management team to
shop around for the right investment package. In order to find a provider who is
prepared to accommodate their particular needs, it is therefore important that such
managers study the investment strategies of prospective investors.
Essentially venture capital providers base their investment criteria on the entry level,
size and value of the project, the industrial sector involved and the region in which it
is located.
For example, some are unlikely to invest in start-ups or to provide growth capital but
may instead concentrate on MBOs. Some focus on a single region of the country or
on specific industrial sectors.
Investors also vary in terms of their philosophy towards their relationship with
investee companies. Some may wish to appoint one of their own executives to the
investee company Board, while others take a more detached, 'hands-off approach.
However, all providers will wish to monitor the investment project regularly
throughout its life.
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8.2.6 Different Funding Schemes
As well as there being a wide variety of different venture capital funding providers,
there are also a variety of different ways in which the venture capital financing
package can be constructed. Different situations call for different financial packages
to be constructed and in particular the proportions of equity to debt.
The proportion of debt to equity will clearly depend on the investors own investment
strategy but it will also be closely related to the nature of the business. A cash-
generative business can carry a lot of debt because the debt can be serviced out of
profits. A young high-tech company, on the other hand, may show no profits for
several years and what will attract investors is the prospect of eventual, longer term
capital gains. In such cases the investor will obviously look for a substantial equity
stake.
In most cases the venture capital provider seeks to be a minority shareholder in the
investee company. For instance, for a moderate-sized MBO it can be possible for the
management team to hold perhaps 60% of the equity assuring them of control of the
company while the investor holds, say, 40%. At the same time, the equity would be
geared up with debt to meet the purchase price. In other words the managers, whose
personal resources are probably reasonably modest, will have become owners of a
sizeable business.
In large MBOs the managers will hold much less of the equity, and the majority of
the ordinary shares will be in the hands of a syndicate of investors. No single investor
likes to hold a minority of the shares, since this concentrates the risk in the hands of a
single organisation. It is also likely to be a disincentive for the management to
perform well.
Investors also expect managers to make a substantial personal commitment to the
project in terms of investment made from their own resources. This demonstrates
their faith in the business and also provides a real financial incentive to make the
business a success. On the other hand, investors recognise that the really important
contribution which manager bring to the party is so much money, but rather skill and
talent. Because of this fluid mix, the structure can be quite flexible. Investors vary
considerably, however, in how much they involve the managers in the construction
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of the package. This underlines the importance of checking the particular interests of
the prospective venture capital funding provider. In addition to the preferences over
the funding structure, the prospective investee company may want to consider the
business preferences of the venture capitalists under consideration.
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8.2.7 Formulating an Exit Plan
A crucial decision in investment strategy relates to time-scale, and the question of the
investor's 'exit'. This depends crucially on the life of the venture capital fund. For
instance, some funds have a life of ten years or more. Given this, some investors
have longer time horizons than others and are prepared to allow investment projects
to develop over a period of some years before they realise their capital gains (e.g.,
3i). Others invest over relatively short periods. Some venture capitalists, being
funded by limited life partnerships (e.g., Candover), will seek a sale of the business
at between three and seven years from the date of their investment. It is likely that the
equity funding structure will reflect this timescale and failure to exit can result in
onerous cash dividend payments being paid to the venture capitalists.
Again, the nature of an exit may be important determinant in persuading venture
capitalists to invest. Many providers will only invest in businesses which have a clear
exit strategy, that is, a plan by which management will grow the business to the point
where it can be sold or floated within a given time limit
However, some are not concerned with the manner in which they eventually exit
from the investment project but are only concerned with its profitability and with the
extent of their own gains.
Despite agreeing objectives at the time of investment, it is not uncommon for
conflicts to arise between a management team and its institutional shareholders over
the most appropriate time to sell. The venture capitalist is answerable to its
underlying investors and is focused on the need to provide the highest overall return
per annum.
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8.2.8 Different Exit Routes
There are a number of different exit routes available to the venture capitalist and the
investee company. Obviously, both have to agree on the chosen method of realising
the exit. The choices they face are discussed in this section.
For management teams who have received an injection of development capital or
carried out a management buy-out or management buy-in backed by venture
capitalists, assessment of available exit routes from the project would seem to be a
relatively straightforward exercise.
Flowever, different venture capitalists may well have different expectations of their
investments, particularly with regard to exit. The majority of venture capitalists
manage third party funds or are organisations linked to such funds. As a result their
performance is closely watched by the outside fund providers. Invariably their
performance is measured by the average annual percentage increase in the value of
the money invested in a particular company, which is more commonly known as the
internal rate of return (IRR). In a competitive market those venture capitalists which
achieve above average IRR's are more likely to attract further outside funds in the
future.
The very nature of the IRR calculation means that cash flows to venture capitalists in
the early years, through dividend yields, early redemption of loan capital or
preference shares and, most importantly, early capital realisations can have a large
and favourable impact on the fund's overall IRR performance.
If a management team can realistically foresee and exit within three to five years then
a relatively short term independent fund with agreed exit horizons may well offer
management the best deal. In order not to create a conflict of aspirations at the outset
of the deal, management should determine realistically the likely exit route and the
most realistic timescale and ensure that their aspirations and expectations are shared
by their financial backers.
A low yield, exit-driven structure which includes financial incentives (for example, a
ratchet to reward the management team for an early exit) may well offer the
management team the best deal in the marketplace with regard to equity participation
but its implications should be understood. The need for an exit may become an
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overriding requirement and a management team that wished to remain independent
and become a public company could find itself being required to pursue a trade sale
in order to preserve the deal which was originally negotiated by them.
Investment houses which are prepared to take a longer term view with regard to exits
and which place more emphasis on a running yield over time will still make
assumptions with regard to a likely exit route and the value which is realistically
achievable at that time. Again, the management team should be comfortable with the
assumptions that are being made.
Certainly a trade sale or flotation are the most common exit routes and it should be
the case that the earlier an exit is achieved the higher will be the likely rates of return
to those involved. It is probably fair to say that management are encouraged to seek
an early exit. This is a little simplistic. It disguises a complex issue which should be
given detailed consideration prior to the initial investment. Furthermore, statistics
show that the majority of investments do not achieve an exit within five years.
Two alternative exit routes to a trade sale or flotation are worth mentioning briefly.
One potential option is refinancing, whereby the same or a new team of venture
capitalists provide finance to acquire the shares of some or all of the existing
management team and/or of the original financial backers. The other is the purchase
by the company of its own shares.
The diagram below shows some of the different routes available
Table 2
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Figure 1: Exit Routes
EXIT ROUTES
Source - HMSO Report ibid p48
Trade sale
A trade sale will normally be managed by a financial adviser who understands the
unquoted market and has both credibility and experience in selling companies.
Depending on the size of the business the financial adviser may be a merchant bank,
a specialist boutique or a firm of accountants. The financial adviser would be
expected to have contacts within the specific market sector in which the business
operates and, if the size of the business makes it possible a foreign buyer may be
considered.
The financial adviser would normally assist in the preparation of an information
memorandum on the company which would provide information to potential
purchasers. This would enable them to put forward their best price, while preserving
the confidentially of commercially sensitive material, as some potential purchasers
may also be competitors. In conjunction with the company, the financial adviser
would draw up a short-list of the most likely potential buyers together with a reserve
list.
A tightly controlled auction involving a limited number of serious potential buyers is
invariably the best way ofmaximising the exit value. Potential buyers on the reserve
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list would not normally be contacted unless insufficient interest was forthcoming
from the initial list or price expectations were not being met. The auction process is
likely to last three to four months and negotiations will usually be led by the financial
adviser. Tight control of the process is crucial.
After a second round involving perhaps two or three of the highest bidders, a
preferred bidder will be chosen with whom final negotiations will be conducted. The
financial adviser should ensure that significant concessions are not lost during the
final negotiations, particularly in the areas of warranties and indemnities, or through
last minute manoeuvres by the purchaser to reduce the purchase price.
The following diagram outlines the advantages and disadvantages of the trade sale.
Table 3
Advantages and Disadvantages of the Trade Sale
Advantages Disadvantages
Management and investors may sell their
entire shareholding
Management may lose independence
Trade sale can be carried out for any size
of company
Further returns unlikely unless partial sale
deal.
Quality ofmanagement is not critical Business may face restructuring at the
hands of the trade buyer
The track record and prospects can be
variable
Timing is flexible
Weaknesses in the business can be dealt
with
A buyer can rectify commercial
management problems
Contractual arrangements can cover
specific difficulties
Trade sales can command higher values if




Source - HMSO Report ibid p49
Flotation
A public flotation is a wholly different transaction from a trade sale. In this case the
financial adviser is co-ordinating and managing the whole process of bringing the
company to a public market and, as sponsor, is fulfilling on behalf of future
shareholders many of the responsibilities that a corporate buyer would undertake
himself. The complexities of a flotation actually mean that it is a longer process than
a trade sale, typically lasting some six to seven months. The public liabilities
associated with the issue of prospectus are substantial and onerous.
Much attention will be focused during the flotation process on the suitability of the
company for a public listing and indeed the process is unlikely to be initiated unless
the financial adviser has already reached the preliminary conclusion that the
company is suitable.
The following table outlines the advantages and disadvantages of a flotation.
Table 4
Advantages and Disadvantages of a Flotation
Advantages Disadvantages
Management retain independence Management and investors may only be
able to sell a proportion of their
investment
Access to new/cheaper sources of finance
to fund growth
Price will depend on market conditions
Liquid market for company shares Timing may not be flexible
Continuing incentives/motivation Exit transaction likely to be more difficult
and costly
Prospects for enhanced investment value Flotation may only be available to larger
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companies
Increased status and public recognition
for the company
Quality of business and management are
essential and any problems are likely to
preclude floating the business
There are significant regulatory
requirements and commitments
Source - HMSO Report ibid p50
Refinancing
Secondary refinancing or secondary buy-outs are becoming more common, although
they still account for a relatively small percentage of exits. This method of exit may
be attractive as a method of passing on ownership of the business to the next
generation ofmanagement. It may be necessary because of the age profile of the
management team or the emergence of an able and ambitious lower management tier.
Alternatively, it may be that one or two members of the management team, who have
an interest in the original transaction, would also be involved in the refinancing. This
can lead to an interesting conflict of interests during negotiations and great reliance
being placed on the skills of the financial advisers involved.
Purchase ofOwn Shares
The achievement of an exit for a financial investor by the target company purchasing
its own shares from the investor is relatively rare. The increase in the value of the
business over time is always likely to be greater than its ability to fund an acquisition
of its own shares if it meets the financial investors' required rates of return. It may,
therefore, be largely ignored as an exit route for the purposes of this discussion, as it
is likely to be encountered only in circumstances where the business has not
performed well and the exit is not being made voluntarily.
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8.2.9 Trade-Offs in the Investment Decisions of European Venture Capitalists
This section is included for comparative purposes. The aim here is to show that
although investment through venture capital is by its very nature different to
investment via the stockmarket, there is a high degree of correlation in terms of what
criteria potential investors regard as important.
Venture capitalists are relative outsiders to the business and the management team
and consequently have to use other criteria when assessing the viability of the
investment. Numerous studies have been conducted in the USA but relatively little
work has been carried out in the Europe. Studies have sought to identify which
139
decision criteria venture capital investors feel are most important. Zopounidis
concludes that there are '..great diversity ofevaluation criteria and their relative
importance from one study to another..' but '..the criterion ofthe management team
is consideredpredominant...'.
Hence there are a number of questions that remain unanswered from the perspective
of venture capital investment in the UK and Europe.
1. What are the key investment factors used by European venture capitalists in
evaluating potential investments?
2. Are the factors consistently applied by venture capitalists throughout Europe.
3. Are there clusters or groupings of venture capitalists based on the decision criteria
applied?
Indeed, these very questions were posed by Muzyka, Birley and Leleux140. They
conducted a survey to examine the issues facing European venture capitalists and
how they dealt with the issues raised in the questions outlined above.
The authors examined their data using co-joint analysis. This method was chosen as
it would measure quantitatively the relative importance of a list of attributes set
against each other. The method is based on requesting the decision maker to make a
series of paired trade-offs determining which of two given factors, all else being
equal, is the more important.
139
Zopounidis, C. 1994, 'Venture Capital Modelling: Evaluating Criteria for the Appraisal of
Investments', The Financier ACMT 1(2) May : p54-64
140
D. Muzyka, S. Birley and B. Leleux, 'Trade Offs in the Investment Decisions of European Venture
Capitalists', Paper presented for publication in the Journal of Business Venturing 1995
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A review of the literature produce 35 key evaluation criteria which could be grouped
into the following seven categories.
1. Financial Criteria - related to the apparent financial aspects of the investment.
2. Product-Market Criteria - related to market size, maturity and growth.
3. Strategic-Competitive Criteria - related to strategic positioning of the investment in the
marketplace.
4. Fund Criteria - related to the constraints of the investment fund.
5. Management Team Criteria - related to the potential track record of the lead entrepreneur and the
management team.
6. Management Competence Criteria - related to the competencies and/or capabilities of the
management team in important functional areas.
7. Deal Criteria - related to the stage and nature of the investment deal.
Using these 35 criteria a questionnaire was developed which required the respondent
to make 53 trade-offs between pairs of independent criteria. The collected data was
then transferred into the co-joint model in order to compute the relative rankings of
the investment decision criteria. The rankings by individual were then correlated to
test for similarity among respondents and as input to an unweighted pairwise cluster
analysis algorithm. The cluster analysis would show whether any groupings of
venture capitalists based on decision criteria existed.
73 institutions across Europe from a broad range of backgrounds completed the
work.




Time to break even 12
Time to payback 20
Expected rate of return 11
Ability to cash-out 9
Product-Market Criteria
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Degree mkt. already established 19
Market size 29
Seasonality of product markets 33
Sensitivity to economic cycles 30
Market growth and attractiveness 18
Uniqueness of product / technology 17
National location of business 27
Degree of product / market understanding 10
Strategic - Competitive Criteria
Ease ofmarket entry 24
Ability to create post entry barriers 14
Sustained share competitive advantage 6
Nature and degree of competition 26
Strength of suppliers and distribution 25
Fund Criteria
Business meets fund constraints 15
Business and product fit within fund 28
portfolio
Ability of investors to influence business 21
Location of business relative to fund 35
Management Team Criteria
Leadership potential ofmgmt. team 2
Leadership potential of lead entrepreneur 1
Recognised industry experience in team 3
Track record of lead entrepreneur 4
Track record ofmanagement team 5
Management Competence Criteria
Marketing/Sales capabilities of team 7
Organisational / administrative capabilities 16
of team
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Financial/Accounting abilities of team 8
Deal Criteria 13
Stage of investment required 23
Number and nature of deal co-investors 32
Ability to syndicate deal 31
Scale and chance of later funding rounds 34
Importance of unclear assumptions 22
Source - Muzyka et al, ibid, p20
What is immediately obvious from the table above is the importance attached to the
management of the company.
Overall, the venture capitalists surveyed exhibited a great deal of consistency in the
relative importance they attached to the decision criteria considered in selection of
investments. The table below shows the relative number of criteria from each of the
seven groups that appeared in each quintile of the overall rankings for the individual
factor rankings given above.
Table 6
Top Quintile Second 20% Third 20% Fourth 20% Bottom 20%
Mgmt Team 5
Mgmt Comp. 1 2 1
Strat - Comp. 1 1 3
Financial 3 1
Product - Mkt 1 3 1 3
Fund 2 1 1
Deal 2 3
Source - Muzyka et al, ibid, pi9
The pattern is worthy of note. While the relative importance of the management team
is not a surprise, the lowly importance of the Product - Market grouping may be seen
as surprising.
The findings suggest that venture capitalists as a group prefer to select an opportunity
which offers a good management team and reasonable financial product and product-
market characteristics, even if the opportunity does not meet the overall fund and
deal requirements. This is interesting in terms of the implications for IPOs. If venture
221
capitalists are doing deals which are not ideal fits with their funds then their
propensity to unwind from them should be high.
In empirical work carried out in the USA by Barry, Muscarella and Vetsuypens141 the
relationship between venture capital investment and levels of aftermarket
underpricing is examined. The authors find no difference in the mean level of
underpricing between venture capital backed firms and those which are not venture
capital backed. This is contra to the evidence presented in the UK.
141
C.B. Barry, C. J. Muscarella and M. R. Vetsuypens, 'Venture Capital and Initial Public Offerings'
Unpublished working paper, Southern Methodist University, Dallas, Tx, 1988
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8.3 Management Buy-outs and Management Buv-ins
The main topic of this chapter relates to MBOs and their close relation, the MBI.
Consequently, in this section the subjects are discussed in more detail.
The management buy-out (or MBO) is now an accepted and established feature of
the financial market. The modern MBO was imported from the United States in the
late 1970s and early 1980s. The number of transactions completed increased rapidly
following the general relaxation of some of the legal complexities surrounding the
deals. Venture capitalists have reacted positively to buy-outs as the market has
grown. A whole industry, consisting of buy-out funds, mezzanine and senior debt
lenders, financial advisers, accountants and lawyers specialising in buy-outs has been
built up around it.
The first MBOs were small with the average transaction size less than £2 million.
The market itself totalled less than £100 million142. The major source of dealflow at
this stage was recession hit companies divesting non-core businesses. Finance was
provided primarily in the form of equity from the small number of venture capitalists
established at that time. The companies that survived the recession in the early 1980s
were either sold or achieved a flotation on the stock market.
As a result of this early success the MBO market took off in the middle 1980s. Many
well known names went through the buy-out process during this period including
Woolworth, Parker Pen and Premier Brands. During the height of the Thatcher years
managers became millionaires, with a number of venture capitalists following suit
through their investment schemes.
Following the rapid growth of buy-outs during 1989 and 1990 newspaper headlines
such as 'Buy-out and Burn-out heralded the demise ofMBOs. A few high profile
failures in the UK and the collapse of the junk bond market in the US prompted
David Owen to remark that 'the growth of leverage buy-outs is a good example of the
doctrine of free enterprise shooting itself in the foot. A diagram showing the number
of companies using venture capital in the UK over the years is included in the graph
pack with this chapter.
142
HMSO Report ibid p77
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8.3.1 The Current State of the UK MBO Market
In practice, the difficulties of the late 1980s and the early 1990s served to regulate the
market. Structures became less geared and business plans more conservative. The
volume and size of transactions has since grown steadily. The buy-out market has
stabilised at around £3 billion143.
Graph 2 in the graph pack charts the total transaction value ofUK buy-outs for the
period 1990 to 1994. The value of transactions has increased as the country recovered
from recession and the funds dedicated to MBOs have increased. The average size of
transaction has also increased over the period. 1994 saw an even higher level than
1989 with some £3.7 billion ofMBOs completed. To put the MBO market size in
context, in 1994 the total market for corporate control in the UK was £9.9 billion.
MBOs represented approximately one third of this number144. The buyout market is
therefore an important part of the UK mergers and acquisition market.
Graph 3 in the graph pack charts the total estimated number ofUK buy-outs and the
total number ofUK merger and acquisition transactions for the period 1990 to 1994.
This shows that the number ofMBOs fluctuate between 500 and 600 in number. This
represents on average 50% of the merger and acquisitions market. By comparison in
1984 the estimated total number of buyouts completed was 250 which represented
30% of the mergers and acquisition market. So not only have buyouts increased in
number, but they have also grown as a proportion of all corporate transactions.
Clearly, the management buy-out is growing in popularity as a method for disposing
of subsidiary businesses.
The reasons for the increasing trend are quite clear. It is now widely recognised that
giving management a stake in a business is an important motivating factor.
Management teams usually have a strong desire to run their own business and to
make more money as shareholders than they could merely as employees. At the same
time, parent companies often like to sell to local management to ensure continuity of
the business. To those companies seeking the highest price, management teams are
HMSO Report ibid p77
144
HMSO Report ibid p79
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generally still able to compete effectively, using in depth knowledge gained in the
business over many years.
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8.3.2 Sources of Buy-outs in the United Kingdom
The buyout companies themselves can come from all possible sources including UK
listed and unlisted parent companies, overseas parent companies, privatisation and
receiverships. Whole listed companies have also been subject to buy-outs by
management.
The largest single source ofMBOs in the UK is divestment from parent companies,
representing just over half of the total deals transacted in 1994. In the early eighties
such divestments were an even more important source of deal flow and up to 65% of
deals came from this source. Buyouts from foreign parents represent between 10%
and 15% of the total145.
The next most important source is buyouts from family ownership, which now
account for 24% of all MBOs. It is this source of deal flow that has always been
claimed as the most important source in Continental Europe. The commonly
advanced explanation for this goes as follows.
Many businesses were formed across Western Europe at the end of the second world
war by entrepreneurs who have now reached retirement age and are intending to live
off the fruits of their past labour. Their family may be unable to continue with the
business, a trade sale may be unattractive and managers themselves often need an
incentive to progress the business further. Selling to the existing management is
therefore a good solution.
However, this argument is not entirely convincing. While buyout statistics in
Continental Europe are not as well developed as in the UK, those that do exist show
that this source has still to be proved as important as was once forecast.
A third source is buyouts from receivership. In 1992 these grew to nearly 20% of the
total. By 1994, however, they had fallen to 5%, showing that this source fluctuates
with the economic cycle.
The number of privatisation buyouts has declined as the Government disposal
program has progressed. However, the rail privatisation and continued port and bus
sell-offs have ensured continued activity in this sector.
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The number of buy-outs of listed companies has been a relatively small but constant
source of transactions. However, they have generated considerable interest due-to
their size and particularly to a perceived conflict of interest. For example, the utilities'
role as service providers may conflict with their new, commercial aim ofprofit
maximisation. Public buyouts will probably continue as before, although a lot
depends on relative pricing in the quoted and unquoted markets.
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8.3.3 Recent Trends in Buy-out Funding
The structure of buy-outs has evolved since the 1980s. Early buyouts were financed
primarily with equity, but during the late 1980s financing became more geared.
Partly in response to the difficulties experienced by highly-geared buy-outs and
partly due to the difficulties in obtaining senior debt from the banks, gearing has
declined significantly in the 1990s.
Despite a number banks returning to the MBO market in the last two years structures
have remained similar to the early 1990s with senior debt relatively scarce.
New venture capital funds have been raised, no doubt enticed by the high returns
achieved by venture backed buyouts, particularly following good exits as the Stock
Market recovered from 1993 onwards. However, as the proportion of debt is
decreased and equity increased, the reduced leverage tends to cut the overall return to
the equity investors. To some extent mezzanine has filled the gap left by the reduced
amounts of available senior debt and this is a more cost effective option than using
venture capital.
Increasing use of vendor finance has also been a feature of the buy-out market
recently. It may be that this is at the expense of mezzanine finance, although this has
only been the case in one or two particular deals. A more likely answer is that it is a
good way to accommodate the gap in price expectations between vendors and
acquirers. The gap can be bridged by including in the financing an element which, for
various reasons, the vendor and acquirer value differently. Thus, the acquirer gets an




Whereas buy-outs depend on being in the right place at the right time, management
buy-ins add additional flexibility to the market in order to help achieve deals which
might otherwise not take place.
Financially, buy-ins work in the same way as buy-outs, the only difference being that
management are brought in from outside to fill gaps in the management team or
provide a completely new team able to develop the business in a different way.
The dividing line between buy-outs and buy-ins is not a distinct one, but the Centre
for Management Buy-out Research has identified 145 buy-ins in 1994, the number
having risen from 30 in 1985 to a peak of 148 in 1989.
Buy-ins frequently arise from family-owned businesses where there is no clear line of
management succession and the owner wishes to retire. Other typical sources include
receiverships and sales of divisions of larger companies which lack the complete
management team required for the division to trade as a stand alone business.
The other notable feature ofmanagement buy-ins is that they are higher risk than
straightforward buy-outs. They involve management teams which are new to the
particular business concerned and so lack the intimate and detailed knowledge of the
company, its strengths, weaknesses and future potential. The individuals may not
have worked together as a team before so are an untried combination with no
guarantee of success.
8.3.5 Recent Developments in Favoured Exits
Trade sale is the most popular form of exit which, while showing a decrease in time
of recession, continues as an exit source. Flotation is the next most regularly used but
is far more cyclical in nature. Between 1990 and 1992 this source fell to almost
nothing whilst receivership rose during this period. Since 1993 flotations of buyouts
have increased while receiverships have risen. For instance, in 1994 34% of all
flotations (including MBOs and others) were venture backed companies146.
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As economic conditions have changed over the past five years, the buyout industry
and financing structures have also evolved. New financing instruments such as
mezzanine have found an important role and the market continues to innovate. The
buyout industry has weathered the last recession well. Transaction size and numbers
are increasing and future prospects look relatively rosy providing there is not a
return to the highly geared deals of the late eighties.
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8.4 MBO Flotations - Recent Evidence
As outlined in the introduction, the aim of this chapter is to examine MBO
companies which subsequently realise an exit by floating on the Stock Exchange.
This section presents some recent evidence on the phenomenon.
8.4.1 Recent Developments in the UK MBO Market
The press and institutional investors themselves are sceptical about MBO
management and their backers using flotations to get rich quick. Development
Capitalists have been accused of floating companies which are not ready for
flotation. There have certainly been cases of this but the fact remains that MBO
flotations do, in general, outperform the stock market even if there are one or two
flotations which in the recent past have gone badly wrong.
In the period from the first of January 1993 to the first of January 1995 there were
130 flotations in the UK. Of those 130, 75 were venture capital backed. In aggregate
these companies had a market capitalisation of some 7.7 billion pounds sterling and a
sum of 3.6 billion pounds sterling was raised. Overall, these venture capital backed
floats, which include MBO's, have outperformed the FT-A11 Share index by 6.3%
and their respective sectors by 9.5%. This sets their performance comfortably ahead
of the universe of IPOs as a whole.
HSBC James Capel147 continue to favour MBO flotation candidates as they usually
bear the following traits. They have detailed 'due-diligence' undertaken at the time of
the MBO and consequently tend to be solid businesses. They tend to be completely
focused on one business area and consequently often perform better than their
competitors. They have an advanced understanding of the value of cash an working
capital management, often having had to bear heavy debt and the associated banking
covenants of the buy-out structure. Partly as a consequence of the last point, they
tend to have high quality and prompt financial reporting systems. Finally, the agency
147
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problem is mitigated to an extent due to the often significant equity ownership by the
management.
A point frequently overlooked by institutions is that not all venture capitalists are the
same. The behaviour of the different interest groups at flotation and in the
aftermarket can be very different. If an investee company is floated, Limited
Partnerships tend by statute to be required to distribute the shares in the buy-out
company in specie to their limited partners. The residual shareholders are often
overseas investors who are not natural holders of the equity. Consequently they often
sell quickly in the aftermarket. Buyout investors such as CINVen are not required to
distribute in this way. They are measured in a 'cash in versus cash out' basis and
consequently can add and do hold on to their residual shareholdings for some time
after the float only releasing their position when they feel the time most appropriate.
Similarly, 3i the largest venture capital player in the UK market is not forced to sell
stock on flotation nor is it obliged to sell before a certain period into the aftermarket.
Insurance company venture capital departments do not have to sell and very
frequently pass the stock on to the quoted sides. The clearing bank buy-out
departments are generally sellers because its how they best refresh their funds
available for new buyout opportunities.
The number of buyout and buy-ins floats during 1995, twenty nine, was significantly
down on the forty nine of the previous year and thirty six of 1993.
The period to flotation of buyouts increased from the level of around three years nine
months which had been sustained for the previous three years to four years, eight
months148.
First year price performance of 1995 buy-out floats was the best of the period 1992-
1995, with an actual average price improvement of over a third (35.5 percent) and a
relative price improvement of over a quarter (25.5 percent).
Relative long term out performance has also been achieved in the CMBOR Index
(sponsored by River & Mercantile). By the end of March 1996 this had outperformed
148
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Recent times have seen a considerable reduction in the level of buyout and buy-in
flotation activity compared to 1993 and 1994. While, overall, the number of new
issues on the Official Market has fallen, sentiment towards buy-out and buy-in
flotations was adversely affected by several large flotations in 1994 which
subsequently performed very badly.
The number of buy-out and buy-ins floats during 1995, twenty nine, was
significantly down on the forty nine of the previous year and the thirty six of 1993.
Of the total buy-out and buy-ins floating, almost a third (nine) were management
buy-ins, a record number.
Not only was the total number of buy-out floats considerably lower than the previous
year, but their average size, £54.9 m, was also much reduced. Consequently their
initial total market capitalisation was little more than two fifths of the previous year's
level. In contrast the average buy-in was larger than both that achieved the previous
year and that of 1995 buy-out floats. The total market capitalisation of buy-ins
floating almost doubled to £74 m149.
Some of the key characteristics of Buyout and Buyin flotations in the period from
1992-1994 are listed in the table below.
Table 7
Key Characteristics of Buyout and Buyin Flotations
MBO MBO MBO MBI MBI MBI
1993 1994 1995 1993 1994 1995
Mkt Cap.
- Total
1941.3 2665.6 1097.2 365.8 328.0 740.6
Mkt Cap.
- Average
64.7 62.0 54.9 73.2 65.6 82.3
Net Funds
Raised -












48.2 49.6 31.7 57.7 50.1 44.5
Ave. P/E 15.8 13.5 14.8 13.7 22.8 14.3
Ave.
Yield





3.9 3.9 4.8 3.9 4.2 3.1
Number
floated
30 43 20 5 5 9
Source - CMBOR ibid p28
Similar trends were also seen in the amount of funds raised at float with substantial
reductions from buy-outs but increases for buy-ins. The more difficult conditions for
new issues were perhaps reflected in the percentage of the enlarged share capital
being offered at the time of float decreasing significantly, particularly for buy-outs.
This level was the lowest since the late 1980s.
Average PE ratios moved in opposite directions for buyouts and buy-ins. Despite the
problems of flotation, but perhaps reflecting the overall high stock market indices for
part of the year, the average PE ratio of buy-outs increased. Those of buy-ins
declined from the unusual levels of the previous years.
The period to flotation of buy-outs increased from the level of around three years
nine months which had been sustained from the previous three years as a group of
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early and mid 1980s buy-outs came to market. In contrast several buy-ins floated
only a very short time after float.
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8.4.3 Characteristics of Recent Management Buy-out Companies
Although two of the floated buy-outs and buy-ins could trace their origins back to the
eighteenth century, those floated were on average post-war rather than pre-war as in
the past two years. Some of the details of the Buyout and Buyin firms floated in
1993-1995 are listed in the table below.
Table 8
1993 1994 1995
Year Founded 1939 1934 1947



















Net Assets in year
pre-float
9.0 5.1 8.5
No. of employees 1337 986 578
Source-CMBOR ibic p29
The average market capitalisation on float of buy-outs and buy-ins together was
marginally up on the previous year reflecting the number of larger buy-ins. This was
despite the inclusion ofAIM market stocks.
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The longer period between buy-out and float is likely to be one of the main factors
behind both the broad maintenance ofmarket capitalisation levels, despite the
companies on average having a smaller valuation at the time of buy-out or buy-in,
and the increase in the average net assets of the companies in the year before
flotation.
There was also a considerable reduction in the average net borrowings of the
companies in the year before flotation.
The average size of company in terms of average number of employees was
substantially reduced, with only six of the floated buy-outs and buy-ins employing
more than one thousand full time employees.
There were major variations in the profitability of the companies, with five making
pre-tax losses and four operating losses in the year before flotation.
Examination of the original sources of all buyouts and buy-ins which exited in 1994
and 1995 shows that those which were originally divestment's from a UK parent
were by far the most likely to exit through a flotation. In contrast, those bought from
family or private shareholders were very unlikely to exit through a float despite their
importance as a source in the overall buyout and buy-in market







1994 (%) 1995 (%) 1994 (%) 1995 (%) 1994 (%) 1995 (%)
Rec.ship 8.3 14.3 5.7 11.7 14.6 17.2
UK
Parent
58.3 57.2 36.8 40.4 43.8 40.6
Foreign
Parent
10.4 7.1 12.6 9.6 14.6 5.1
Private 10.4 7.1 20.7 27.6 20.8 29.7
Priv-ation 6.3 14.3 23.0 9.6 20.1 1.6
Going Pvt 6.3 0.0 1.3 1.1 4.1 7.8
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Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Sample 48 28 87 48 48 64
Source-CMBOR ibid p29
The CMBOR examined new issue prospectuses to determine the reasons stated for
flotation. The results of their study are shown in the table below.
Table 10
Reason Total Number Total %
Pay-off buyout loans -
personal
19 65.5






Expansion - General 26 89.7
Expansion - WC 9 31.0
Expansion - Fixed Capital 3 10.3
Expansion - Acquisition 13 44.8
Status 19 65.5
Employee share ownership 10 34.5
Source-CMBOR ibid p30
Clearly, reasons may be influenced by advisers suggesting a set pattern of responses.
Nevertheless some important changes were noted compared to the same
classifications for 1994 flotations. The two most important reasons stated (although
in reverse order from 1994) were for general expansion purposes and to pay off
buyout loans taken on by the company.
Flotation also gives the opportunity for management and venture capital providers to
sell some of their holdings at the time of flotation. There was significantly less
inclination to do this during 1995, reflecting the concerns of the market as to the long
term commitment of previous stockholders following the disappointing performance
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of several floated buy-outs in 1994. Indeed there were a number of cases where no
shares were sold at all and several where directors increased their holdings.
Previous studies suggest that the extent of share ownership both at the time of buyout
or buy-in and following a subsequent flotation may be closely associated with
performance. Traditionally employee participation at the time of flotation has been
given priority. Evidence shown above indicates a sharp decline in the importance of
flotation as a means of giving employees the opportunity to own shares. Just over a
third of new issue particulars suggested this compared to nearly two thirds the
previous year.
Further support for declining involvement of the wider employee body was seen in
the arrangements made for employees to obtain shares at the time of float. This fell
significantly to under three fifths of buyout and buy-in flotations. There was little
change in the percentage of companies having general share option schemes although
there was, surprisingly, a decline in the incidence of executive schemes.
After float the percentage of equity held by directors and management, 24.7 percent,
was higher than in the previous year (21.9 percent). This may reflect the smaller
original value of transactions and the larger number of 1980's buy-outs, where
management equity holdings were larger than more recently completed deals, as well
as the smaller overall percentage of the enlarged share capital being sold at the time
of flotation. There were large variations in insider share ownership between
companies; some 17 percent of companies, a similar level to 1994, had management
stakes of at least 40 percent.
In line with the reduction in buy-outs and buy-ins floating in 1995, the number of
buyout float millionaires declined from seventy five in 1994 to fifty five in 1995.
There was however an increase in the percentage ofmanagers having an initial
flotation stake of between £lm and £2m. While considerable publicity is given to the
millionaires, it is interesting to note that just over a quarter of executive directors, a
similar proportion to 1994, have share stakes worth less than £0.25m on flotation.
Among other post flotation stake holders, there was a slight increase in venture
capital share of the equity to 29.2 percent. With the lower amount of equity being
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offered, only two fifths (39.7 percent) emerged in public ownership immediately
after flotation150.
The extent to which individual venture capital firms may seek to exit their investee
companies through flotation rather than other forms of exit may to some extent




8.4.4 Stock Market Performance of Recently Floated MBOs/MBIs
This section contains detail on the main features of individual company performance
in 1995.
Unlike the very varied individual performance of buy-out and buy-in flotations seen
during 1994, 1995s' new issues had an overall more satisfactory price performance
as measured both in terms of actual share price movements and relative to the FT-All
Share Index.
On this basis the ten best performing floated buyouts and buy-ins, or 34.5 percent of
the number coming to market in 1995, had a relative share price out-performance of
at least thirty percent with five of at least fifty percent. In comparison with last year,
four of this year's floats outperformed on a relative basis the best of the 1994
floats' 51. Only three of this year's floats performed worse than 10 percent below the
FT-All Share Index compared with nine (18.8 percent) the previous year.
First year price performance of 1995 buy-out floats was the best of the period 1992-
1995 with an actual average price improvement of over a third (35.5 percent) and a
relative price improvement of over a quarter (25.5 percent). These figures include
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reverse-in stocks and AIM flotations .
This improvement was particularly marked in comparison with the initial
performance of 1994 buy-out and buy-in floats where there was only a very marginal
price improvement. During 1995 there was a marked improvement in the actual share
price of 1994 floats reflecting general stock price improvements; the overall relative
performance worsened slightly.






1992 Floats to 31.12.92 +23.8 +10.5
to 31.12.93 +70.4 +24.0
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to 31.12.94 +62.5 +31.3
to 31.12.95 +70.0 +16.9
1993 Floats to 31.12.93 +28.2 +2.1
to 31.12.94 +3.2 -4.5
to 31.12.95 +28.2 -1.4
1994 Floats to 31.12.94 +0.9 +3.0
to 31.12.95 +15.3 -0.7
1995 Floats to 31.12.95 +35.5 +25.5
Source-CMBOR ibic p34
Looking at performance characteristics, the best performers (as in 1993) have been
medium sized buy-out and buy-in companies- those where the original buy-out or
buy-in value was between £10m and £30m. Clearly, successful deals of this size will
have increased their market capitalisation considerably by the time of float, which
explains the better performance of buy-outs and buy-ins in 1995 which had an initial
market capitalisation of over £30m.
As noted earlier, the average period to float was considerably longer in 1995 than in
the previous few years. In 1992 and 1993, although not 1994, the best performers
were buy-outs and buy-ins which had taken three or four years to float. This period
again produced good performance with companies outperforming relative to the FT-
All Share Index by almost a third (31.7 percent).
In both 1992 and 1994 floats where less than 50 percent of the enlarged share capital
was offered for sale had performed more satisfactorily than those where more than 50
percent had been offered. This was again the case in 1995.
The increase in buy-ins being floated was accompanied by a sharp reversal of their
performance relative to buy-outs. Whereas in 1992/94 buy-ins had outperformed
buy-outs, they had a disappointing overall performance in 1995.
Table 12
1993 1993 1994 1994 1995 1995
floats floats floats floats floats floats
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Price Ch. Rel. Ch. Price Ch. Rel. Ch. Price Ch. Rel. Ch.
MBO
Value
<£10m +22.0 +6.5 +5.3 +7.5 +23.8 +11.7
£10m-
£30m
+45.8 +0.3 +2.9 +4.9 +76.9 +63.0
£30m+ +22.2 +6.0 -4.4 -2.2 +11.2 +5.7
Mkt Cap.
on Float
<£30m +25.5 +4.3 +3.1 +3.9 +18.5 +7.7
£30m+ +28.9 + 1.4 +0.1 +2.7 +46.5 +37.1
Period to
float
<3yr +26.9 +9.7 -5.7 -2.9 +32.4 +24.4
3/4 yr +25.1 +9.5 -0.7 -0.3 +44.9 +31.7
5yr+ +37.1 -28.2 +11.9 +14.7 +24.5 +17.3
% sh. cap.
offered
<50% +17.1 -0.2 +2.4 +4.2 +39.8 +29.5
>50% +39.1 +2.2 -0.9 +1.7 +19.8 +11.0
MBO? +31.3 +12.3 +17.0 +20.1 +7.5 +2.5
MBI? +27.7 +0.4 -1.0 +1.0 +46.7 +34.7
Source-CMBOR ibid p35
The debate over the longer term performance of floated buy-outs and buy-ins has led
to the establishment of an index, the CMBOR Index of buy-out and buy-in floats.
This has been sponsored by River & Mercantile.
The CMBOR Index comprises those companies listed on the London Stock
Exchange which have previously been subject to a buy-out or buy-in as defined by
CMBOR. Companies included are revised daily to include new flotations and to take
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off companies which have subsequently been subject to some form of second exit.
The base date for the CMBOR Index is end 1990 and the Index includes all buyout
and buy-in floats which were quoted at that date. The Index has been calculated since
July 1995, and on a daily basis since January 1996. Recent results from the index are










CMBOR Index +118.7 +28.7 +20.1 +7.2
FTSE All
Share
+78.6 +21.2 +18.5 +2.3




+79.0 +17.8 +9.7 +7.4
Source-CMBOR ibid p35
As is shown in graph 4 in the graph pack, relative price out-performance has been
achieved by the Index since its formation. Between its base date and the end of
March 1996, the out-performance relative to the FT All Share Index has been 40.1
percentage points and against the Hoare Govett Smaller Companies Index 39.7
percentage points. For the fifteen months to March 1996, the Index increased by 28.7
percent compared to 17.8 percent for the Hoare Govett Smaller Companies Index.
Recent academic research carried out in the United States by Brav and Gompers1:i3
mirrors the finding of the results of the Centre for Management Buyout Research.
They investigated the long run performance of recent IPO firms in a large sample
covering 934 VC backed floats which occurred in the period 1972 - 1992 and 3407
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A. Brav and P. Gompers, 'Myth or Reality? The Long Run Underperformance of Initial Public
Offerings: Evidence from Venture and Nonventure Capital Back Companies' Journal of Finance Vol
LIL No. 5 December 1997 pl791 - 1821
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non-venture capital backed floats which occurred in the period 1975 - 1992. They
found that venture capital backed IPOs outperform non-venture capital backed IPOs
using equally weighted returns. The value weighted returns study shows that the
outperformance of the venture capital backed IPOs is a function of the
underperformance of small sub $50m non-venture capital backed IPOs.
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8.5 Study Methodology and Data
8.5.1 The Study Data
The data used in this study is concerned with initial public offerings made on the
Main Market and the Unlisted Securities Market of the London Stock Exchange. The
study period spans six years from July 1989 to June 1995.
The dataset was constructed in the following manner. Data on companies floating
was obtained from KPMG Corporate Finance, London. The information provided
included financial information on floating companies and information on the relevant
professional advisors. This information was cross-referenced against information
provided by the Quality of Markets Department at the London Stock Exchange for
accuracy. Pricing data for the IPO companies was obtained from DataStream
International and cross-referenced against a second source courtesy of FactSet Ltd.
The initial dataset containing pricing data included some 302 companies.
The final sample consists of 175 companies. Clearly, the sample is smaller than that
used for analysis purposes in the previous chapter. This is a function of data
availability pertaining to the independent variables used in the econometric analysis.
The average level of excess return achieved by the sample constituents on the first
day of trading was 7.9%. This level represents the index adjusted return from the
flotation price to the mid-market price at the end of the first day's trading. All
flotation methods are considered in the analysis, but as indicated in the Keasey and
Short154 study, the placing method is that most favoured by companies.
The following table indicates the flotation methods chosen by companies.
Method Number
Placing 109
Placing / Offer for Sale 31
Placing / Intermediaries Offer 33
Offer for Sale 1
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8.5.2 Model and Variables
In the analysis to follow, the level of underpricing is defined as:
EXRTNj = [(Pit/It)/(Pi0/I0)]-l
Where Pit= share price at the close of the t th day of trading
Pi0= offer price
It = FT All Share Index level at the close of the t th day of trading
I0 = FT All Share Index level at flotation
Measuring excess returns in this level assumes that the betas of the IPO firms are the
same as that of the market as a whole. As previously discussed, this is a strong
assumption, but one which has been used previously in the literature.
For the purposes of the study, the immediate excess return was focused upon. To that
end the dependent variable is constructed to show excess return on the first day of
trading.
For the current sample of 175 firms, the average underpricing on the initial day of
trading was 7.9% as indicated. However, the standard deviation of 15.2% is
illustrative of the variation in underpricing across the individual firms. The level of
7.9% is lower than reported in recent studies. This may in part be reflected in the
relatively large number of sizeable flotations undertaken in the period, (such as the
privatisation of the water and regional electricity companies). Over the other periods
which were examined (days 5,10,15 and 20) the level of underpricing and standard
deviation of returns were broadly similar.
The relevant statistics are shown in the table below.
Day 1 Day 5 Day 10 Day 15 Day 20
Average
Return
7.89% 8.55% 8.05% 8.34% 8.34%
Std.
Deviation
15.24% 14.61% 15.22% 14.45% 15.59%
The variables used are shown in the model below.
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EXRTN = B0 + B,.BIG + B2.MBO + B3.PBV + B4.PSAL + B5.TURNOVER +
B6.NAV + B7.PRE + Bg.FUNDS + B9.RETAINED
Where the variables are defined as follows
Dependent Variable Description
EXRTN Level of excess return
Independent Variables
BIG Dummy variable coded 1 where the company was a
government privatisation issue or a particularly large
flotation
MBO Dummy variable coded 1 if the new issue was an MBO
PBV Share price to Book value ratio
PSAL Share price to sales ratio
TURNOVER Turnover in the period immediately pre float
NAV Nav in the period immediately pre float
PRE Pre-tax profit in the period immediately pre float
FUNDS Funds raised in the flotation
RETAINED Percentage of equity retained by shareholders in the float
The focus of this study is to determine any differentiation between the returns
produced by MBO firms in the initial post issue period and in addition to determine
whether any effect, if indeed one exists, persists for a period of time into the post
issue period. For that purpose each study was conducted for a number of different
time periods.
The study focused on MBOs in particular and did not include other types of venture
capital backed funding structure pre-flotation. This was done for a number of
reasons. Firstly, this study sought to add to the literature in the area ofMBOs
specifically and hence considering MBIs would, to a degree, have confused th
picture. One of the aims of the study was to provide evidence specifically to back or
contradict the existing literature in respect of the price performance ofMBO backed
flotations. Secondly, as one of the aims of the study was to search for the possibility
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ofmanagerial signalling via equity retention, focusing on MBOs, where management
teams should have a larger stake in the entity and are less likely to have conducted a
successful MBO in the past, (unlike an MBI candidate) should provide a better
signal.
The list of explanatory variables used in this study is not the same as for the main
study undertaken in chapter seven. Hopefully this passage should explain why it is
necessary to change the independent variables.
The changes reflect the fact that MBO businesses normally have certain
characteristics which differentiates them from other small IPOs. Namely, they tend to
have substantial asset backing (as this is what the MBO debt is secured against) and
they tend to be commercially viable (and in that sense profitable, unlike say a
Biotech IPO). To that end variables TURNOVER, NAV and PRE attempt to capture
these characteristics to determine if there is any share price effect associated with the
aforementioned characteristics. Variables PBV and PSAL address similar issues but
from a different perspective. These ratios are traditionally used by investors as
barometers of'value' in an IPO. MBO flotations should score highly in this regard
and hence the variables are included to see whether there is any share price effect
associated with the level of these variables. FUNDS is included in this analysis to
determine whether there is a share price reaction associated with an MBO (which
will be highly leveraged) raising substantial funds to pay back its debt. The notion
here is that if an MBO is capital rationed as a function of its debt burden and the
servicing costs thereof, then raising a large sum on flotation to pay this back may be
taken as a positive signal by investors that the managementwill now be able to
deploy previously tied up resources into profitable projects.
To discuss each variable individually ,the variable BIG was included in the model to
see whether any differential effects in underpricing existed for those much larger
issues including government privatisations and in addition to see whether this effect
persisted through time. MBO is a dummy variable used to separate the MBOs from
the other firms in the dataset. PSAL is a variable which relates the market value of
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the company to its turnover. The notion behind including this variable is to see
whether those companies which have a lower price to sales ratio (and hence may
present better 'value') produce higher excess returns. Similarly, the PBV variable
relates the market value of the company to its asset value. The notion here is to test
whether lower price to book value companies have positive valuation characteristics
which produce higher excess returns. TURNOVER, NAV and PRE variables
measure sales, assets and profitability of the firms. The inclusion of these variables
seeks to show if any relation between these variables and the level of excess returns
exists. FUNDS measures the amount of funds raised in the flotation. The idea here is
to determine if floats which raise less funds are potentially less risky and hence may
exhibit lower degrees of excess returns. RETAINED measures the percentage of
funds retained in the company post flotation. The notion here is that less risky firms
(which should produce lower excess returns) have high retention levels.
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8.5.3 Empirical Methods
The empirical analysis conducted was that of an ordinary least squares regression
(OLS) with excess return as dependent variable and the explanatory variables as
indicated in the previous section. The models were run on the MicroFit 4
econometrics package.
In the models run where the explanatory variable was excess return 15 and 20 days
after flotation, the model was found to suffer from a heteroscedasticity problem. The
result of the existence of this problem was that while the parameter estimates were
linear and unbiased they were not minimum variance in the class of all unbiased
estimators. The absence of the minimum variance criterion places a question on the
validity of any inference which can be drawn from the model. As a result, the
heteroscedasticity problem had to be solved in some way. The traditional method of
solving such a problem is to determine which of the independent variables is causing
the variances to be non-constant and then to 'scale' the regression equation to resolve
the problem. Unfortunately, in this case such a procedure would be very difficult to
accomplish effectively due to the number of independent variables. However, the
same result can be achieved by the use ofWhite's heteroscedasticity consistent
standard errors. This approach does not attempt to identify the specific cause of the
problem but makes an algebraic manipulation to cure the problem. Heteroscedastic
consistent parameters are shown for all the models but as intimated, they are only
strictly relevant to the last two studies.
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8.5.4 Model Results
The regression results are shown below.
Day 1 Day 5 Day 10 Day 15 Day 20
R Squared 0.075 0.114 0.095 0.070 0.0811
F Statistic 1.476 2.363 * 1.919** 1.3378 1.6186
*
- significant at the 5% level
* *
- significant at the 10% level
The results of the model estimation procedure reveals that both R squared values and
F statistics are low. This is not entirely unexpected as high R squared values would
mean that it were possible to forecast which stocks would produce high excess
returns. Nevertheless, the low values do mean that the level of security which can be
attached to inference from the parameter estimates is modest. The individual
parameter results are discussed below.
Summary Parameter Results
Regressor Day 1 Day 5 Day 10 Day 15 Day 20
BIG NO NO NO NO YES (10%)
MBO YES (10%) YES (5%) NO NO NO
PBV NO YES (10%) YES (10%) YES (5%) YES (10%)
PSAL NO NO NO NO NO
TURNOVER NO NO NO NO NO
NAV NO YES (10%) NO NO NO
PRE NO NO NO NO NO
FUNDS NO NO NO NO NO
RETAINED NO YES (5%) NO NO NO
Model Parameter Results (Full Statistics in Statistical Appendices)
Day One Returns
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Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
Dependent variable is ADJ1
175 observations used for estimation from 1 to 175
******************************************************************************
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob]
BIG -.031293 .12987 -,24096[.810]
MBO -.046261 .025673 -1.8019[.073]
PBV .3152E-3 .2454E-3 1.2843 [.201 ]
PSAL .4768E-4 .6059E-3 .078692[.937]
TURNOVER .7582E-7 .2188E-6 .34651 [.729]
NAV -.2537E-6 .2512E-6 -1.0096[.314]
PRE .1668E-5 .1863E-5 ,89560[.372]
FUNDS -.1253E-6 .4115E-6 -,30459[.761]
RETAINED .10893 .069959 1.5570[.121]
CONST .031802 .043966 .72334[.470]
******************************************************************************
Week One Returns
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
Dependent variable is ADJ5
175 observations used for estimation from 1 to 175
******************************************************************************
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob]
BIG -.089826 .12177 -,73766[.462]
MBO -.051795 .024073 -2.1516[.033]
PBV .4912E-3 .2301E-3 2.1346[.034]
PSAL .4864E-3 .5681E-3 .85621 [.393]
TURNOVER .8855E-7 .2052E-6 .43162[.667]
NAV -.2177E-6 .2356E-6 -.92411 [.357]
PRE .1560E-5 .1747E-5 .89321 [.373]
FUNDS .3393E-7 .3858E-6 .087942[.930]
RETAINED .12878 .065599 1.9631 [.051]
CONST .019610 .041226 ,47567[.635]
******************************************************************************
Week Two Returns
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
******************************************************************************
Dependent variable is ADJ10
175 observations used for estimation from 1 to 175
******************************************************************************
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prc
BIG -.14512 .12827 -1.1314[.260]
MBO -.038324 .025358 -1.5113 [. 133]
PBV .5109E-3 .2424E-3 2.1073[.037]
PSAL .6111E-3 .5984E-3 1.0212[.309]
TURNOVER .6537E-7 .2161E-6 .30246[.763]
NAV -.1147E-6 .2482E-6 -,46240[.644]
PRE .2017E-5 .1840E-5 1.0960[.275]
FUNDS .7066E-7 .4064E-6 ,17385[.862]
RETAINED .11892 .069101 1.7210[.087]
CONST .012521 .043426 ,28832[.773]
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Week Three Returns
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
Dependent variable is ADJ15
175 observations used for estimation from 1 to 175
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prc
BIG -.12889 .12345 -1.0441 [.298]
MBO -.033754 .024405 -1.3831 [. 169]
PBV .4524E-3 .2333E-3 1.9389[.054]
PSAL .2377E-3 .5759E-3 .41280[.680]
TURNOVER .8453E-7 .2080E-6 .40640[.685]
NAV -.1065E-6 .2388E-6 -,44583[.656]
PRE .1637E-5 .1771E-5 ,92439[.357]
FUNDS .118E-6 .3911E-6 ,28586[.775]
RETAINED .099429 .066504 1.4951 [. 137]
CONST .023249 .041794 .55628[.579]
Week Four Returns
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
***********:]«**:]«******5(:>(c:j«>|«5t::ic>|c;)c>]ci|c:Jc:|<:(s:(s5(:5f::|e:J«>f:>|«:]«:]::l:5)s5]«:(:}|«j]<}]e5t:>|e:f!5)c5):sl<5)c:ic:(c>|<******************
Dependent variable is ADJ20
175 observations used for estimation from 1 to 175
******************************************************************************
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob]
BIG -.16782 .13233 -1.2682[.207]
MBO -.033369 .026159 -1.2756[.204]
PBV .5951E-3 .2501E-3 2.3796[.018]
PSAL -.7680E-4 .6173E-3 -. 12440[.901 ]
TURNOVER .8269E-7 .2229E-6 .37088[.711]
NAV -.6680E-7 .2560E-6 -,26094[.794]
PRE .1964E-5 .1898E-5 1.0345[.302]
FUNDS .9900E-7 .4193E-6 .23612[.814]
RETAINED .10266 .071285 1.4402[. 152]
CONST .024659 .044799 .55044[.583]
257
8.5.5 Discussion of Results
From the panel of results as presented above the following conclusions can be drawn.
The results with respect to the MBO variable are most interesting. The variable is
significant over the first two observation periods but is in fact signed negatively. This
is indicative ofMBOs exhibiting lower levels of excess return in the immediate
aftermarket. The variable ceases to have any significance over other time scales.
This result would seem to stack up against the earlier anecdotal evidence that MBO
firms outperform the universe of other flotations. However, in this context it must be
noted that even though the time frame of the study extends to twenty days of trading
into the after-market, this in itself is not that long a time window. It may well be that
the MBOs do outperform over longer (six months) time periods but this effect is not
captured by the dataset used in this study.
Interestingly, MBOs are appearing to exhibit lower excess return in the immediate
aftermarket. This phenomenon may well be explainable in terms of the signalling
literature discussed earlier in this thesis.
As mentioned in the preceding sections of this chapter, venture capitalists spend a
great deal of time vetting potential investments before actually committing funds. In
that sense they may, by investing in the first place, be sending a credible signal to the
equity investors who subsequently invest in the MBO on listing that the investment is
of 'high' quality. In the same way that using a high reputation sponsor is purported to
act as a signal of potential investment quality (and hence lower excess return), being
a former MBO may produce the same net effect. This postulation would explain the
results as found.
There is a precedent in the academic literature for these findings. Megginson and
Weiss155 found in their study of venture capital backed IPOs undertaken in the 1983
1987 period that venture capitalist backing reduced the mean and median level of
underpricing associated with these flotations. They take this result as evidence to
support their theory that venture the presence of venture capitalists acts as a
certification mechanism to potential investors in the same way as certification which
155
W. Megginson and K. Weiss, 'Venture Capitalists Certification in Initial Public Offerings' Journal
of Finance Vol XLVI No. 3 July 1991 p879 - 903
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can be undertaken through the use of high reputation bankers and accountants. They
add to the strength of their argument by observing that the venture capital backed
firms were more successful in attracting high reputation banks and accountants to
handle their issue.
To discuss the other findings in brief, the most prevalent finding is that the PBV
variable is significant over a number of time periods. This would point to shares with
a higher asset backing producing a higher level of excess returns. This would be
consistent with investments which exhibit better 'value' characteristics producing
larger excess returns in the aftermarket. The fact that the first day result was negative
may point to the gradual buying interest in these stocks increasing over time.
The final result to comment upon relates to the fact that the dummy variable
representing the government privatisation issues produced a statistically positive
result for the last time period in the study. This indicates abnormal excess returns
from such stocks, but only after some time.
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8.6 Conclusion
This chapter has sought to examine the venture capital market in the UK with
particular emphasis on MBO flotations. The results of the study contained in section
four of this chapter do not square entirely with the evidence introduced earlier. It
would appear that the phenomenon of outperformance from venture capital backed
flotations was not evidenced by the results. This may be due to the relatively short
time period over which the data set produced data but nevertheless, the results stand.
The potential reasons for this observed result may have a great deal to do with the
'signalling' of underlying IPO quality alluded to in earlier work. What is interesting
to note is that while the presence of a venture capitalists via his/her involvement in an
MBO acts as a positive signal to investors by apparently reducing uncertainty over
the prospects for the business and the associated level of excess return, the use of a
highly reputable sponsor appears to have no such effect, at least in this case.
The evidence presented from work into longer term returns from MBOs (and indeed
MBIs) indicates that they do produce excess returns relative to other asset classes.
This in fact does tie in with the scenario outlined. It would be consistent for 'high
quality' IPOs to produce low immediate excess returns in accordance with the
signalling effect but for these investments to produce better long term returns as a
function of their higher quality.
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Conclusions
This thesis concerned itself with an examination of the market for Initial Public
Offerings in the United Kingdom. This is the mechanism by which corporate entities
gain a listing on London's quoted equity markets. Equity markets are dynamic,
continually evolving with the passing of time, but what remains an all pervasive fact
is that investing in IPO companies appears to produce an excess return on average to
investors regardless of which international equity market the issue is listed upon or
indeed over which period in time one cares to look at.
This study concerns itself with the United Kingdom IPO market where work on the
phenomenon goes back to that undertaken by Merrit, Howe and Newbould in the
latter half of the 1960's. They found that the average excess return across issues in
their sample was 13.7%. Subsequent UK based studies have re-affirmed this finding
with the absolute level of excess return being somewhat variable between studies
(such as those conducted by Levis and Holland and Horton) but continually in the
10% range.
A broadly similar level of excess return has been found to persist in the considerably
more voluminous body of evidence provided by the many American financial
economists who have focused on this issue.
This thesis has sought to investigate this phenomena. Firstly the presence or not of
the phenomena is identified for the data set used, a theoretical explanation for its
existence having been drawn from the literature. Once the excess return levels have
been identified as existing in the dataset at hand, further work to examine some of the
more interesting aspects of the anomaly is introduced and discussed.
Before these discussions are commenced and the empirical work undertaken, the
institutional features of the UK IPO market are introduced. The work in this area can
be found in chapters one to four. It is hoped that by reading this material the reader
will be aware of the highly complex dynamics of the UK IPO market, the many
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players involved and the myriad of complex issues that must be considered by a
company attempting a flotation. As is clear from the work in these four chapters the
process is complex. It is also continually evolving. Perhaps the most significant
development to have taken place since work on this project began has been the
creation of the Alternative Investment Market (AIM). This has now replaced the
Unlisted Securities Market (USM) and the s535 listing (the latter having been
replaced by the creation of Ofex). This market aims to draw smaller more embryonic
companies to it by allowing them to achieve a listing while having a shorter trading
history than main market flotations and at a lower cost. This market has been
relatively successful in attracting a number of new companies onto the market.
Outwith the advent ofAIM, changes have been made to the rules governing the main
UK market. Principally these relate to the virtual disappearance of the Intermediaries
Offer as a means of achieving a flotation. This has been made more or less defunct
due to a change in the maximum amount (by value) that can be raised by a company
in a traditional institutional placing. This means that even more IPOs arrive on the
market via the placing route and hence fewer and fewer private individuals gain
access to IPOs when they float.
As previously alluded to, there is a considerable amount of literature which looks at
the phenomenon of IPOs excess returns. The bulk of the literature originates in the
USA where the subject has been studied for forty years or more. The UK literature is
more embryonic in its nature but much of it follows the same lines as the work
carried out in the USA. There have been a great many theses advanced to try to
explain the observed phenomena. Asymmetric information, Signalling, Ex-Ante
Uncertainty, Cascades, Stabilisation and Implicit Insurance are all notions advanced
in the literature. There are pro's and con's to almost every approach, evidence for and
against. These are all discussed in some detail in chapter five.
This thesis concerns itself, in the first instance, by examining the data set to attempt
to test for the presence of 'stabilisation'. This explanation for IPO excess returns has
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been researched quite extensively in the USA by authors such as Ruud and Shultz
and Zaman, but to date little work has been done in the UK.
Stabilisation is an intuitively appealing explanation for IPO excess returns. It is not
based on any pre-conceived notions of the operations of the investment banking
industry nor any notion indirect compensation between agents. It is an intuitively
simple explanation which has to it's great advantage the fact that it can be transferred
across markets. A number of the other explanations are predicated on certain
institutional features of the markets in which the research studies were focused. This
makes for fundamental results which are, by virtue of their lack of portability
between markets, less satisfactory. 'Stabilisation' has the advantage of portability.
Consequently, chapter six concentrates on examining the data base to search for the
presence of stabilisation in the returns ofUK IPOs in the 1989-1995 period.
Compelling evidence to support the presence of stabilised returns in the UK IPO
market over that period is presented. It would appear that the initial day one excess
return of 8.4% is a result of stabilising activities by investment banks. The level of
this stabilisation broadly declines over time, consistent with investment banks
ceasing stabilising activities. In this way this research provides evidence in favour of
stabilisation as an explanation of IPO excess returns in the UK.
This fact having been established, this thesis then moves on to examine a number of
features of the UK IPO market. Chapter seven specifically examines 'signalling' in
the context of the UK IPO market. The notion of this research is to examine whether
there is any differential excess return between IPOs using 'high' or Tow' quality
sponsoring bankers. The literature would suggest that higher 'quality' investment
bankers should frank their reputation on the IPOs that they float hence reducing the
indirect cost of flotation (as witnessed by the level of excess returns). The evidence
presented in chapter seven allows no weight to be added to this argument. It appears
that there is not an indirect cost advantage from using a high quality sponsoring
investment bank. With this in mind, further work on IPO costs is conducted in
chapter seven. The notion behind this work is to look at direct costs of flotation (the
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fact that choosing a high reputation sponsor does not reduce indirect costs having
been established) to determine if there is a point (measured in terms of funds raised)
below which IPO companies should not concern themselves with appointing a 'high'
quality sponsor. Such a point, where company's raise approximately £30m, is so
identified.
This is an interesting revelation. It points to the fact that 'smaller' IPOs should use
'lower' quality brokers to minimise their flotation costs. This points to a rosy future
indeed for the newly created AIM market whose characteristics fit this scenario well.
The final research chapter is chapter eight. This chapter looks at the phenomenon of
venture capital backed flotations, and management buy-out flotations in particular.
This topic is of increasing interest due to the ever increasing number of venture
capital backed flotations that are listing on the London market. The chapter
introduced the subject of venture capital in some detail as it is quite dissimilar in
some ways to the subjects introduced earlier in this thesis.
The literature on MBO backed flotations suggests that they provide useful share price
outperformance relative to all other IPOs. Consequently, this study looks MBO
flotations in the 1989-1995 period to determine if any differential excess return can
be identified in the aftermarket. No such evidence can be found from the dataset
used. It appears that there is no differential excess return in the immediate
aftermarket for MBO backed flotations. This result runs somewhat contrary to that
presented in the current literature but is consistent with the 'signalling' study
conducted in chapter seven. The result points to MBO floats producing a level of
excess return commensurate with those floats signalling their 'quality' through
having attracted the interests of a venture capital investor in the past.
It appears then that while the appointment of high quality sponsors does not reduce
ex-ante uncertainty, the fact that the investee company has been venture capital
backed does.
268
In conclusion then we may draw the following results from the study. Firstly, the UK
IPO market is a complex and dynamic environment in which a great many new
companies seek a listing each year. Excess returns exist and appear to be caused, at
least in part, by stabilising activities conducted by investment bankers which decline
over time. Appointment of'high' quality sponsoring investment bank does not
appear to reduce the indirect costs of underpricing and in addition, smaller IPOs
could save themselves considerable direct costs by not appointing a 'high quality'
sponsor. Finally, no evidence can be found to suggest that MBO floats produce
excess returns in the immediate after-market. However, the evidence found in
connection with MBO floats is consistent with MBO floats 'signalling' high quality
(and hence having lower levels of excess returns) as a function of having attracted
venture capital backers.
The topic of IPOs is a huge one and no thesis could possibly hope to cover more than
a small piece of a puzzle which remains unsolved. This piece of work is no
exception. It focuses on a relatively small part of the UK IPO market but it does offer
some new insights into the dynamics of that market. Any amount of further research
could be undertaken. One area of interest with regard to 'stabilisation' would be to
look at the structure of the stabilising activities to see if the sponsoring broker plays
the major role. One would expect this to be the case but lack of data availability may
make this a difficult task. A particularly fruitful area of research might examine the
longer term (2 year) post IPO performance of IPO firms. Since that topic was never
intended for study in this thesis, a discussion of the longer term returns from
investing in IPOs is limited to the literature review. However, an examination of the
long term IPO returns, particularly in the area of venture capital backed flotations,
could provide fruitful indeed.
From the point of view of the author this thesis has represented an enjoyable journey
through an interesting and challenging area. The journey was sometimes difficulty
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Statistical Material relating to Chapter Six
Returns Matrix From The Stabilisation Study
Company Name Day 1 Daw 5 Day 10 Day 15 Day 20
Raw % Raw % Raw % Raw % Raw %
Return Return Return Return Return
HILL HIRE 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.0
MICE GROUP 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.0
BSKYB 0.05 0.00 0.01 -0.04 -0.0
INNOVATIVE TECHNOLOGIES 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.0
RM PLC 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.1
RAP GROUP 0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.0
CLYDEPORT 0.13 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.2
KILN CAPITAL 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.0
TELEWEST COMMUNICATIONS 0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.01 -0.0
EUCLIDIAN 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.0
ASHBOURNE -0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.0
SEAPERFECT 0.04 0.18 0.11 0.07 0.0
JJB SPORTS 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.06 0.0
TELE-CINE CELL 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.0
TLG 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.15 0.1
CHURCHILL CHINA 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.0
REGENT CORPORATION 0.04 0.07 0.04 -0.04 -0.1
CALLUNA 0.29 0.28 0.43 0.33 0.3
IRISH PERMANENT 0.18 0.16 0.19 0.20 0.1
FILTRONIC COMTEK 0.10 0.25 0.34 0.36 0.3
SERVISAIR PLC 0.02 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.1
ED AND F MAN -0.05 -0.03 -0.09 -0.09 -0.0
GAMES WORKSHOP GROUP 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.0
ENNEMIX 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.0
MACKIE INTERNATIONAL GROUP 0.01 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.0
RYLAND GROUP 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.0
COMPEL GROUP PLC 0.01 -0.05 -0.07 -0.10 -0.1
INDEPENDENT PARTS GROUP 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.0
COPYRIGHT PROMOTIONS 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.04 0.0
CHAMBERLIN PHIPPS GROUP 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.0
PILLAR PROPERTY 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.0
AROMASCAN 0.00 -0.02 -0.05 -0.06 -0.0
MAGNUM POWER -0.06 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.4
PANTHER SECURITIES CO 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 -0.05 -0.0
FREEPORT LEISURE 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.0
IDEAL HARDWARE 0.12 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.2
YATES BROTHERS WINE LODGES 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.25 0.2
EXCO 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.16 0.1
FINELIST 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.03 0.0
CARNELL PLC 0.37 0.41 0.44 0.44 0.4
EURODOALLAR 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.0
VIDEOLOGIC GROUP -0.04 -0.18 -0.37 -0.12 -0.1
UNIVERSAL CERAMIC MATERIALS 0.02 0.05 0.10 0.19 0.2
JBA HOLDINGS 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.0
JOHN MANSFIELD GROUP 0.00 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.0
CHESTERTON INTERNATIONAL 0.00 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.1
BLOOMSBURY PUBLISHING 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.1
6
CPL AROMAS 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.0
VCI -0.06 -0.07 -0.14 -0.11 -0.0
UPF 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.2
AMEY HOLDINGS 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.0
SPARGO CONSULTING 0.13 0.17 0.16 0.11 0.1
BREWIN DOLPHIN HOLDINGS 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.08 -0.1
AEROSTRUCTURES HAMBLE 0.00 0.02 0.02 -0.01 -0.0
ARGENT 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.0
LONDON CLUBS 0.10 0.13 0.14 0.12 0.1
CASSELL 0.05 0.08 0.17 0.16 0.1
THE DENBY GROUP 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.0
ITERMEDIATE CAPITAL GROUP 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.0
AUTOMOTIVE PRECISION HOLDINGS 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.06 0.0
CLS HOLDINGS -0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 -0.0
KAY'S FOOD GROUP 0.10 0.00 0.05 0.05 0.0
NORCOR 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.0
NIGHTFREIGHT 0.06 0.02 0.00 -0.02 -0.0
SPECIALITY SHOPS 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.0
DCC 4.41 4.39 4.34 4.33 4.3
LOMBARD INSURANCE GROUP -0.01 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.0
HEALTHCALL -0.01 -0.07 -0.09 -0.10 -0.0
CAPITOL GROUP 0.06 0.12 0.13 0.08 0.1
REDROW GROUP -0.05 -0.06 -0.09 -0.12 -0.1
VYMURA 0.03 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.0
MY KIN DA TOWN -0.03 -0.07 -0.05 -0.09 -0.0
GO AHEAD GROUP 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.0
HAMLEYS -0.02 -0.02 0.00 0.00 -0.0
DRS 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.09 0.0
GRT BUSES 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.0
KELLER 0.70 0.67 -0.03 -0.02 -0.1
OXFORD MOLECULAR 0.05 -0.06 -0.15 -0.16 -0.1
SUPERSCAPE VR PLC 0.28 0.26 0.16 0.17 0.1
FISCAL PROPERTIES -0.04 -0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.0
ST JAMES BEACH HOTEL 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.0
RUGBY ESTATES 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.15 0.1
HOUSE OF FRASER 0.04 0.05 0.01 0.05 -0.0
PERSONA 0.04 0.04 0.07 0.10 0.1
GROUPE CHEZ GERARD PLC -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.0
UNIPALM GROUP PLC 0.31 0.24 0.37 0.32 0.3
TRAFFICMASTER 0.14 0.46 0.43 0.35 0.3
WAINHOMES PLC -0.04 -0.08 -0.06 -0.07 -0.0
NOTTINGHAM GROUP PLC 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.0
INSPEC GROUP PLC 0.18 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.2
CAPITAL SHOPPING CENTRES -0.10 -0.07 -0.04 -0.03 -0.0
DOMNIC HUNTER PLC 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.14 0.1
DOMINION ENERGY PLC 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.00 0.0
COAL INVESTMENTS PLC 0.23 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.0
ROBERTWISEMAN DAIRIES 0.02 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.0
BEAZER HOMES PLC -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.02 0.0
MAID PLC -0.08 -0.23 -0.40 -0.40 -0.4
NEWPORT HOLDINGS 0.03 -0.02 -0.11 0.01 0.0
BRIGHTSTONE PROPERTIES PLC 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.0
MDIS -0.01 -0.04 -0.06 -0.01 0.0
WELLINGTON HOLDINGS PLC 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.0
PARTCO GROUP PLC 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.1
MIDLAND INDEP. NEWSPAPERS 0.21 0.16 0.17 0.19 0.2
APPLIED DISTRIBUTION PLC 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.0
WASTE RECYCLING GROUP 0.35 0.28 0.25 0.23 0.3
GRAHAM GROUP PLC 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.13 0.1
CEDARDATA PLC 0.09 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.0
GOLDSBOROUGH HEALTHCARE PLC 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 -0.13 -0.1
UNITED CARRIERS GROUP 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.01 0.0
RADSTONE TECHNOLOGY PLC 0.05 0.03 -0.07 -0.06 -0.1
FINELIST GROUP PLC -0.04 -0.06 -0.08 -0.04 -0.0
TRING INTERNATIONAL GROUP 0.16 0.12 0.10 0.09 0.0
CLINICAL COMPUTING 0.33 0.21 0.22 0.14 0.1
TRIFAST PLC 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.0
PARKSIDE INTERNATIONAL PLC 0.12 0.13 0.05 0.07 0.0
CHIROSCIENCE PLC 0.01 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.0
ALPHA AIRPORTS PLC 0.20 0.20 0.16 0.17 0.1
CODA GROUP PLC 0.12 0.11 0.10 0.09 0.0
UTILITY CABLE PLC 0.03 -0.08 0.16 0.22 0.1
SLIMMA PLC 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.1
CEMENTONE PLC 0.16 0.24 0.24 0.26 0.3
RACKWOOD MINERAL HOLDING S PLC 0.14 0.10 0.12 0.12 -0.0
ROSSMOUNT PLC 0.10 0.14 0.10 0.10 0.1
CHELSFIELD PLC 0.15 0.16 0.19 0.16 0.1
SEC PLC 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.13 0.1
NELSON HURST PLC 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.10 0.1
LONDON INDUSTRIAL PLC 0.04 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.1
INSPIRATIONS PLC 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.0
TELSPEC 0.12 0.24 0.17 0.18 0.2
MILLGATE PLC 0.05 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.0
ON DEMAND INFORMATION PLC 0.41 0.36 0.33 0.28 0.3
CELLTECH GROUP PLC -0.08 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11 -0.1
FENCHURCH PLC -0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.06 -0.0
BADGERLINE GROUP PLC 0.00 -0.01 -0.05 -0.04 0.0
LILLPUT PLC -0.08 -0.07 -0.10 -0.12 -0.1
BIOTRACE INTERNATIONAL 0.12 0.11 0.15 0.14 0.1
RUBEROID PLC 0.08 0.11 0.08 0.12 0.1
AZLAN GROUP PLC 0.05 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.1
HOZELOCK GROUP PLC 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.0
D.F.S. FURNITURE CO PLC 0.04 0.08 0.13 0.15 0.1
LITHO SUPPLIES 0.01 0.03 0.08 0.10 0.1
INDEPENDENT INSURANCE GROUP PLC 0.00 0.22 0.23 0.22 0.2
GARTMORE PLC 0.01 0.02 0.10 0.09 0.1
CANADIAN PIZZA PLC -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.08 -0.0
TOWRY LAW PLC 0.03 -0.03 -0.04 0.00 0.0
ALLDERS PLC 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.12 0.1
CHARLES SIDNEY PLC 0.00 -0.03 -0.05 -0.05 -0.0
THE ROXBORO GROUP PLC -1.26 -1.25 -1.26 -1.26 -1.2
ABACUS GROUP PLC 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.1
EMERALD ENERGY LTD 0.22 0.41 0.56 0.69 0.5
CREST PACKAGING LEISURE 0.04 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 0.0
CENTRE GOLD PLC 0.29 0.22 0.18 0.16 0.2
BSM GROUP PLC 0.02 0.00 -0.04 -0.06 -0.0
CANTAB PHARMACEUTICALS PLC 0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.06 -0.0
SCOTIA HOLDINGS PLC -1.00 0.04 0.03 0.02 -0.0
VIRTUALITY GROUP PLC 0.53 0.54 0.51 0.43 0.4
HAMLET GROUP PLC 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.0
SHIELD DIAGNOSTICS GROUP 0.04 -0.01 -0.02 -0.13 -0.0
BAKYRCHIL GOLD 0.18 0.14 0.16 0.09 0.0
FLYING FLOWERS 0.12 0.17 0.17 0.23 0.2
SHARELINK INVESTMENT SERVICES 0.14 0.14 0.23 0.32 0.3
QUADRAMATIC PLC 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.1
COURT CAVENDISH GROUP -0.11 -0.20 -0.13 -0.17 -0.1
POLICY PORTFOLIO LTD 0.04 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.1
FIELD GROUP 0.74 0.75 0.77 0.76 0.7
CELSIS INTERNATIONAL 0.67 0.69 0.69 0.69 -0.0
BUSINESS POST GROUP 0.06 0.12 0.18 0.18 0.1
DEVRO INTERNATIONAL 0.13 0.13 0.12 0.12 0.1
ENVIRONMED 0.19 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.1
METROTECT INDUSTRIES 0.29 0.26 0.25 0.24 0.2
ANAGEN PLC -0.15 -0.05 -0.11 -0.11 -0.2
CARPETRIGHT 0.11 0.13 0.11 0.11 0.1
CRABTREE GROUP 0.31 0.30 0.36 0.44 0.4
NORTHERN IRELAND ELECTRICITY 0.11 0.11 0.14 0.17 0.1
FINE DECOR 0.91 0.92 0.95 0.95 0.9
AG HOLDINGS 0.25 0.25 0.18 0.26 0.2
QUALYE MUNRO HOLDINGS 0.10 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.1
RJB MINING -0.07 -0.05 -0.10 -0.10 -0.1
INVERESK PLC 0.14 0.10 0.13 0.13 0.1
OGC INTERNATIONAL -0.06 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.0
PHONELINK PLC 0.33 0.47 0.44 0.40 0.3
RPC GROUP 0.82 0.83 0.83 0.83 0.3
DREW SCIENTIFIC GROUP 0.36 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.2
BREAK FOR THE BORDER 0.11 0.13 0.16 0.16 0.1
DIVISION GROUP 0.80 0.69 0.84 0.77 0.6
BRUNTCLIFFE AGGREGATES 0.04 0.39 0.25 0.28 0.2
STAGECOACH 0.10 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.1
DAVID BROWN GROUP 0.17 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.2
WESTMINSTER HEALTHCARE 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.0
HOLLIDAY CHEMICALS HOLDINGS 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.0
QUALITY SOFTWARE PRODUCTS HOLDING 0.31 0.24 0.21 0.24 0.2
HAMBRO INSURANCE SERVICES GROUP 0.49 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.7
ATREUS 0.07 0.00 0.02 0.00 -0.0
DAVID LLOYD LEISURE 0.18 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.1
YORKSHIRE FOOD GROUP 0.20 0.17 0.15 0.10 0.1
MOTOR WOLD GROUP 0.26 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.2
TRIO HOLDINGS -0.39 -0.30 -0.20 -0.20 -0.2
OIS INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION 0.06 0.11 0.10 0.13 0.2
NATIONAL EXPRESS 0.04 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.1
HUNTERS ARMLEY 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.09 0.1
TADPOLE TECHNOLOGY 0.27 1.09 1.01 0.91 0.9
CRITCHELY GROUP 0.08 0.07 0.07 0.13 0.1
WETHERSPOON (JD) -0.03 0.00 0.03 0.04 0.0
DORLING KINDERSLEY HOLDINGS 0.23 0.29 0.31 0.36 0.4
LINX PRINTING TECHNOLOGIES 0.10 0.14 0.13 0.13 0.1
VARDON 0.05 0.13 0.09 0.02 0.0
TRINITY HOLDINGS 0.07 0.10 0.13 0.11 0.1
TEPNEL DIAGNOSTICS 0.46 0.37 0.34 0.42 0.3
TAUNTON CIDER 0.10 0.10 0.14 0.12 0.1
QUALITY CARE HOMES 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.0
MFI 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.00 0.0
ANGLIAN GROUP -0.03 -0.04 -0.03 0.02 -0.0
BRITISH BIOTECHNOLOGY GROUP -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.06 -0.0
THE TELEGRAPH -0.14 -0.09 -0.14 -0.16 -0.1
KENWOOD APPLIANCES 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.0
COUNTRY CASUALS 0.11 0.10 0.07 0.07 0.0
VEGA GROUP 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.1
IND. CONTROL. SERV. GROUP 0.30 0.30 0.28 0.34 0.2
GROSVENOR INNS -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 -0.1
HUGHES (TJ) 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.13 0.1
WASTE MANAGEMENT INTERNATONAL 0.04 0.09 0.06 0.06 0.0
BRITISH DATA MAMANGEMENT -0.11 -0.05 0.00 0.08 0.0
FORTH PORTS 0.10 0.13 0.11 0.16 0.1
AVONSIDE GROUP -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.05 -0.0
ROSEBYS 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.1
SEALFIELD RESOURSES -0.02 -0.03 -0.07 -0.11 -0.1
HARRINGTON KILBRIDE -0.19 -0.22 -0.22 -0.22 -0.2
BURN STEWART DISTILLERS 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.02 0.0
JIB GROUP 0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.0
FROST GROUP 0.13 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.2
SCOTISH POWER 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.0
SCOTISH HYDRO ELECTRIC 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.0
MANCHESTER UNITED -0.24 -0.26 -0.34 -0.29 -0.2
MIRROR GROUP NEWSPAPERS -0.01 -0.05 -0.10 -0.10 -0.1
POWERGEN 0.19 0.20 0.14 0.15 0.1
NATIONAL POWER 0.19 0.20 0.15 0.17 0.1
LONDON ELECTRICITY 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.1
MIDLANDS ELECTRICITY 0.17 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.1
EASTERN ELECTRICITY 0.18 0.16 0.14 0.15 0.1
SOUTH WESTERN ELECTRICITY 0.19 0.19 0.18 0.19 0.1
SOUTHERN ELECTRIC 0.19 0.18 0.16 0.16 0.1
EAST MIDLANDS ELECTRICITY 0.19 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.1
NORWEB 0.20 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.1
SOUTH WALES 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.23 0.2
MANWEB 0.24 0.26 0.26 0.23 0.2
SEEBOARD 0.08 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.0
YORKSHIRE ELECTRICITY 0.13 0.35 0.35 0.35 0.3
NORTHERN ELECTRICITY 0.16 0.17 0.18 0.18 0.1
EIDOS 0.02 0.02 0.02 -0.07 -0.0
BRABANT RESOURSES -4.61 -4.57 -4.61 -4.61 -4.6
STANDARD PLATFORMS -0.64 -0.74 -0.75 -0.76 -0.8
SETON HEALTHCARE 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.09 0.0
M & W 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.0
INTERCARE GROUP 0.53 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.5
INVERGORDON DISTILLERS GROUP 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.02 0.0
QS HOLDINGS 0.07 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.0
TORDAY AND CARLISLE 0.01 0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.0
ABI LEISURE -0.05 0.00 -0.03 -0.04 -0.0


























RICHMOND OIL AND GAS
WESTMINSTER SCAFFOLDING
ABBEY NATIONAL
■0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.0
0.19 0.21 0.21 0.27 0.2
0.16 0.20 0.17 0.21 0.2
0.14 0.18 0.18 0.22 0.2
0.16 0.19 0.17 0.20 0.2
0.18 0.21 0.21 0.27 0.2
0.12 0.16 0.14 0.17 0.1
0.21 0.21 0.23 0.28 0.2
0.05 0.05 0.07 0.22 0.2
0.14 0.18 0.15 0.19 0.2
0.18 0.23 0.21 0.24 0.2
0.17 0.23 0.21 0.26 0.2
0.14 0.18 0.10 0.10 0.1
0.42 0.36 0.36 0.36 0.3
0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.0
■0.16 -0.16 -0.18 -0.19 -0.1
0.10 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.1
■0.06 -0.06 -0.09 -0.09 -0.0
■1.01 -1.03 -0.99 -0.99 -0.9
-0.09 -0.09 -0.06 -0.07 -0.0
■0.30 -0.20 -0.20 -0.25 -0.2
0.00 -0.04 -0.09 -0.09 -0.0
0.05 0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.0
■0.07 -0.13 -0.24 -0.17 -0.1
0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.0
■0.53 -0.53 -0.65 -0.43 -0.4
■0.77 -0.77 -0.77 -0.77 -0.7
0.16 0.13 0.10 0.10 0.1
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Statistical Tests for Skewness. Kurtosis and Normality
For the purposes of this part of the study it is necessary to test the distributions to
determine whether they exhibit properties which are not symptomatic of a normal
distribution.
The results of the tests of skewness, kurtosis and normality are shown below for data
in both logged and non-logged forms. The data is tested at each discrete time period.
The tests used are as listed below. The Prophet v5 package was used for the analysis.
Normality Shapiro Wilk Test
Skewness D'Agostino Test
Kurtosis Anscombe-Glynn Test
Normailty D'Agostino Pearson Test
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Test Results: Logged Data
Day One Return
Normality test:
Null hypothesis'. The population
follows the normal distribution.
Shapiro-Wilk test
Significance level: 0.05
Calculated W = 0.6504





Null hypothesis'. The population follows the normal distribution.
Alternative hypothesis : The population is nonnormal due to
skewness (asymmetry).
Significance level: 0.05
Calculated skewness = 2.1143
Expected value for normal distribution = 0.0
Calculated statistic: Z = 3.7253
Corresponding P value: P = 0.0002
Inference: Reject hypothesis of normality.
Reason: P < 0.05
Anscombe-Glynn kurtosis test:
Null hypothesis'. The population follows the normal distribution.
Alternative hypothesis : The population is nonnormal due to
nonnormal kurtosis (light- or heavy-tailedness).
Significance level: 0.05
Calculated kurtosis = 4.0861
Expected value for normal distribution = 0.0
Calculated statistic: Z = 2.688
Corresponding P value: P = 0.0072
Inference: Reject hypothesis of normality.
Reason: P < 0.05
D'Agostino-Pearson omnibus normality test :
Null hypothesis: The population follows the normal distribution.
Alternative hypothesis : The population is nonnormal due to
nonnormal kurtosis (light- or heavy-tailedness) or skewness.
Significance level: 0.05
Calculated skewness = 2.1143
Expected value for normal distribution = 0.0
Calculated kurtosis = 4.0861
Expected value for normal distribution = 0.0
Calculated statistic: K = 21.1036
Corresponding P value for chi-square with
2 degrees of freedom: P = 0.0001
Inference: Reject hypothesis of normality.
Reason: P < 0.05
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Test Results: Logged Data
Week One Return
Normality test:
Null hypothesis: The population
follows the normal distribution.
Shapiro-Wilk test
Significance level'. 0.05
Calculated W = 0.7012





Null hypothesis'. The population follows the normal distribution.
Alternative hypothesis : The population is nonnormal due to
skewness (asymmetry).
Significance level: 0.05
Calculated skewness = 1.5524
Expected value for normal distribution = 0.0
Calculated statistic: Z = 2.9936
Corresponding P value: P = 0.0028
Inference'. Reject hypothesis of normality.
Reason: P < 0.05
Anscombe-Glynn kurtosis test:
Null hypothesis'. The population follows the normal distribution.
Alternative hypothesis : The population is nonnormal due to
nonnormal kurtosis (light- or heavy-tailedness).
Significance level: 0.05
Calculated kurtosis = 1.2128
Expected value for normal distribution = 0.0
Calculated statistic: Z = 1.3425
Corresponding P value: P = 0.1794
Inference: Fail to reject hypothesis of normality.
Reason: P > 0.05
D'Agostino-Pearson omnibus normality test:
Null hypothesis'. The population follows the normal distribution.
Alternative hypothesis : The population is nonnormal due to
nonnormal kurtosis (light- or heavy-tailedness) or skewness.
Significance level: 0.05
Calculated skewness = 1.5524
Expected value for normal distribution = 0.0
Calculated kurtosis = 1.2128
Expected value for normal distribution = 0.0
Calculated statistic: K = 10.7642
Corresponding P value for chi-square with
2 degrees of freedom: P = 0.0046
Inference: Reject hypothesis of normality.
Reason: P < 0.05
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Test Results: Logged Data
Week 2 Return
Normality test:
Null hypothesis: The population
follows the normal distribution.
Shapiro-Wilk test
Significance level'. 0.05
Calculated W = 0.704
Corresponding P value: P < 0.0001
Inference: Reject hypothesis
of normality.
Reason'. P < 0.05.
D'Agostino skewness test:
Null hypothesis'. The population follows the normal distribution.
Alternative hypothesis : The population is nonnormal due to
skewness (asymmetry).
Significance level'. 0.05
Calculated skewness = 1.5599
Expected value for normal distribution = 0.0
Calculated statistic: Z = 3.0045
Corresponding P value: P = 0.0027
Inference: Reject hypothesis of normality.
Reason: P < 0.05
Anscombe-Glynn kurtosis test:
Null hypothesis'. The population follows the normal distribution.
Alternative hypothesis : The population is nonnormal due to
nonnormal kurtosis (light- or heavy-tailedness).
Significance level'. 0.05
Calculated kurtosis = 1.2464
Expected value for normal distribution = 0.0
Calculated statistic: Z = 1.3659
Corresponding P value: P = 0.1719
Inference'. Fail to reject hypothesis of normality.
Reason'. P > 0.05
D'Agostino-Pearson omnibus normality test:
Null hypothesis'. The population follows the normal distribution.
Alternative hypothesis : The population is nonnormal due to
nonnormal kurtosis (light- or heavy-tailedness) or skewness.
Significance level: 0.05
Calculated skewness = 1.5599
Expected value for normal distribution = 0.0
Calculated kurtosis = 1.2464
Expected value for normal distribution = 0.0
Calculated statistic: K = 10.8925
Corresponding P value for chi-square with
2 degrees of freedom : P = 0.0043
Inference'. Reject hypothesis of normality.
Reason: P < 0.05
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Test Results: Logged Data
Week Three Return
Normality test:
Null hypothesis: The population
follows the normal distribution.
Shapiro-Wilk test
Significance level. 0.05
Calculated W = 0.7549





Null hypothesis: The population follows the normal distribution.
Alternative hypothesis : The population is nonnormal due to
skewness (asymmetry).
Significance level: 0.05
Calculated skewness = 1.4135
Expected value for normal distribution = 0.0
Calculated statistic: Z = 2.7873
Corresponding P value: P = 0.0053
Inference: Reject hypothesis of normality.
Reason: P < 0.05
Anscombe-Glynn kurtosis test:
Null hypothesis: The population follows the normal distribution.
Alternative hypothesis : The population is nonnormal due to
nonnormal kurtosis (light- or heavy-tailedness).
Significance level: 0.05
Calculated kurtosis = 0.8644
Expected value for normal distribution = 0.0
Calculated statistic: Z = 1.0815
Corresponding P value: P = 0.2795
Inference: Fail to reject hypothesis of normality.
Reason: P > 0.05
D'Agostino-Pearson omnibus normality test:
Null hypothesis: The population follows the normal distribution.
Alternative hypothesis : The population is nonnormal due to
nonnormal kurtosis (light- or heavy-tailedness) or skewness.
Significance level: 0.05
Calculated skewness = 1.4135
Expected value for normal distribution = 0.0
Calculated kurtosis = 0.8644
Expected value for normal distribution = 0.0
Calculated statistic: K = 8.9389
Corresponding P value for chi-square with
2 degrees of freedom: P = 0.0115
Inference: Reject hypothesis of normality.
Reason: P < 0.05
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Test Results: Logged Data
Week Four Return
Normality test:
Null hypothesis'. The population
follows the normal distribution.
Shapiro-Wilk test
Significance level'. 0.05
Calculated W = 0.7639





Null hypothesis'. The population follows the normal distribution.
Alternative hypothesis : The population is nonnormal due to
skewness (asymmetry).
Significance level: 0.05
Calculated skewness = 1.1083
Expected value for normal distribution = 0.0
Calculated statistic: Z = 2.2926
Corresponding P value: P = 0.0219
Inference: Reject hypothesis of normality.
Reason: P < 0.05
Anscombe-Glynn kurtosis test:
Null hypothesis: The population follows the normal distribution.
Alternative hypothesis : The population is nonnormal due to
nonnormal kurtosis (light- or heavy-tailedness).
Significance level: 0.05
Calculated kurtosis = -0.3255
Expected value for normal distribution = 0.0
Calculated statistic: Z = 0.5949
Corresponding P value: P = 0.5519
Inference: Fail to reject hypothesis of normality.
Reason: P > 0.05
D'Agostino-Pearson omnibus normality test:
Null hypothesis: The population follows the normal distribution.
Alternative hypothesis: The population is nonnormal due to
nonnormal kurtosis (light- or heavy-tailedness) or skewness.
Significance level: 0.05
Calculated skewness =1.1083
Expected value for normal distribution = 0.0
Calculated kurtosis = -0.3255
Expected value for normal distribution = 0.0
Calculated statistic: K = 5.6098
Corresponding P value for chi-square with
2 degrees of freedom: P = 0.0605
Inference: Fail to reject hypothesis of normality.
Reason: P > 0.05
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Test Results: Non-Logged Data
Day One Return
Normality test:
Null hypothesis: The population
follows the normal distribution.
Shapiro-Wilk test
Significance level. 0.05
Calculated W = 0.6173





Null hypothesis: The population follows the normal distribution.
Alternative hypothesis : The population is nonnormal due to
skewness (asymmetry).
Significance level. 0.05
Calculated skewness = 2.5122
Expected value for normal distribution = 0.0
Calculated statistic: Z = 4.1622
Corresponding P value: P = 0.0001
Inference: Reject hypothesis of normality.
Reason: P < 0.05
Anscombe-Glynn kurtosis test:
Null hypothesis: The population follows the normal distribution.
Alternative hypothesis : The population is nonnormal due to
nonnormal kurtosis (light- or heavy-tailedness).
Significance level. 0.05
Calculated kurtosis = 6.5661
Expected value for normal distribution = 0.0
Calculated statistic: Z = 3.3274
Corresponding P value: P = 0.0009
Inference: Reject hypothesis of normality.
Reason: P < 0.05
D'Agostino-Pearson omnibus normality test:
Null hypothesis: The population follows the normal distribution.
Alternative hypothesis : The population is nonnormal due to
nonnormal kurtosis (light- or heavy-tailedness) or skewness.
Significance level. 0.05
Calculated skewness = 2.5122
Expected value for normal distribution = 0.0
Calculated kurtosis = 6.5661
Expected value for normal distribution = 0.0
Calculated statistic: K = 28.3949
Corresponding P value for chi-square with
2 degrees of freedom: P = 0.0001
Inference: Reject hypothesis of normality.
Reason: P < 0.05
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Test Results: Non-Logged Data
Week One Return
Normality test:
Null hypothesis: The population
follows the normal distribution.
Shapiro-Wilk test
Significance level: 0.05
Calculated W = 0.6846





Null hypothesis'. The population follows the normal distribution.
Alternative hypothesis: The population is nonnormal due to
skewness (asymmetry).
Significance level: 0.05
Calculated skewness = 1.7787
Expected value for normal distribution = 0.0
Calculated statistic: Z = 3.3067
Corresponding P value: P = 0.0009
Inference: Reject hypothesis of normality.
Reason: P < 0.05
Anscombe-GIynn kurtosis test:
Null hypothesis'. The population follows the normal distribution.
Alternative hypothesis : The population is nonnormal due to
nonnormal kurtosis (light- or heavy-tailedness).
Significance level'. 0.05
Calculated kurtosis = 2.3599
Expected value for normal distribution = 0.0
Calculated statistic: Z = 2.0092
Corresponding P value: P = 0.0445
Inference: Reject hypothesis of normality.
Reason'. P < 0.05
D'Agostino-Pearson omnibus normality test:
Null hypothesis'. The population follows the normal distribution.
Alternative hypothesis : The population is nonnormal due to
nonnormai kurtosis (light- or heavy-tailedness) or skewness.
Significance level'. 0.05
Calculated skewness = 1.7787
Expected value for normal distribution = 0.0
Calculated kurtosis = 2.3599
Expected value for normal distribution = 0.0
Calculated statistic: K= 14.9712
Corresponding P value for chi-square with
2 degrees of freedom: P = 0.0006
Inference: Reject hypothesis of normality.
Reason: P < 0.05
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Test Results: Non-Logged Data
Week Two Return
Normality test:
Null hypothesis: The population
follows the normal distribution.
Shapiro-Wilk test
Significance level'. 0.05
Calculated W = 0.7096





Null hypothesis: The population follows the normal distribution.
Alternative hypothesis : The population is nonnormal due to
skewness (asymmetry).
Significance level: 0.05
Calculated skewness = 1.5273
Expected value for normal distribution = 0.0
Calculated statistic: Z = 2.9571
Corresponding P value: P = 0.0031
Inference: Reject hypothesis of normality.
Reason: P < 0.05
Anscombe-Glynn kurtosis test:
Null hypothesis: The population follows the normal distribution.
Alternative hypothesis : The population is nonnormal due to
nonnormal kurtosis (light- or heavy-tailedness).
Significance level: 0.05
Calculated kurtosis = 1.1536
Expected value for normal distribution = 0.0
Calculated statistic: Z = 1.3006
Corresponding P value: P = 0.1934
Inference: Fail to reject hypothesis of normality.
Reason: P > 0.05
D'Agostino-Pearson omnibus normality test:
Null hypothesis: The population follows the normal distribution.
Alternative hypothesis : The population is nonnormal due to
nonnormal kurtosis (light- or heavy-tailedness) or skewness.
Significance level: 0.05
Calculated skewness = 1.5273
Expected value for normal distribution = 0.0
Calculated kurtosis = 1.1536
Expected value for normal distribution = 0.0
Calculated statistic: K = 10.4363
Corresponding P value for chi-square with
2 degrees of freedom: P = 0.0054
Inference: Reject hypothesis of normality.
Reason: P < 0.05
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Test Results: Non-Logged Data
Week Three Return
Normality test:
Null hypothesis'. The population
follows the normal distribution.
Shapiro-Wilk test
Significance level'. 0.05
Calculated W = 0.7428
Corresponding P value: P < 0.0001
Inference'. Reject hypothesis
of normality.
Reason: P < 0.05.
D'Agostino skewness test:
Null hypothesis'. The population follows the normal distribution.
Alternative hypothesis : The population is nonnormal due to
skewness (asymmetry).
Significance level: 0.05
Calculated skewness = 1.4676
Expected value for normal distribution = 0.0
Calculated statistic: Z = 2.8691
Corresponding P value: P = 0.0041
Inference: Reject hypothesis of normality.
Reason: P < 0.05
Anscombe-Glynn kurtosis test:
Null hypothesis: The population follows the normal distribution.
Alternative hypothesis : The population is nonnormal due to
nonnormal kurtosis (light- or heavy-tailedness).
Significance level: 0.05
Calculated kurtosis = 1.0986
Expected value for normal distribution = 0.0
Calculated statistic: Z = 1.2608
Corresponding P value: P = 0.2074
Inference: Fail to reject hypothesis of normality.
Reason: P > 0.05
D'Agostino-Pearson omnibus normality test:
Null hypothesis: The population follows the normal distribution.
Alternative hypothesis : The population is nonnormal due to
nonnormal kurtosis (light- or heavy-tailedness) or skewness.
Significance level: 0.05
Calculated skewness = 1.4676
Expected value for normal distribution = 0.0
Calculated kurtosis = 1.0986
Expected value for normal distribution = 0.0
Calculated statistic: K = 9.8214
Corresponding P value for chi-square with
2 degrees of freedom: P = 0.0074
Inference: Reject hypothesis of normality.
Reason: P < 0.05
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Test Results: Non-Logged Data
Week Four Return
Normality test:
Null hypothesis'. The population
follows the normal distribution.
Shapiro-Wilk test
Significance level: 0.05
Calculated W = 0.7816





Null hypothesis'. The population follows the normal distribution.
Alternative hypothesis : The population is nonnormal due to
skewness (asymmetry).
Significance level'. 0.05
Calculated skewness = 1.2521
Expected value for normal distribution = 0.0
Calculated statistic: Z = 2.5331
Corresponding P value: P = 0.0113
Inference: Reject hypothesis of normality.
Reason: P < 0.05
Anscombe-Glynn kurtosis test:
Null hypothesis: The population follows the normal distribution.
Alternative hypothesis : The population is nonnormal due to
nonnormal kurtosis (light- or heavy-tailedness).
Significance level: 0.05
Calculated kurtosis = 0.4385
Expected value for normal distribution = 0.0
Calculated statistic: Z = 0.7071
Corresponding P value: P = 0.4795
Inference: Fail to reject hypothesis of normality.
Reason: P > 0.05
D'Agostino-Pearson omnibus normality test:
Null hypothesis: The population follows the normal distribution.
Alternative hypothesis : The population is nonnormal due to
nonnormal kurtosis (light- or heavy-tailedness) or skewness.
Significance level: 0.05
Calculated skewness = 1.2521
Expected value for normal distribution = 0.0
Calculated kurtosis = 0.4385
Expected value for normal distribution = 0.0
Calculated statistic: K = 6.9166
Corresponding P value for chi-square with
2 degrees of freedom: P = 0.0315
Inference: Reject hypothesis of normality.
Reason: P < 0.05
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Data Used in Enumeration Work in Chapter Six




70-75 0 0 0 0 0
65-70 0 0 0 0 0
60-65 0 0 0 0 0
55-60 0 0 0 0 0
50-55 0 0 0 0 0
45-50 0 0 0 0 0
40-45 0 0 0 0 0
35-40 0 0 0 0 0
30-35 0 1 0 1 1
25-30 0 0 0 1 0
20-25 0 4 2 3 5
15-20 14 12 9 12 8
10-15 4 1 6 2 4
5-10 3 3 3 2 1
0-5 5 4 5 4 4
-5 toO 3 2 2 3 3
-10 to -5 1 0 3 2 3
I cn r—t~ 0 1 o 2 0 1 2 1
-20 to-15 0 0 0 0 1
-25 to -20 0 0 0 0 0
-30 to -25 0 0 0 0 0
-35 to -30 0 0 0 0 0
-40 to -35 0 0 0 0 0
-45 to -40 0 0 0 0 0
32 27 31 32 31
70-75 2 1 1 1 1
65-70 1 3 1 2 1
60-65 0 0 0 0 0
55-60 0 0 1 0 1
50-55 2 2 2 1 1
45-50 2 2 0 0 0
40-45 2 2 4 5 4
35-40 3 4 3 4 7
30-35 6 1 4 4 6
25-30 6 8 3 7 10
20-25 8 19 17 17 17
15-20 18 16 23 21 23
10-15 29 33 29 29 32
5-10 49 43 49 48 32
0-5 77 56 38 44 44
-5 toO 22 31 29 27 28
-10 to -5 11 9 14 16 17
-15 to -10 4 4 8 12 12
-20 to -15 3 3 3 6 6
-25 to -20 1 3 3 2 3
-30 to -25 1 0 0 0 0
-35 to -30 0 0 1 1 0
-40 to -35 1 0 2 1 0
-45 to -40 0 0 0 1 2
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Statistical Backup Pertinent to Chapter Seven
****************************************************************************
WLS Estimation of Primary Regression Model
****************************************************************************
**** MULTIPLE REGRESSION ****
Listwise Deletion of Missing Data
Weighted Least Squares - Weighted By..FUNDS_RA







SAME SB .080 87.113
AUDREP .921 86.635
SAME_AUD 194 126.873
BIG STOC .681 149.382
N of Cases = 219
**** MULTIPLE REGRESSION ****
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. LNEXRTN
Block Number 1. Method: Enter
RETD LNGPROC LNPTP NAV SPONREP SAME SB AUDREP SAME AUD
BIG STOC
















DF Sum of Squares Mean Square
Regression 9 72456.33825 8050.70425
Residual 209 64464.42652 308.44223
F = 26.10117 Signif F = .0000
**** MULTIPLE REGRESSION ***
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. LNEXRTN
Variables in the Equation
Variable B SE B T
RETD -.091309 .023268 -3.924
LNGPROC .006035 .008712 .693
LNPTP .012541 .005588 2.244
NAV 2.79755E-08 1.2171E-08 2.299
SPONREP .062907 .013124 4.793
SAMESB -.004805 .016234 -.296
AUDREP -.022096 .014693 -1.504
SAMEAUD .002751 .015894 .173
BIGSTOC -.046818 .014080 -3.325
















Number Eigenval Cond Variance Proportions
Index Constant RETD LNGPROC LNPTP NAV SPONREP
1 4.43574 1.000 .00001
2 1.20750 1.917 .00018
3 1.02837 2.077 .10035
4 .99752 2.109 .89126
5 .84678 2.289 .00008
6 .62665 2.661 .00131
7 .46819 3.078 .00046
8 .20067 4.702 .00078
9 .11347 6.252 .00137
10 .07510 7.685 .00420
SAME SB AUDREP SAME AUD BIG STOC
1 .00818 .00088 .00414 .00979
2 .05068 .00125 .15715 .00078
3 .04616 .64747 .00030 .00413
4 .01045 .07569 .00003 .00050
5 .44380 .11709 .00017 .00703
6 .19909 .01881 .02721 .24077
7 .06268 .00436 .06462 .01325
8 .05227 .02434 .08947 .40933
9 .05615 .00480 .64449 .04925
10 .07053 .10531 .01240 .26517
****************************************************************************
Examination of the results indicates that multicollinearity is not a
major problem in the model
End Block Number 1 All requested variables entered.
Residuals Statistics:
Min Max Mean Std Dev N
*PRED -.0343 .1983 .0641 .0453 219
*RESID -.3023 .3642 .0109 .0987 219
*ZPRED .... 0
*ZRESID .... 0
Total Cases = 289
Serial Correlation Test
Durbin-Watson Test = 1.83322
The value of the Durbin-Watson test above implies that the null hypothesis of
no serial correlation in the model cannot be rejected.
NOTE: No plots will be produced when a WLS weighting variable (/REGWGT
command syntax) is specified. You can SAVE the appropriate variables and
use other procedures (e.g. EXAMINE and PLOT) to produce the requested
plots. To plot weighted versions of the residuals and predicted values,
use COMPUTE before plotting:
COMPUTE RESID = SQRT(REGWGTvar) * RESID
COMPUTE PRED = SQRT(REGWGTvar) * PRED
**** MULTIPLE REGRESSION ****
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. LNEXRTN
From Equation 1: 2 new variables have been created.
Name Contents
PRE 4 Predicted Value
RES4 Residual
Number of valid observations (listwise) = 219.00
Descriptive Statistics Used in Testing





































Valid observations - 289 Missing observations - 2
Results of Breusch Pagan Godfrey Test for Heteroscedasticity
The test was conducted in the following manner.
1) Firstly, the residuls from the estimated model were obtained.
2) The sum of the squared residuals was then divided by the number of obserations.
3) Variable BPGRES was constructed as the ration of residuals squared to the
constant derived in step 2)
4) BPGRES was regressed on the original explanatory variables and the regression
sum of squares obtained.
5) Half this value was compared to the Chi-Squared distribution with the
appropriate degrees of freedom.
**** MULTIPLE REGRESSION ***
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. BPGRES
Block Number 1. Method: Enter
RETD LNGPROC LNPTP NAV SPONREP SAME SB AUDREP REPREP
BIG STOC












Adjusted R Square .18342
Standard Error 224.38996
Analysis of Variance
DF Sum of Squares Mean Square
Regression 9 2918647.40023 324294.15558
Residual 209 10523328.53801 50350.85425
F = 6.44069 Signif F = .0000
Half Regression Sum of Squares = 1459323. Consequently we can reject the null
hypothesis of homoscedasticity.
Due to the level of heteroscedasticity found inference from the model as
specified will be of low quality.
Consequently, White's heteroscedasticity consistent variances were calculated
and the results of tests of significance based on these estimates reported.
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Results of Estimation Using MicroFit version 4 package
White Heteroscedasticitv Consistent Estiamates for Model Parameters
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
Dependent variable is LNEXRTN
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob]
RETD -.027305 .037409 ,72990[.466]
LNGPROC -.0039985 .010505 -.38063 [.704]
LNPTP -.0041487 .0078108 -.53115[.596]
NAV .9895E-7 .3774E-7 2.6217[.009]
SPONREP .033816 .019986 1.6920[.092]
SAMESB .012230 .015502 .78893 [.43 1 ]
AUDREP -.012430 .017423 -.71346[.476]
SAMEAUD -.038123 .023227 -1.6413 [.102]
BIGSTOC -.034864 .032223 -1.0820[.281]
CONST .077626 .091335 .84990[.396]
******************************************************************************
R-Squared .10022 R-Bar-Squared .061471
.096459 F-Stat. F( 9,209)S.E. of Regression
2.5 865 [.008]
Mean of Dependent Variable .074943 S.D. of Dependent Variable .099568
Residual Sum of Squares 1.9446 Equation Log-likelihood 206.5307


















* D:Heteroscedasticity CHSQ( 1)= 1.4284[.232]* F( 1,217)= 1.4246[.234]
A:Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlation
B:Ramsey's RESET test using the square of the fitted values
C:Based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals
D:Based on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values
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Parameter Estimates Based on White Adjusted Standard Errors
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
Based on White's Heteroscedasticity adjusted S.E.'s
******************************************************************************
Dependent variable is LNEXRTN
******************************************************************************
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob]
RETD -.027305 .039971 -.68312[.495]
LNGPROC -.0039985 .013211 -,30266[.762]
LNPTP -.0041487 .011781 -,35214[.725]
NAV .9895E-7 .2841E-7 3.4835[.001]
SPONREP .033816 .015954 2.1196[.035]
SAME SB .012230 .015271 .80089[.424]
AUDREP -.012430 .017923 -.69353[.489]
SAMEAUD -.038123 .021721 -1.7551 [.081 ]
BIGSTOC -.034864 .027932 -1.2482[.213]
CONST .077626 .089001 .87219[.3 84]
******************************************************************************
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Analysis of Costs of Flotation
**** MULTIPLE REGRESSION ****
Listwise Deletion ofMissing Data
Equation Number 1 Dependent Variable.. COSTS OF
Block Number 1. Method: Enter FUNDS RA SPONREP SPECDV





R Square , .73198
Adjusted R Square .72916
Standard Error 1916.19413
Analysis of Variance
DF Sum of Squares Mean Square
Regression 3 2857926697.77459 952642232.59153
Residual 285 1046462988.68908 3671799.96031
F = 259.44829 SignifF= .0000
Variables in the Equation —
Variable B SE B Beta T Sig T
FUNDSRA .034251 .001871 1.999761 18.311 .0000
SPONREP 662.154148 343.668670 .071683 1.927 .0550
SPECDV -.022711 .001975 -1.311794 -11.497 .0000
(Constant) 351.774589 137.799683 2.553 .0112
From the analysis variable SPECDV (=FUNDS_RA * SPONREP) is highly
significant. Dummy variable SPONREP is not strictly significnat but
is very nearly. The critical value for the t test is 1.96 at the 5%
level versus the recorded value of 1.93.
What is clear is that there are two very different cost functions for
the two agent types.
Reputable:
Costs of Float = A + B1 FUNDS RA + B2SPONREP + B3SPECDV
351.77 + 0.03452FUNDS_RA + 662.15SPONREP - 0.0227SPECDV
1013.92 + 0.01182FUNDS_RA
Others
Costs of Float = A + B1 FUNDS RA + B2SPONREP + B3SPECDV
351.77+ 0.03452FUNDS_RA
Therefore, its clearly more expensive to use a reputable sponsor for
floats below a certain size. To find that size we solve the two equations
above for FUNDS RA.
Thus..1013.92 + 0.01182FUNDSRA = 351.77 + 0.03452FUNDS_RA
0.0227FUNDS-RA = 662.15
FUNDS RA = 29169
Therefore, using a an unreputable sponsor starts to become uneconomic
when more than about thirty million pounds of funds are being raised.
Chapter Seven - Statistics Supporting Futher Analysis Work.
Regression results including costs of flotation as a variable
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
******************************************************************************
Dependent variable is LNEXRTN
206 observations used for estimation from 1 to 206
j}:*****************************************************************************
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob]
RETD -.059612 .038870 -1.5336[.127]
LNGPROC -.0025681 .0099828 -,25725[.797]
LNPTP .5747E-3 .0079859 ,071960[.943]
NAV -.6164E-7 .4199E-7 -1.4680[. 144]
SPONREP -.0010265 .020095 -.051084[.959]
SSB .0033909 .015038 .22548[.822]
AUDREP .014244 .018280 .77921 [.437]
SAUDREP -.010453 .025116 -.41619[.678]
BIGSTOCK -.0043452 .035331 -.12298[.902]
COSTS .3283E-5 .2788E-5 1.1775 [.240]
CONST .058493 .078313 .74691 [.456]
********************* *********************************************************
R-Squared .047797 R-Bar-Squared -.0010338
S.E. of Regression .099393 F-Stat. F( 10, 195) .97883[.463]
Mean ofDependent Variable .073621 S.D. ofDependent Variable .099342
Residual Sum of Squares 1.9264 Equation Log-likelihood 188.9378





* Test Statistics * LM Version * F Version
******************************************************************************
* * *
* A:SerialCorreiation*CHSQ( 1)= 2.4897[.l 15]*F( 1,194)= 2.3734[.125]
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* B:Functional Form *CHSQ( 1)= 2.1567[.142]*F( 1,194)= 2.0526[. 154]
* * *
* C:Normality *CHSQ( 2)= 26.5521 [.000]* Not applicable
* * *
* D:Heteroscedasticity*CHSQ( 1)= 5.2247[.022]*F( 1,204)= 5.3086[.022]
A:Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlation
B:Ramsey's RESET test using the square of the fitted values
C:Based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals
D:Based on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
Based on White's Heteroscedasticity adjusted S.E.'s
Dependent variable is LNEXRTN
206 observations used for estimation from 1 to 206
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob]
RETD -.059612 .042458 -1.4040[. 162]
LNGPROC -.0025681 .014278 -,17986[.857]
LNPTP .5747E-3 .012421 ,046267[.963]
NAV -.6164E-7 .3899E-7 -1,5809[.l 16]
SPONREP -.0010265 .023596 -,043504[.965]
SSB .0033909 .014938 .22699[.821]
AUDREP .014244 .020185 .70566[.481]
SAUDREP -.010453 .020382 -,51284[.609]
BIG__STOCK -.0043452 .057341 -,075778[.940]
COSTS .3283E-5 .3299E-5 .99523 [.321 ]
CONST .058493 .085123 .68716[.493]
Regreression Results including Offer Type Dummy Variables
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
******************************************************************************
Dependent variable is LNEXRTN
206 observations used for estimation from 1 to 206
******************************************************************************
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob]
RETD -.063562 .040781 -1.5586[. 121 ]
LNGPROC -.0023563 .010189 -.23127[.817]
LNPTP .9901E-3 .0081080 .12211 [.903]
NAV -.5209E-7 .4487E-7 -1.1609[.247]
SPONREP .0086607 .022288 .38859[.698]
SSB -.0027894 .015761 17698[.860]
AUDREP .014846 .018399 .80690[.421]
SAUDREP -.013053 .025321 -.51551 [.607]
BIGSTOCK .0031595 .036343 .086934[.931]
COSTS .3567E-5 .2830E-5 1.2604[.209]
CONST .10556 .12807 .82423 [.411]
OFFDY -.076473 .10641 -.71865[.473]
PLDMY -.037772 .10096 -.37411 [.709]
PINT -.047759 .10234 -.46667[.641]
POFF -.060405 .10234 -.59023 [.556]
SfS»J<5(S***************************************************************************
R-Squared .058937
S.E. of Regression .099839
Mean of Dependent Variable .073621
Residual Sum of Squares 1.9039
Akaike Info. Criterion 175.1498
DW-statistic 1.7915
R-Bar-Squared -.010042
F-Stat. F( 14, 191) ,85442[.609]
S.D. of Dependent Variable .099342
Equation Log-likelihood 190.1498
Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 150.1907
Diagnostic Tests
5fC5fS>l«H«**************************************************************************
* Test Statistics * LM Version * F Version
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A:Serial Correlation*CHSQ( 1)= 2.3958[.122]*F( 1,190)= 2.2357[.137]
* *
B:Functional Form *CHSQ( 1)= .051473[.821]*F( 1, 190)= .047487[.828]
* *
C:Normality *CHSQ( 2)= 23.5277[.000]* Not applicable
* *
D:Heteroscedasticity*CHSQ( 1)= 3.5386[.060]*F( 1,204)= 3.5655[.060]
A:Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlation
ELRamsey's RESET test using the square of the fitted values
C:Based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals
D:Based on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values
Regression Results on Sub Sample of data - 1989-1990
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
Dependent variable is LNEXRTN
46 observations used for estimation from 1 to 46
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob]
RETD -.22936 .099861 -2.2968[.028]
LNGPROC .019567 .027592 .70917[.483]
LNPTP .029838 .020533 1.4532[. 155]
NAV .5666E-7 .6714E-7 .84395 [.404]
SPONREP -.051666 .033728 -1.5319[. 134]
SSB -.0060559 .031723 -. 19090[.850]
AUDREP .017314 .029706 .58284[.564]
SAUDREP .0037512 .061098 .061397[.951 ]
BIGSTOCK -.062156 .040582 -1.5316[. 134]
CONST .12016 .19679 .61059[.545]
R-Squared .62628
S.E. of Regression .077572
Mean of Dependent Variable .079637
Residual Sum of Squares .21663
Akaike Info. Criterion 47.9677
DW-statistic 2.1326
R-Bar-Squared .53285
F-Stat. F( 9, 36) 6.7032[.000]
S.D. of Dependent Variable .11350
Equation Log-likelihood 57.9677
Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 38.8245
Diagnostic Tests
* Test Statistics * LM Version * F Version
* * *
* A:Serial Correlation*CHSQ( 1)= ,34867[.555]*F( 1,35)= ,26732[.608]
* * *
* B:Functional Form *CHSQ( 1)= 7.5038[.006]*F( 1,35)= 6.8223[.013]
* * *
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* C:Normality *CHSQ( 2)= ,73969[.691]* Not applicable
* * *
* D:Heteroscedasticity*CHSQ( 1)= 4.6414[.031 ]*F( 1,44)= 4.9378[.031]
jfc*****************************************************************************
A:Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlation
B:Ramsey's RESET test using the square of the fitted values
C:Based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals
D:Based on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
Based on White's Heteroscedasticity adjusted S.E.'s
******************************************************************************
Dependent variable is LNEXRTN
46 observations used for estimation from 1 to 46
******************************************************************************
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob]
RETD -.22936 .087740 -2.6141 [.013]
LNGPROC .019567 .024431 .80091 [.428]
LNPTP .029838 .019469 1.5326[. 134]
NAV .5666E-7 .6269E-7 .90384[.372]
SPONREP -.051666 .030886 -1.6728[.103]
SSB -.0060559 .029377 -.20615[.838]
AUDREP .017314 .038716 ,44720[.657]
SAUDREP .0037512 .029040 . 12917[.898]
BIGSTOCK -.062156 .045512 -1.3657[. 181]
CONST .12016 .17106 .70246[.487]
******************************************************************************
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Regression Results on Sub Sample of data - 1989-1990 (Adding Cost Variable)
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
Dependent variable is LNEXRTN
46 observations used for estimation from I to 46
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob]
RETD -.23792 .099519 -2.3907[.022]
LNGPROC .018729 .027435 ,68267[.499]
LNPTP .026291 .020623 1.2748[.211]
NAV -.4693E-8 .8411E-7 -,055797[.956]
SPONREP -.066321 .035686 -1.8584[.072]
SSB .0022732 .032290 .070401 [.944]
AUDREP .0097005 .030204 .32117[.750]
SAUDREP .0055801 .060751 .091853 [.927]
BIGSTOCK -.076607 .042103 -1.8195[.077]
COSTS . 1100E-4 .9180E-5 1.1983 [.239]
CONST .13913 .19625 .70894[.483]
R-Squared .64101
S.E. of Regression .077107
Mean of Dependent Variable .079637
Residual Sum of Squares .20809
Akaike Info. Criterion 47.8924
DW-statistic 2.1675
R-Bar-Squared .53844
F-Stat. F( 10, 35) 6.2495[.000]
S.D. of Dependent Variable .11350
Equation Log-likelihood 58.8924
Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 37.8348
Diagnostic Tests
* Test Statistics * LM Version * F Version
* * *
* A:Serial Correlation*CHSQ( 1)= ,47924[.489]*F( 1,34)= ,35795[.554]
* * *
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* Bfunctional Form *CHSQ( 1)= 6.7142[.010]*F( 1,34)= 5.8109[.021]
* * *
* C:Normality *CHSQ( 2)= .35557[.837]* Not applicable
* * *
* D:Heteroscedasticity*CHSQ( 1)= 4.9205[.027]*F( 1, 44)= 5.2703[.027]
A:Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlation
B:Ramsey's RESET test using the square of the fitted values
C: Based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals
DiBased on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
Based on White's Heteroscedasticity adjusted S.E.'s
Dependent variable is LNEXRTN
46 observations used for estimation from 1 to 46
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob]
RETD -.23792 .089239 -2.6661 [.012]
LNGPROC .018729 .024482 .76502[.449]
LNPTP .026291 .017687 1.4865[. 146]
NAV -.4693E-8 .7697E-7 -,060976[.952]
SPONREP -.066321 .033635 -1.9718[.057]
SSB .0022732 .029535 .076967[.939]
AUDREP .0097005 .039856 .24339[.809]
SAUDREP .0055801 .029886 .18671 [.853]
BIGSTOCK -.076607 .045725 -1.6754[. 103]
COSTS .1100E-4 .7920E-5 1.3 890[. 174]
CONST .13913 .17419 .79872[.430]
Regression Results on Sub Sample of data - 1991-1992
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
ifcstcstsslcslclcslciilcslcjIeslssfcjieslcslesic^jfcHcslcsie^sfsslestc*************#:]!**********#***************************
Dependent variable is LNEXRTN
33 observations used for estimation from 1 to 33
^jfc****************************************************************************
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob]
RETD .017636 .11499 . 15337[.879]
LNGPROC .0037779 .028286 . 13356[.895]
LNPTP -.043190 .018416 -2.3452[.028]
NAV -.9034E-7 .7676E-7 -1.1770[.251 ]
SPONREP .049233 .067620 .72808[.474]
SSB .016164 .049058 .32948[.745]
AUDREP .046654 .054505 .85596[.401]
SAUDREP -.024503 .11495 -.21316[.833]
BIG_STOCK .081738 .066202 1.2347[.229]
CONST .43525 .24048 1.8100[.083]
*********************************** >(c4:5(!5j:*st:s|<sf:***********************************
R-Squared .44137
S.E. of Regression .10873
Mean ofDependent Variable .11145
Residual Sum of Squares .27190
Akaike Info. Criterion 22.3555
R-Bar-Squared .22278
F-Stat. F( 9, 23) 2.0191 [.084]
S.D. of Dependent Variable .12333
Equation Log-likelihood 32.3555




* Test Statistics * LM Version * F Version
******************************************************************************
* * *
* A:Serial Correlation*CHSQ( 1)= 4.6429[.031]*F( 1,22)= 3.6020[.071]
* * *
* B:Functional Form *CHSQ( 1)= ,49538[.482]*F( 1,22)= ,33528[.568]
* * *
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*C:Normality *CHSQ( 2)= .20065[.905]* Not applicable
* * *
* D:Heteroscedasticity*CHSQ( 1)= ,54695[.460]*F( 1,31)= ,52246[.475]
******************************************************************************
A:Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlation
B:Ramsey's RESET test using the square of the fitted values
C:Based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals
D:Based on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
Based on White's Heteroscedasticity adjusted S.E.'s
Dependent variable is LNEXRTN
33 observations used for estimation from 1 to 33
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob]
RETD .017636 .12265 . 14378[.887]
LNGPROC .0037779 .023990 . 15748[.876]
LNPTP -.043190 .016287 -2.6518 [.014]
NAV -.9034E-7 .8061E-7 -1.1206[.274]
SPONREP .049233 .046415 1.0607[.300]
SSB .016164 .038721 ,41744[.680]
AUDREP .046654 .054277 .85956[.399]
SAUDREP -.024503 .11355 -.21579[.831 ]
BIGSTOCK .081738 .051744 1.5796[. 128]
CONST .43525 .21867 1.9904[.059]
Regression Results on Sub Sample of data - 1991-1992 (Adding Cost Variable)
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
Dependent variable is LNEXRTN
33 observations used for estimation from 1 to 33
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob]
RETD -.046241 .12077 -,38290[.705]
LNGPROC .0031977 .027645 . 11567[.909]
LNPTP -.047391 .018231 -2.5995[.016]
NAV -.1350E-6 .8113E-7 -1.6637[.l 10]
SPONREP .059827 .066486 ,89984[.378]
SSB .016268 .047941 .33934[.738]
AUDREP .049147 .053292 .92223[.366]
SAUDREP -.0057933 .11308 -,051232[.960]
BIG_STOCK -.074767 .12624 -,59228[.560]
COSTS .8701E-5 .6027E-5 1.4438[. 163]
CONST .48180 .23720 2.0312 [.054]
R-Squared .48972
S.E. of Regression . 10625
Mean ofDependent Variable .11145
Residual Sum of Squares .24837
Akaike Info. Criterion 22.8492
DW-statistic 2.2821
R-Bar-Squared .25778
F-Stat. F( 10, 22) 2.1114[.069]
S.D. of Dependent Variable .12333
Equation Log-likelihood 33.8492
Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 14.6184
Diagnostic Tests
* Test Statistics * LM Version * F Version
* * *
* A:Serial Correlation*CHSQ( 1)= 3.1613[.075]*F( 1,21)= 2.2249[.151]
* * *
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* B:Functional Form *CHSQ( 1)= ,026764[.870]*F( 1, 21)= .017046[.897]
* * *
* C:Normality *CHSQ( 2)= ,39799[.820]* Not applicable
* * *
* D:Heteroscedasticity*CHSQ( 1)= ,38376[.536]*F( 1,31)= ,36474[.550]
*********************************************************************
A:Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlation
B:Ramsey's RESET test using the square of the fitted values
C:Based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals
D:Based on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
Based on White's Heteroscedasticity adjusted S.E.'s
*********************************************************************
Dependent variable is LNEXRTN
33 observations used for estimation from 1 to 33
*********************************************************************
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob]
RETD -.046241 .14569 -.31738[.754]
LNGPROC .0031977 .024899 . 12842[.899]
LNPTP -.047391 .016295 -2.9082[.008]
NAV -.1350E-6 .8427E-7 -1.6016[. 124]
SPONREP .059827 .043926 1.3620[.187]
SSB .016268 .037248 .43676[.667]
AUDREP .049147 .055539 .88490[.3 86]
SAUDREP -.0057933 .094322 -.061420[.952]
B1GSTOCK -.074767 .10056 -.74349[.465]
COSTS .8701E-5 .3822E-5 2.2767[.033]
CONST .48180 .23829 2.0219[.056]
Regression Results on Sub Sample of data - 1993-1995
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
Dependent variable is LNEXRTN
127 observations used for estimation from 1 to 127
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob]
RETD .056441 .044614 1.2651 [.208]
LNGPROC .021226 .010694 1.9849[.049]
LNPTP .0042083 .0092633 .45430[.650]
NAV -. 1821E-6 .1553E-6 -1.1725 [.243]
SPONREP -.013950 .024695 -,56489[.573]
SSB -.0058828 .014971 -.39295 [.695]
AUDREP .0062186 .020807 .29888[.766]
SAUDREP -.0067331 .023649 -.28471 [.776]
BIGSTOCK .046736 .068994 .67738[.499]
CONST .20952 .082610 2.5362[.013]
R-Squared .10971
S.E. of Regression .082271
Mean of Dependent Variable .061613
Residual Sum of Squares .79192
Akaike Info. Criterion 132.2145
DW-statistic 1.7995
R-Bar-Squared .041225
F-Stat. F( 9,117) 1,6020[. 122]
S.D. of Dependent Variable .084022
Equation Log-likelihood 142.2145
Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 117.9936
Diagnostic Tests
* Test Statistics * LM Version * F Version
* * *
* A:Serial Correlation*CHSQ( 1)= 1.2237[.269]*F( 1,116)= 1.1286[.290]
* * *
* B:Functional Form *CHSQ( 1)= 5.7223[.017]*F( 1,116)= 5.4733[.021]
* * *
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* C:Normality *CHSQ( 2)= 47.6062[.000]* Not applicable
* * *
* D:Heteroscedasticity*CHSQ( 1)= 2.8737[.090]*F( 1,125)= 2.8939[.091]
A:Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlation
B:Ramsey's RESET test using the square of the fitted values
C: Based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals
D:Based on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
Based on White's Heteroscedasticity adjusted S.E.'s
Dependent variable is LNEXRTN
127 observations used for estimation from 1 to 127
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob]
RETD .056441 .042826 1.3179[. 190]
LNGPROC .021226 .013736 1.5453 [. 125]
LNPTP .0042083 .012078 .34843 [.728]
NAV -.1821E-6 .2006E-6 -.90761 [.366]
SPONREP -.013950 .029572 -.47173 [.63 8]
SSB -.0058828 .015003 -.39212[.696]
AUDREP .0062186 .014919 .41683 [.678]
SAUDREP -.0067331 .019849 -.33921 [.735]
BIGJ3TOCK .046736 .12552 .37233 [.710]
CONST .20952 .086160 2.4317[.017]
He*****************************************************************************
46
Regression Results on Sub Sample of data - 1993-1995 (Adding Cost Variable)
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
******************************************************************************
Dependent variable is LNEXRTN
127 observations used for estimation from 1 to 127
******************************************************************************
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob]
RETD .056999 .044333 1.2857[.201]
LNGPROC .019428 .010687 1.8179[.072]
LNPTP .0033590 .0092203 ,36430[.716]
NAV -.5383E-7 . 1744E-6 -,30875[.758]
SPONREP -.0086430 .024767 -,34896[.728]
SSB -.012340 .015427 -,79989[.425]
AUDREP .010839 .020880 .51908[.605]
SAUDREP .3892E-3 .023927 .016266[.987]
BIG_STOCK .081213 .071944 1.1288[.261]
COSTS -. 1042E-4 .6595E-5 -1.5 804[. 117]
CONST .20589 .082119 2.5072[.014]
$********:ic*:|c:|e:ie9|c:{c:ic:|c9|<************************
R-Squared .12847
S.E. of Regression .081750
Mean of Dependent Variable .061613
Residual Sum of Squares .77523
Akaike Info. Criterion 132.5673
R-Bar-Squared .053343
F-Stat. F( 10, 116) 1.7100[.086]
S.D. of Dependent Variable .084022
Equation Log-likelihood 143.5673
Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 116.9243
DW-statistic 1.7554
Diagnostic Tests
* Test Statistics * LM Version * F Version
* * *
* A:Serial Correlation*CHSQ( 1)= 1.8099[.179]*F( 1,115)= 1.6626[.200]
* * *
* B:Functional Form *CHSQ( 1)= 5.2605[.022]*F( 1,115)= 4.9693[.028]
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* * *
* C:Normality *CHSQ( 2)= 58.4483[.000]* Not applicable
* * *
* D:Heteroscedasticity*CHSQ( 1)= ,54269[.461]*F( 1, 125)= .53644[.465]
A:Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlation
BiRamsey's RESET test using the square of the fitted values
C:Based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals
D:Based on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
Based on White's Heteroscedasticity adjusted S.E.'s
Dependent variable is LNEXRTN
127 observations used for estimation from 1 to 127
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob]
RETD .056999 .042595 1.3382[.183]
LNGPROC .019428 .013438 1.4458[. 151]
LNPTP .0033590 .011865 .28310[.778]
NAV -.5383E-7 . 1531E-6 -.35158[.726]
SPONREP -.0086430 .029852 -,28953[.773]
SSB -.012340 .015406 -,80099[.425]
AUDREP .010839 .015192 .71342[.477]
SAUDREP .3892E-3 .019375 .020088[.984]
BIGSTOCK .081213 .11245 .72219[.472]
COSTS -. 1042E-4 .7893E-5 -1.3206[. 189]
CONST .20589 .084014 2.4507[.016]
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Regression results as Discussed in Chapter Eight
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
Dependent variable is ADJ1
175 observations used for estimation from 1 to 175
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob]
BIG -.031293 .12987 -,24096[.810]
MBO -.046261 .025673 -1.8019[.073]
PBV .3152E-3 .2454E-3 1.2843 [.201 ]
PSAL .4768E-4 .6059E-3 .078692[.937]
TURNOVER .7582E-7 .2188E-6 .34651 [.729]
NAV -.2537E-6 .2512E-6 -1.0096[.314]
PRE .1668E-5 .1863E-5 .89560[.372]
FUNDS 1253E-6 .4115E-6 -,30459[.761]
RETAINED .10893 .069959 1.5570[. 121]
CONST .031802 .043966 .72334[.470]
******************************************************************************
R-Squared .074531 R-Bar-Squared .024051
S.E. of Regress ion .15056 F-Stat. F( 9, 165) 1.4764[. 160]
Mean of Dependent Variable .078854 S.D. of Dependent Variable .15241
Residual Sum of Squares 3.7404 Equation Log-likelihood 88.1746





* Test Statistics * LM Version * F Version
* * *
* A:Serial Correlation*CHSQ( 1)= .70318[.402]*F( 1,164)= ,66164[.417]
* * *
* B:Functional Form *CHSQ( 1)= ,62452[.429]*F( 1,164)= ,58736[.445]
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* * *
* C:Normality *CHSQ( 2)= 609.9504[.000]* Not applicable
* * *
* D:Heteroscedasticity*CHSQ( 1)= 8.3473[.004]*F( 1, 173)= 8.6652[.004]
A:Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlation
BiRamsey's RESET test using the square of the fitted values
C:Based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals
D:Based on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
Based on White's Heteroscedasticity adjusted S.E.'s
Dependent variable is ADJ1
175 observations used for estimation from 1 to 175
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob]
BIG -.031293 .090561 -,34555[.730]
MBO -.046261 .023139 -1.9992[.047]
PBV .3152E-3 .3663E-3 .86055 [.391 ]
PSAL .4768E-4 .8924E-3 .053426[.957]
TURNOVER .7582E-7 .1384E-6 ,54767[.585]
NAV -.2537E-6 .1067E-6 -2.3776[.019]
PRE .1668E-5 .1515E-5 1.1016[.272]
FUNDS -. 1253E-6 .3932E-6 -.31871 [.750]
RETAINED .10893 .065798 1.6555[. 100]
CONST .031802 .034360 .92557[.356]
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Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
Dependent variable is ADJ5
175 observations used for estimation from I to 175
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob]
BIG -.089826 .12177 -,73766[.462]
MBO -.051795 .024073 -2.1516[.033]
PBV .4912E-3 .2301E-3 2.1346[.034]
PSAL .4864E-3 .5681E-3 .85621 [.393]
TURNOVER .8855E-7 .2052E-6 .43162[.667]
NAV -.2177E-6 .2356E-6 -.92411[.357]
PRE .1560E-5 .1747E-5 .89321 [.373]
FUNDS .3393E-7 .3858E-6 .087942[.930]
RETAINED .12878 .065599 1.9631 [.051]
CONST .019610 .041226 .47567[.635]
R-Squared .11418 R-Bar-Squared .065859
S.E. of Regression .14118 F-Stat. F( 9, 165) 2.3630[.015]
Mean of Dependent Variable .085453 S.D. of Dependent Variable .14607
Residual Sum of Squares 3.2887 Equation Log-likelihood 99.4365
Akaike Info. Criterion 89.4365 Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 73.6126
DW-statistic 1.9710
Diagnostic Tests
* Test Statistics * LM Version * F Version
* * *
* A:Serial Correlation*CHSQ( 1)= .010521 [.918]*F( 1, 164)= ,0098605[.921]
* * *
* B:Functional Form *CHSQ( 1)= .085512[.770]*F( 1, 164)= .080176[.777]
* * *
* C:Normality *CFISQ( 2)= 316.5164[.000]* Not applicable
* * *
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* D:Heteroscedasticity*CHSQ( 1)= 5.1857[.023]*F( 1,173)= 5.2830[.023]
A:Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlation
B:Ramsey's RESET test using the square of the fitted values
C: Based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals
D:Based on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
Based on White's Heteroscedasticity adjusted S.E.'s
Dependent variable is ADJ5
175 observations used for estimation from 1 to 175
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob]
BIG -.089826 .086436 -1.0392[.300]
MBO -.051795 .022075 -2.3463[.020]
PBV .4912E-3 .2719E-3 1.8068[.073]
PSAL .4864E-3 .9017E-3 .53944[.590]
TURNOVER .8855E-7 .1322E-6 ,67006[.504]
NAV -.2177E-6 .1148E-6 -1.8964[.060]
PRE .1560E-5 .1282E-5 1.2171 [.225]
FUNDS .3393E-7 .3037E-6 .11171 [.911]
RETAINED .12878 .056569 2.2765 [.024]
CONST .019610 .029741 .65935[.511]
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Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
Dependent variable is ADJ10
175 observations used for estimation from 1 to 175
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob]
BIG -.14512 .12827 -1.1314[.260]
MBO -.038324 .025358 -1.5113 [. 133]
PBV .5109E-3 .2424E-3 2.1073 [.037]
PSAL .6111E-3 .5984E-3 1.0212[.309]
TURNOVER .6537E-7 .2161E-6 .30246[.763]
NAV -.1147E-6 .2482E-6 -,46240[.644]
PRE .2017E-5 .1840E-5 1.0960[.275]
FUNDS .7066E-7 .4064E-6 . 173 85 [.862]
RETAINED .11892 .069101 1.7210[.087]
CONST .012521 .043426 .28832[.773]
sic******}!"!'*******************
R-Squared .094746 R-Bar-Squared .045369
S.E. of Regression .14872 F-Stat. F( 9, 165) 1.9188[.052]
Mean of Dependent Variable .080478 S.D. ofDependent Variable .15221
Residual Sum of Squares 3.6492 Equation Log-likelihood 90.3355
Akaike Info. Criterion 80.3355 Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 64.5116
DW-statistic 1.8908
Diagnostic Tests
* Test Statistics * LM Version * F Version
* * *
* A:Serial Correlation*CHSQ( 1)= ,46476[.495]*F( 1,164)= ,43671[.510]
* * *
* B:Functional Form *CHSQ( 1)= .028715[.865]*F( 1, 164)= .026914[.870]
* * *
* C:Normality *CHSQ( 2)= 210.4736[.000]* Not applicable
* * *
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* D:Heteroscedasticity*CHSQ( 1)= 5.1448[.023]*F( 1, 173)= 5.2400[.023]
AiLagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlation
B:Ramsey's RESET test using the square of the fitted values
C:Based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals
D:Based on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
Based on White's Heteroscedasticity adjusted S.E.'s
Dependent variable is ADJ10
175 observations used for estimation from 1 to 175
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob]
BIG -.14512 .096764 -1.4997[. 136]
MBO -.038324 .024025 -1.5952[.l 13]
PBV .5109E-3 .2636E-3 1.9384[.054]
PSAL .6111E-3 .0011624 ,52574[.600]
TURNOVER .6537E-7 .1286E-6 .50845[.612]
NAV 1147E-6 .1302E-6 -.88126[.379]
PRE .2017E-5 .1556E-5 1.2964[.197]
FUNDS .7066E-7 .3378E-6 .20915 [.83 5]
RETAINED .11892 .061727 1.9266[.056]
CONST .012521 .032487 .38540[.700]
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
Dependent variable is ADJ15
175 observations used for estimation from 1 to 175
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob]
BIG -.12889 .12345 -1.0441 [.298]
MBO -.033754 .024405 -1.3831 [.169]
PBV .4524E-3 .2333E-3 1.9389[.054]
PSAL .2377E-3 .5759E-3 .41280[.680]
TURNOVER .8453E-7 .2080E-6 .40640[.685]
NAV -.1065E-6 .2388E-6 -,44583[.656]
PRE .1637E-5 .1771E-5 .92439[.357]
FUNDS . 118E-6 .3911E-6 .28586[.775]
RETAINED .099429 .066504 1.4951 [-137]
CONST .023249 .041794 .55628[.579]
****************************
R-Squared .069900 R-Bar-Squared .019168
S.E. of Regression .14313 F-Stat. F( 9, 165) 1.3778[.202]
Mean of Dependent Variable .080461 S.D. of Dependent Variable .14452
Residual Sum of Squares 3.3801 Equation Log-likelihood 97.0390
Akaike Info. Criterion 87.0390 Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 71.2151
DW-statistic 1.9151
Diagnostic Tests
* Test Statistics * LM Version * F Version
* * *
* A:Serial Correlation*CHSQ( 1)= ,27007[.603]*F( 1,164)= ,25349[.615]
* * *
* B:Functional Form *CHSQ( 1)= ,75980[.383]*F( 1,164)= ,71515[.399]
* * *
* C:Normality *CHSQ( 2)= 209.9971[.000]* Not applicable
* * *
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* D:Heteroscedasticity*CHSQ( 1)= ! ,2992[.254]*F( 1,173)= 1.2939[.257]
A:Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlation
B:Ramsey's RESET test using the square of the fitted values
C:Based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals
D:Based on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
Based on White's Heteroscedasticity adjusted S.E.'s
Dependent variable is ADJ15
175 observations used for estimation from 1 to 175
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prol
BIG -.12889 .092285 -1.3967[. 164]
MBO -.033754 .024198 -1.3949[. 165]
PBV .4524E-3 .2251E-3 2.0092[.046]
PSAL .2377E-3 .8792E-3 ,27042[.787]
TURNOVER .8453E-7 .1326E-6 .63736[.525]
NAV -.1065E-6 . 1180E-6 -.90216[.368]
PRE .1637E-5 .1412E-5 1.1593 [.248]
FUNDS .1118E-6 .3298E-6 .33905[.735]
RETAINED .099429 .061058 1,6284[. 105]
CONST .023249 .033188 .70053[.485]
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Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
Dependent variable is ADJ20
175 observations used for estimation from 1 to 175
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob]
BIG -.16782 .13233 -1.2682[.207]
MBO -.033369 .026159 -1.2756[.204]
PBV .5951E-3 .2501E-3 2.3796[.018]
PSAL -.7680E-4 .6173E-3 -. 12440[.901j
TURNOVER .8269E-7 .2229E-6 .37088[.711]
NAV -.6680E-7 .2560E-6 -,26094[.794]
PRE . 1964E-5 .1898E-5 1.0345 [.302]
FUNDS .9900E-7 .4193E-6 .23612[.814]
RETAINED .10266 .071285 1.4402[.152]
CONST .024659 .044799 .55044[.583]
******************************************************************************
R-Squared .081125 R-Bar-Squared .031005
S.E. of Regression .15342 F-Stat. F( 9, 165) 1,6186[. 114]
Mean of Dependent Variable .083439 S.D. of Dependent Variable .15585
Residual Sum of Squares 3.8835 Equation Log-likelihood 84.8900
Akaike Info. Criterion 74.8900 Schwarz Bayesian Criterion 59.0661
DW-statistic 1.9708
Diagnostic Tests
* Test Statistics * LM Version * F Version
* * *
* A:Serial Correlation*CHSQ( 1)= .013358[.908]*F( 1,164)= ,012520[.911]
* * *
* B:Functional Form *CHSQ( 1)= ,59780[.439]*F( 1,164)= ,56214[.454]
* * *
* C:Normality *CHSQ( 2)= 165.9943[.000]* Not applicable
* D:Heteroscedasticity*CHSQ( 1)= ,28006[.597]*F( 1,173)= .27731 [.599]
A:Lagrange multiplier test of residual serial correlation
B:Ramsey's RESET test using the square of the fitted values
C: Based on a test of skewness and kurtosis of residuals
D: Based on the regression of squared residuals on squared fitted values
Ordinary Least Squares Estimation
Based on White's Heteroscedasticity adjusted S.E.'s
Dependent variable is ADJ20
175 observations used for estimation from 1 to 175
Regressor Coefficient Standard Error T-Ratio[Prob]
BIG -.16782 .089526 -1.8745 [.063]
MBO -.033369 .025149 -1.3268[. 186]
PBV .5951E-3 .1909E-3 3.1174[.002]
PSAL -.7680E-4 .0010727 -.071592[.943]
TURNOVER .8269E-7 .1461E-6 ,56584[.572]
NAV -.6680E-7 .1330E-6 -.50210[.616]
PRE .1964E-5 .1358E-5 1.4458[. 150]
FUNDS .9900E-7 .3379E-6 .29301 [.770]
RETAINED .10266 .065777 1,5608[. 120]
CONST .024659 .036022 ,68456[.495]
